Modern education in the Sudan, 1898-1965 by Mohammad, N.E.S.
MODERN EDUCATION IN THE SUDAN,
1898-1965.
by
Naair El Seed Mohammad
Thesis presented
Doctor of Philosophy,











EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN 25
CHAPTER III
MISSIONARY EDUCATION IN THE NORTH 10i|
CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:
PROM THE REC ONQUEST TO THE DE LA WARR
COMMISSION 165
CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:





This work traces the close association between
education and political events in modern Sudan from the
establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in 1898
to just before the end of the first decade after Independence
in 1965. It examines their mutual influence, through Government
policies, both colonial and national, through European Christian
Missionary activities in the Southern and Northern parts of the
Sudan, and through the activities and growth of an educated
elite movement emanating from the Gordon College, w.iich later
on became the University of Khartoum, and the educational
institutions associated with it. The thesis discusses the
educational problems and ideas thrown up during this formative
period.
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When the armies of Mohammad 'Ali1 conquered the
Northern Sudan in 1821 nothing spectacular was added as far as
education was concerned. The identification of the country with
what was going on in the Moslem World was already complete. Arab
culture and Moslem religion had been predominant in the Northern
Sudan since the 16th century, Sufi Tariqas were widespread, and the
caravan routes to West, North, Africa and the Red Sea formed strong
links with and for peoples going to and from the Hajj, just as the
p
Nile had been a permanent link with Egypt from times immemorial.
Mohammad 'Ali and his successors, during the Turkiyya
continued to give subventions in various forms to mosques and
khalwas which were scattered in the country. The movement of
Sudanese students to al-Azhar increased in this epoch due to the
increased safety for travellers and the general movement between
Egypt and the Sudan. This was indicated by the establishment of
the "Sennariyya-5 Riwaq," a student hostel set up at al-Azhar in
1. Mohammad 'Ali was the ruler of Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman
Sultan at the time.
2. P.L. Shinnie, Meroe, A Civilisation of the Sudan, London, 1967,
P. 13.
3. Turkiyya in Sudanese history means the period between 1821-1883
when Sudan was under Turkish rule, through the ruler of Egypt.
J+. 'Abd-al- 'Aziz Amln 'Abd-al-Majld, Al-tarbiya fl s-Sudan fi-1-
qarn at-tasi' 'ashar, Cairo, 191^.9, Vol. II, p. 16.
5. Sennar was the capital of the Punj Kingdom which existed in Sudan
before the conquest of Mohammad 'Ali. Sennariyya means 'of
Sennar* or that Kingdom which was the equivalent of a 'modern
Sudanese' as the Sudan with its present boundaries is the product
of the Conquests that took place during the time of Mohammad 'Ali
and his successors.
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18*4.6. This raised the number of Sudanese students hostels at
al-Azhar to three, as there had already been one hostel for students
from Dar-Fur, in the Western Sudan, and another one for the Nubians
who came from the moat southerly part of Egypt and the most
Northerly of the Sudan.1 It is interesting to note that before
the Sennariyya Biwaq came into being there were twenty-two hostels
at al-Azhar for students coming from different parts of the Moslem
world.2
The Sennariyya Riwmq cam# into being after a certain
Sudanese student Mohammad 'Ali Wide'a arrived in Cairo in the year
1253 (A.H.) to study at al-Azhar. He found six other students who
had preceded him there. They presented a petition to Moqammad 'Ali
asking for the arrangement of a ration of bread to be issued to them.
The approval was given five years later in 1256 A.H. Then vidi'a
and his colleagues, who might have Increased by the®, again petitioned
Mohammad *Ali asking this time for a hostel. Mohammad 'Alifs
answer to his Secretary of Finance was, "My will has decided the
buying of a new place and its allocation for the mujawirin from
Sennar.
Besides the traditional religious education, three
attempts were made during the Turco-Egyptian period to introduce
modern education in the Sudan. The first attempt was during the
1. 'Abd-al-MaJld, Vol. II, p. 20.
2. 'Abd-al-Ma.lid, Vol. II, p. 19.
—— 3. Mujawir means a temporary neighbour.
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visit of Mohammad 'All to the Sudan in 1838-39 when he advised
Sudanese notables about the use of improving their agricultural
knowledge.* He suggested that they should send to hira some of
their sons to be instructed in the modern agricultural techniques
that were available in Egypt at the time. He assured them that he
would send them to schools there and consider them as his own
children.
After he had returned, six sons of Sudanese notables
arrived in Cairo. Mohammad 'All ordered that they be given
special treatment, and allotted a servant to attend to them, though
normally there was a servant for every ten students at the school.
He also ordered that the six Sudanese students should not be
separated. !^e are not told how old these students were or what
was their previous attainment. But we are told that the programme
outlined by Mohamad 'All for them was that they should be well
taught in reading and writing and when they had accomplished that
they should be taught the science of agriculture. Mohammad 'All
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also ordered that he should be informed about what happened to them.
The secondary school to which the Sudanese students
were sent in 1839 had been opened in Egypt in 1825. It was meant
to prepare students for medicine, engineering, the infantry, the
cavalry, and the navy, as well as for further specialisation in some
oriental and occidental languages.The school, one of two in
1. 'Abd-al-Majld, Vol. II, p. 16.
2. Ibid.
3. Ahmad 'laaat 'Abd-al-Xarlm, Ta'rlkh at-Ta'ILn fl *Asr Mohammad
'All, Cairo, 193&, P. 225. " *
Egypt at the time, used to receive its students from amongst those
who had got their initial education at the "maicatib", the indigenous
Egyptian Islamic Schools where they had learnt the Qur'an by heart
and the reading of some elementary Ashar books on religion and
Arabic grammar, besides the elementary principles of arithmetic
and handwriting. The background of the students made the Job of
the school particularly difficult as they had to be prepared within
four or five years for the specialised schools.
At the secondary school the students were given
courses In Arabic, Turkish, arithmetic, algebra and geometry,
together with history, geography, handwriting and drawing. The
Sovemraent of Mohammad *Ali paid great attention to the students
of the secondary schools as they were intended for his policy of
modernisation. They were privileged with the facilities of
sleeping on beds in their hostels and of sitting on chairs and at
desks in their classrooms. They were also provided with vegetables
and meat for their daily food and were fed and dressed along
European lines. The enumeration of these privileges would help
to reflect the austerity of life for the students at al-Ashar and
the similar, though minor, indigenous centres of Moslem education.
The school of agriculture for which Mohammad 'All
suggested that the Sudanese students should be prepared, was one
of the specialised schools to which Egyptian students who finished
their secondary education were intended to go. Mohammad 'All
was very interested in this school and used to pay personal visits
to watch its development and to salveIthe problems that were facing
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it In its early stages. He had high hopes of modernising
agriculture in Egypt, and probably in the Sudan too, through that
school. The course of study at the school was three years during
which the students were taught liberal subjects such as geography
and history of philosophy in addition to public health, chemistry
and the agricultural subjects.3,
Rifa'a al-^ahtjawl, who was the head of the School of
Languages at Cairo, "Madrasat al Alsun", mentioned that after the
school of agriculture, the group of Sudanese students were trans¬
ferred to the school of languages. The purpose of that, according
to Rifa 4a, was "to enable them to get the taste of the civilising
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knowledge so that they may spread it In their country." He re¬
collected some of these students when he saw them later on at
Khartoum, working as clerks in the offices of the province. There
are no available sources to show that the first attempt by Mohammad
4Ali was followed by any other similar enterprise during his life¬
time and it was the lot of Rifa 'a to carry on the second attempt in
the Sudan after the death of Mohammad 'All.
Rifa 3a -as a leading Egyptian scholar and intellectual,
who studied and taught at al-Ashar before he was sent to France vy
Mohammad 'Alt. After his return he was well received by Mohammad
'All and his son Ibrahim Pasha and assigned the task of making
translations. Eventually he was permitted to establish and direct
1. Ibid., p. 351.
2. Rifa 'a Hafi * al~^aht}awl, Hanahi j al-'aXbab al-mi^rlyya fl mabahlj
al~adab al-'asriyya. Cairo, 1912, p. 263.
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the School of Languages, a higher school op college, where many
European books were translated on different subjects in arts and
sciences. The modernising ideas of Rifa'a, which impressed, and
were encouraged by rfoijaaimad 'All, were not to the taste of his
son and successor the Khedive 'Abbas the First. 'Abbas went down
into history as a reactionary and a set enemy of modernisation who
started closing down the modern schools in Egypt.'1,
Paradoxically enough it was 'Abbas who decided in
lbpO to open the first modern school in the Sudan for which he
chose no lesser a man than Hufa'a ai-fahtawi. It looked more of
a cynical act of exile than a real concern about the welfare of the
Sudan or a mask of recognition fo** iiifa'a and his distinguished
colleagues. However, the official reason was given in a letter
froia the Khedive*s Court to the department of Schools stating that
"the private council of the Khedive has decided that a school
shall be established in the Sudanese territories to save the children
of their inhabitants and residents from the hell of ignorance, so
that they may be distinguished by their acquisition of the sciences
and knowledge. Two hundred and fifty boys shall b® accepted and
registered at the school. The Council also preferred that Hifa's
Bey should be appointed headmaster of the school ... "
Eleven teachers and a physician were chosen to accompany
Rifa'a on his mission. Amongst them was Lietttenant Colonel Mohammad
Bayyumi Afandi, one of the moat senior teachers in the School of
1. 'Abd-al-MaJld. Vol. II, pp. 3-8.
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Engineering who was also the head or the department for the
translation of mathematical works in the School of Languages as
well as the inspector of mathematics for the country# Bayyumi
was sent to France in 1826, at the age of seventeen, where he
studied for nine years during which he specialised in hydraulics.
After his return in 1835 he was appointed assistant to the chief
engineer of Irrigation at the ^anaifir and besides had a teaching
post and translated books on surveying, algebra, trigonometry,
mechanics and weights, logarithms and coal.* Bsyyumi died two
years after his arrival in Khartoum.
Another man who was selected to go with Blfa'e to
Khartoum was Captain Aljmad ^a'il, who also studied for six years
in France I83S-36 and after his return was appointed assistant to
Bayyumi. The others were young men of junior officer ranks, a
first lieutenant and four second lieutenants who were probably
Hlfa*a*s and Bayyuai's pupils and assistants at the schools of
languages and engineering. The army titles indicate the military
nature of modern education in Egypt at the time of Mohammad 'All.
Three teachers fro® al-Aahar were selected to accompany
them, one of fchom, Sheikh Kajab, went into hiding immediately after
he heard of his nomination to Khartoum and when he was not found a
2
Sheikh Makkawi was chosen to replace him. So when Rifa 'a went to
Khartoum with ten teachers and a physician, five of his colleagues,
Bsyyumi, Parghali, Mural, Othman, and the physician Sail® Afandi al
1. Ibid., p. 28,
itid., pp.30-33.
e
Hakim, died within the first two years of their stay in Khartoum.
They were replaced by five others from Cairo and Rifa *e was urged
to do his beat at the school.*
Rifa 'a was not keen on the school as he was clear In
his mind about the purpose of his presence In Khartoum. To him
it was exile because of the malicious connivance of his opponents
at the Khedive's Court in Cairo. Hor did the Governor General
at the time, Isma'II Abu-Jabal Pasha, see anything in opening
the school except an excess of expenditure which ought to be
avoided or kept to the minimum.-* So he gave away to the arny
garrisons the provisions that were sent from Cairo for the school.
Rifa 'a who was too frustrated to take an interest in the school,
agreed to this, as even his salary st Cairo was frozen during the
four years of his stay In Sudan under the pretext that the
inventory and checking of the Library of European books in his
former school of language# at Cairo was yet not completed.
The news of the transferrence of the school provisions
to the garrisons was taken up by the Schools Department in Cairo
who wrote to Rifa 'a rebuking him and also to the governor asking
him to restore the provisions to the school. Rifa'a was also
asked to report on the progress of the school as the Khedive was
Interested in its opening.4 So Rifa'a reported that "most of the
1. Rifa 'a, Manahlj al-'albab, p. 265*
2. lama *Il Abu Jabal Pasha was Governor General from Ramadan 1268
A.M. to 16th Rajab 1269 A.M.
3. 'Abd-al-MaJld, Vol. II, p. 33.
J+. Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 30, letter dated 3 Shawwal 1268 A.H.
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pupils escape to the distant hills where it is difficult to ^et
then back. Besides they ar® stupid ana since the death of the
three teachers the school became a name without any reality."*
In accordance with the frequent changes of Governor-
General© in Sudan during the Turkiyya, a new Governor General, Sella
Fasha £a*ib^ was appointed to succeed lama'll Abu~Jaba.l Pasha.
The new Governor General was in favour of opening the school in
accordance with the instructions from Cairo. So two months after
he had arrived from kgypt to take his office at Khartoum, he sent
a letter to the Khedive informing him of the opening of the school
and asked for sobs© supplies including paper, European suits of
slothes, kitchen utensils for 230 pupils and a ration of rice for
a whole year.^
According to Hifa'm the number of pupils was thirty-one
at the beginning and it increased by seven more after six weeka
from the opening.*4" lUfa'a reported this to the Department of
Schools in Cairo, told fchera that good efforts were being made to¬
wards the teaching of the pupils and that by the end of the school
year in the month of Sha 'bin 1270 an examination would be held at
the school in the presence of the learned notables. He also
ordered some books on Turkish language, Arabic grammar and
1. Ibid letter 1st Sha'ban 1268.
2. Sallia Pashe Sa'ib, Governor General 16th Kajab 1269 A.H. -
Jumada al-'Ula 1270 A.H.
3. Letter dated 7th Shawwil 1269, 'Abd-ajMailci. Vol, II, p. 33.
4. Letter dated 11th Habi * al-'Awwal 1270 A.H.
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morphology, and mathematics, which were used in the Egyptian schools.
Rifa'a also saw promising signs of intelligence in ten of the pupils
so he assigned them the duty of learning the Qur'an by heart, and
more Arabic grammar, Turkish vocabulary and handwriting. This
increased attention was to prepare them to assist in the teaching
of their fellows.'*'
The examination was held in Sha'ban 1270 A.H. and was
attended by the Governor General, some notables, the judge, 'ulama
and senior Government officials. The result of the examination was
2
sent to Cairo and new books were ordered for the school. But
before the second year of the school had started the Khedive 'Abbas
died in Jairo and was succeeded by Sa'Id Pasha-^ who in the first
week of his reigi ordered the Governor General to close down the
school and send Rifa'a to Cairo. Rifa'a returned to Cairo
carrying with him from the Governor General at Khartoum to the
Khedive in Cairo one thousand six hundred and twenty five pieces
of gold from the treasury of Khartoum.^" In spite of the
cancellation of the school, and for a few months after, correspondence
was still going on between Government departments in Cairo about
the supplies needed for the school at Khartoum. This was finally
closed down by a letter from the KhediveSt Court to the effect that
1. Ibid., p. 34.
2. Ibid.
3. 'Abd-al-Majld, Sa'Id Pasha was Khedive from Shawwal 1270 to Rajab
1279, July 163Wan. I863. Vol. II, p. 36.
Ibi^«* letter dated 6 Dhi-al-Hajja 1270.
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"since that school did not produce any result and the mentioned
Bey (Rifa'a) had arrived in Cairo it would be better to use the
supplies intended for the school in a more fruitful way.""''
A few years later Rifa'a was delighted to record
that some of the pupils who started in his school at Khartoum were
able to be teachers in the five schools that were opened in the
Sudan during the reign of Isma'il. Rifa a predicted that the
five schools would succeed more than his school because they v^ere
founded on well meaning motives and good intentions of the Khedive
Isma'il. Rifa'a thought that Sudan had all the potentialities
of being the identical twin of Egypt in progress and development
once it got rid of *the causes of disease* and came under good
and enlightened administration. He envisaged the dawn of this
development in the five schools, in the project of the railway line
to the port of Sawakin and in the expeditions for the exploration
"5
of the sources of the Nile.
The story of the five schools goes back to the time
of Sa'Id, the predecessor of Isma'Il. The Governor General of the
Sudan Musa Hamdl Pasha^" wrote a memorandum to the Khedive Sa'Id
asking his permission for the training of the sons of the Sudanese
inhabitants and chiefs in the offices of the Government in the Sudan.
They were to be trained in the clerical, accounting and other office
1. Ibid., letter dated 5 §afar 1271 A.H.
2. Isma'Il grandson of Mohamad 'Ali Pasha was Khedive 18th Jan.
l863-26th June, 1879.
3. Rifa'a, Manahij al-'albab, p. 280.
Musa Hamdl Pasha Governor General k Safar 1279 A.H. - 8 Shawwal
1281.
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Jobs so that they would master these arts In a short time. Some
of them would then be selected as Sudanese clerks Instead of the
Egyptian clerks as the later would coat a lot of money in their
salaries and their transportation to the Sudan. Also the
difference in the oliraate would not always agree with their health.
Muss Head? Pasha suggested that the Sudanese boys who would be
trained under this scheme should be given between thirty to seventy
five piastres.1 The memorandum indicated the need for a certain
degree of participation of the Sudanese in the bureaucratic
machinery of the Turoo-Bgyptlan administration.
Two months after the memorandum had been written
Isrna *Il came to power, and a month later he wrote to Muse Haasdl
Pasha, explaining his policy towards his subjects in the Sudan.
Iama'II stated that the spread of civilisation and welfare to¬
gether with good citisenship and development were amongst nls
greatest hopes. This, he realised, necessitated the dissemin¬
ation of learning amongst the people so that they would be
•cultivated in the love of the homeland and in the eagerness to
obtain distinction and progress in the sciences and the arts.1
Therefore lama '11 thought it was important to set up s school at
Khartoum where able teachers of Arabic and Turkish should be
provided to teach a number of five hundred students from the
B Inhabitants of those territories.B
laroa'Il urged his Governor General to pay his best
attention towards the organisation of the school and to work out
1. «Abd-al-Ma.1?d, Letter dated 25 Juaadi al '01a 1279 A.H.,
Vol. II, p. 72.
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what should be taught In It 'according to what was appropriate
to the attainment of the indicated objectives*. The necessary
persuasion and enoouragement should b© shown to the inhabitants so
that they would look forward towards 'the gathering of the fruits
of civilisation*. The Governor General was assured that if he
did not have the required teaohers at Khartoum he could order
them from Cairo. He was also told that if he considered that
the conditions in the Sudan needed two schools instead of one then
two would be provided.*
Hues ^arndl Pasha wrote to the Khedive saying that he
would begin to train, in the offices of Khartoum and the provinces,
those who had already learnt reading and writing and if possible
studied the Our'in by heart. They would be from amongst the sons
of the chiefs and inhabitants and of the Turk®. Thus he found a
ahence to implement his earlier proposal. As for the schools he
thought that as the Sudan was so vast and extensive the opening of
one or two schools would mean that the people in one part were
likely to enjoy "the fruits of civilisation" while their fellows
in the other provinces would nave no opportunity. Instead, he
suggested that five schools should be opened, one in each of the
provinces of Khartoum, Berber, Dongola, Kordofan, and Take. The
total number of students could still be five hundred. Should this
fa© done, the Governor General assured the Khedive, all the Inhabitants
would wish to educate their sons and "reap the harvests of
p
civilisation and progress?."
1* 'Abd-ai-HajXd. letter dated 6th Sha'bln. 1279 A.H., Vol. II, p. 72.
2. 'Abd-al-Ma.lId. letter dated Ramadan 1279 A«H» $ 7ol#lI| p»731*
the Khedive gave his approval to the scheme of the
Governor General* arid the latter embarked on carrying it out.
He arranged for two hundred students at the Khartoum School and
for seventy-five pupils at each of the other four schools. He
managed to recruit locally the masters needed for the teaching of
Arabic and the Our*an, what he needed from Cairo was five teachers
of Turkish, one for each school. He preferred them to be knowledg¬
eable, besides Turkish, in Arabic Grammar and the two types of
Arabic caligraphy "Thulth" and ,fHiq'a". He also asked for 351
copies from 13 Arabic textbooks on grammar. The oudget for the
2
five schools was estimated to be 19906 piastres per month.
The Departs*® t of Schools in Cairo was asked to
provide the teachers and the books required for the Sudan.* Some
of the books were found in stock and the rest were bought from the
bookshops in Cairo.^ The five teachers were also appointed^ at
the salary of one thousand piastres per month.^ The Treasury was
notified, by the Khedive*e office, of the appointment of the
teachers arid their salaries and was asked to arrange for their
transportation accompanied by the books and to charge the expenses
against the budget of the Sudan.^
1. Ibid., letter dated 10th Dhu ai-Qa'ide 1279 A.H.
2. Ibid., letter dated 2,3rd Huharram 1289 A.H. Vol. II, p. 7k*
3. Ibid.. letter dated 9th Rabi '-al-Thanl 1280 A.H.
4. ibid., letter dated 23rd Rabi '-al-Thanl 1280 A.H.
5. Ibid., letter dated 5th Rabi '-al-Thanl 1280 A.H.
6. Ibid., letter dated 23rd Rabi '-al-Thanl 1280 A.H.
?• 'Abd-al-Halid, letter dated 14th Jumada al- 'Awwal 1280 A.H.,
Vol. II, p. 74.
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Two years later two of the Turkish teachers were
reported to the Khedive by the Governor of Berber and Dongola to
be negligent of their duties. The teacher of Turkish at Dengola,
who was also the headmaster of the school, was described as
inattentive to teaching his subject and busy with fishing. The
other one at Berber, "though paid one thousand piastres a month"
produced no result at all. Although he was reminded several times
to give more attention to his work, that, the Governor said, was
to no avail. The Governor recommended that both of them be
dismissed. He thought it was sufficient to keep :he teachers of
- 1
Arabic and the Qnr * an at the two schools. The Khedive concurred
with the Governor and thought it was sufficient to teach the
rudiments of Arabic grammar and of mathematics to the pupils at the
2
two schools.
*hether the harsh recommendation of the Governor was
due to the persistent negligence on the part of the eachera or to
some other reason is hazardous to guess. However it made it
clear that the Inspection of the schools was the prerogative of
the Governor of the Province who communicated directly with the
Khedive. The Governor in his letter complained that when he
visited the school at Dongola he found some of the students were
at the ages of twenty to thirty yet they did not know •anything*
in Arabic grammar or Turkish and they could only understand some
Arabia. He chose fifty-five of these and recruited them for a
1. Ibid,, Letter dated 27th Hama4~"«n» Vol. II, p. 84.
2. Ibid.
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special battalion he wanted to form.1 The linguistic difficulties
of the students at Dangola could be due to the fact that the mother
2
tongue of the original inhabitants, the Dongolawis, was not Arabic.
If Turkish ma also explained to them in Arabic, as it possibly
was, then they were likely to find it much more difficult. The
situation seemed to be different in the other schools as a few
years later favourable reports were received.
On the 13 h June 1870 the Governor General, Ja'far
Pasha Mather, reported to the Khedive Isma'Il that the pupils at
the Government schools that were founded seven years before had
made remarkable progress. Some of them were selected to train
for future posts in the telegraph service, some were appointed
to clerical Jobs at various departments and others were training
in engineering.1 The Khedive was delighted with the news which
meant to hia that ^knowledge was spreading in the Sudanese
territories and that the inhabitants were being ushered into the
threshold of civilisation and that was amongst his greatest hopes.*
He considered it an achievement and a result of the good endsavours
of the teachers, the excellent supervision of the headmasters and
the much appreciated help of the Governor General.^
So the Khedive approved the Governor General's
1. *Abd-al~Kajid. Letter dated 27th Saaa^in 1262, Vol. II, p. bk»
2. C.H. Armbruster, I on.^olese Kublan Alexlcon, Cambridge, 1965.
3. 'Abd-al~Ma jid. Letter dated Ihth Rabi '-al- 'Awwal 1287 A.H.,
Vol. II, p. 82.
i+. lb id., letter dated 18th Rabl'u al-'Awwal 1287 A.H. Also,
RTchard Hill, A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-EgyptIan
Sudan, London 1951, pp. l6l-90. " ~~
1?
recoramendations of increasing the parents of each of the head¬
masters by a hundred piastre®, and of adjusting the salaries of
the fceaohera from three hundred to five hundred piastres according
1 2
to status and ability. An Ardab of dhura was also sanctioned
as a monthly allowance for each of the former mid the latter. The
Governor General was asked to convey to them the delight of the
Khedive at their work and that If they continued their good efforts
towards the execution of his instructions he would continue to
bestow his rewards and his good attention upon them.
The good gestures and keen interest of Isma *Il
encouraged the Governor General to send a further report five
months later. The pupils wh had been selected for the telegraph
school finished their training in three months time and were
posted at the stations that needed them. The Governor General
also intimated his intention to select about twenty students to
be taught mathematics and engineering for some time before they
were attached, to the Government steamers. There they would be
trained for the jobs of future steamer engineers. Furthermore
the country needed physicians as tl © few who were there grew old
and almost disabled. Ten doctors had been asked for from Cairo
but the Council of Health there did not even agree to approve that
small number.
1, 196 litres
2. Dhura is Sorghum, a crop, which is used as a staple diet in Sudan.
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So to solve his problem the Governor General selected
twenty students to study the scienoes of medicine and pharmacy. The
job was made easier, he told the Khedive, because of the presence
of Lieutenant Muhammad Sukkarl the physician of the General
Hospital at Khartoum. He had undertaken to teach the students
daily, using European and Arabic textbooks of medicine, and would
do his beat so that they could be prepaired in a short time.
Sukkari himself had studied medicine in France and the physicians
at Khartoum confirmed that he was fully qualified to undertake
the Job.
Eh© Khedive, though he appreciated the enthusiasm of
his Governor General, drew his attention to the fact that the
physicians arid the pharmacists who would be entrusted with health
ma iters should be skilful and proficient In their profession.1
As he assumed the Governor General realised It would not be possible
to prepare such qualified people in a short time, the Khedive
decided that the doctors needed for the *hadan should be selected
and sent soon. The Governor General was satisfied with the
Xhedive's Idea and arrangement and hoped that the physicians he
was about to receive would be proficient and sufficient. As for
the Sudanese students, who had already started their studies, two
months before the reply of the Khedive, the Governor General hoped
that they would be able to learn the basic principles of medicine
and how to administer vaccination in a short period which would
2
not be more than one year.
1. 'Abd-al-Hajld, Letter dated 23rd Ghawwal 1287 A.H. Vol. II, p. 8,3*
2. Ibid., Letter dated Ghayat Dhll-Hajja 1267 A.H.
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>'jh©n in 1871 the Khedive lensa #Il recalled Ja'far
Paaua Ha$har to Cairo and suppressed the office of Governor General,
he appointed Mumtas Pasha over the combined governates of Khartoum,
Sennar, The White Kile and Fasughli.1
''tuiatas Pasha was well known for his enthusiasm for the
cultivation of cotton in the Sudan. Large quantities of cotton
were badly needed by tine Khedive to offset the repercussions of
lower prices far the Egyptian cotton after the end of the American
Civil War.^ Immediately Murafciz Pasha succeeded his rival, he
suggested to the Khedive that a hundred young men should be
selected from amongst the students at the Khartoum School and
others so that they might be sent to Cairo to be trained at the
schools of mechanical and agricultural engineering. Afterwards
they could be distributed to work at the cotton ginning and
compressing machines in the different parts of the Sudan.-'1
The Khedive laraa'fl was impressed by the idea >f
Mumtaz. He gave him hie approval and hoped that the young men
would be brilliant and capable enough to benefit from the training.1*
The Khedive also gave his orders to the Ministry of the Interior in
Egypt to make the necessary arrangements for the Sudanese students
c
when they had arrived. The orders were carried out through the
1. R. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, pp. 37-38.
2. H. Hill, in the Sudan, XbEO-lool, p. lip.
3» *Abd-al-'Iajld, Letter dated 13th Shawwsl 1288 A.H. Vol. II, p.6i+.
U. Ibid., Letter dated 25th Dhil-Hajja 1268 A.H. p. 05.
5« Ibid., Letter dated as above.
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Department of Schools which made the required allocation of the
students to the appropriate achools in Cairo and Alexandria.'"
The need for more staff increased with the expansion
of the territories under Government control. It was during the
reign of the Khedive lama *Ii that the conquest of Bar-Fur and
2
Equator!a was completed. The Governor Generals in The Sudan
realised the expanding needs of their administration and for local
recruits. The need for telegraph communication was felt necessary
both by the Khedive Isma'Tl in Cairo and the Governor Generals at
Khartoum.-' So when two schools were asked for, one at Khartoum
and the other at Ksssala, to train telegraphists for the developing
services,^ the Khedive gave his approval.-* Besides telegraphists,
the need was also felt for clerks and accountants as most of those
brought from Egypt and sent to the outposts in the Sudan found out
that it did not agree with thera.
To solve the problem of the shortage of clerks and
accountants the Governor General suggested to the Khedive that four
or five capable clerks Mho were also well versed in accountancy
should be sent to Khartoum to undertake the task of training
Sudanese students. When the latter were trained they would be
1. ibid., Letter dated 26th Rabi'-al-Thanl, 1269 A.if.
2. R. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 182. R. Hill, Egypt in
the Sudan," London, 1959, pp. '1.36-162.
3. R. Hill, Jjgggt in the Sudan, pp. I3O-I33.
U- 'Abd-al-Ma.jid, Letter dated 28 £afar 1291 A. a. , Vol. II, p. 87.
3. Ibid.. Letter dated 3 Habi '-el-ThanI 1291, A.If.
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I
posted to the various districts of the country. The proposal
p
■was endorsed and the required clerks were sent to the yudan.
The same need was felt in the field of medicine. During the two
weeks when Isam *Il was deposed as Khedive and replaced by his sen
Tawflq,^ Al-¥aqa*ll *-al-Mlqrlyya publishers report that a
pharmacist, whom it described as fully knowledgeable in the field
was appointed to teach his subject at a medical school that was
opened at Khartoum. He was also appointed senior pharmacologist of
the whole 'hidan. The medical school referred to was probably a
eont inuatIon of the former project started by Ja'far Pasha Ma§har
which was Intended at first for the training of local doctors who
were eventually reduced, after the intervention of the Khedive, to
train as medical assistants.
The deposition of Isma'Il, after what was considered
an extravagant policy that Involved Egypt in huge debts,3 had its
effect on Sudan. After the reign of Isma'Il the heavy taxation
Imposed m the Sudanese and the accompanying ruthlessness in its
collection that had characterised the Turco-Egyptian period
continued as before.^ No schools were opened after Isaia *Il, but
none of the already existing schools was reported to have been
1. Ibid., Letter dated 7 Ehawwal 1293 A.H., p. 88.
2. Ibid.. Letter dated 12 Shawwal 1293 A.H. (38th October 1876).
3. Ibid., TawfIq was officially inaugurated 18th August 1680, p.90.
L* Al-Vaga/i '-al-Mlssriyya, 23 Sha 'ban 1396 A.H. (11th August 1679).
3. Cromer, Modern hgypt, Vol. I, pp. 128-146.
*Abd-al-Ha jid, Letter dated 29th Sha'ban 1290 A.H. Vol. II,
pp. 86-67.
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closed. Schools were reported to be functioning at Khartoum,
El Obeid, Sennar, Berber, and Savakin.
At the Khartoum school, where the headmaster was once
a former chief qa^l °f Gar-Fur province, French was taught besides
Arabic arid Turkish. The students were between eighteen to twenty
years of age and the fees were sixteen piastres monthly if the
student was a day student. Nothing is said of how much a boarding
student cost but it was reported that boarding students were
treated along military lines. The annual examination at the
Khartoum school was a ceremonial occasion attended by the Governor
General, ha'uf Paaha at the time, in whose praise and that of the
Khedive specially composed poems were recited and the royal anthem
was played. Senior Government officials took part in examining
the students while coffee, refreshments and rich food were served
to the examiners during the examination days,"* reminiscent of the
examination procedure at the ephemeral school started by Sifa'a
al-^ah^awl twenty-seven years before.
A similar examination ceremony was reported to have
taken place at the Berber School waere the headmaster was also the
teacher of Arabic. Recitation, composition of Arabic poetry,
aritnmetlc, theology and handwriting were amongst the subjects of
2
the oral and written examinations. The result of the
examination was sent to the Governor General at Khartoum, who
1. AI- aqa*i '-al-Hiqriyya No. 931 dated 2i+ Shawwal 1297, A. H.
'Abd-al-Majld. Vol. XI, p. 66.
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nominated the best ten students to be trained for clerical job3
in the Government offices. Their former colleagues at Berber
school who had also spent three years at the school had been
appointed by that time to the telegraph department.
The schools continued until the outbreak of the
Mahdist revolution and the fall of their towns into the hands of
the rebels. Some of the teachers were killed in the fighting and
some fled the country'*' during the disturbances. The schools were
either destroyed or fell into disuse together with the Turkish
administration they were intended to serve. However some of the
telegraphists were made use of by the Mahdist state to operate what
remained of the telegraph system, namely the line between Khartoum
2
and Omdurman. Some of the accountants, the clerks and the
artisans were given some relevant work to do for the Khalifa and
his administration. So while the products of those schools and
the training they had received during the Turkiyya was made of
some use during the Mahdiyya, the schools themselves were dis¬
continued and fell into oblivion.
Those government schools, and fcr that matter the much
less well-known schools which were attached to the Catholic
Christian missions in the Sudan,^ did not play a major part in the
life of the Sudan. Their only role might have been in helping to
introduce a limited degree of modernization such as in the use of
1. 'Abd-al-Majid, Vol. II, p. 91*..
2. P.M. Holt, "Modernization and Reaction in the Nineteenth Century
Sudan" Published in William R. Polk and Richard Chambers, eds..
Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle Bast, Chicago, 1968, .
p. l^l'
3. *Abd-al-Ma,1 id, Vol. II, pp. 105-llU. Below Ch. Ill, p.108.
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the telegraph, or in providing a number of artisans for cotton-
ginning, steamers, the medical service and in providing for a
certain degree of Sudanisation in the civil service particularly
in the lower echelons under the Turkish or Egyptian overlords.
The smallness of their number, the shortness of the
period of their stay at the schools where they came fully grown
from longer periods at the Khalwas, their scattered stations after
training or perhaps the very nature of what was taught to them
might account for the inconspicuousness of their place in the
history of that era. One might seek an explanation in the
nature of the society in which they lived. The most important
roles were played at that time by those who had received
traditional Islamic education either at al-Azhar, or in the
Sufi T.ariqas, or at the Khalwa, that indigenous Sudanese Islamic
school that escaped the vicissitudes of all the other institutions
during the Mahdiyya.^" Modern schools had to wait to be started
at the outset of the condominium period beginning with the Gordon
Memorial College and with missionary schools both in the Northern
and Southern parts of the Sudan.
1. For a political history of The Mahdiyya see P.M. Holt,
The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898, London, 1958*
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CHAPTER II
EDUCATION IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN
Education in the Southern Sudan has hed a different
story from that in the North. This was partly because of the
inaccessibility of the country due to the swamps on the White Nile
and the heavy rainfall and tsetse fly that kept the animal rearing
Arab tribes, which were responsible for the spread of Arabic and
Islamic Culture in the North, from penetrating the South, and
limited their movements to the fringes during the dry season.^"
Hence the South remained predominantly pagan. Relationship with
the North existed, however, through traders and slave raiders till
the conquest of Mohammad 'Ali. During the reigi of Isma 'II in
1863 the whole South was brought under his rule and that was
inherited by the Mahdist State which effected some degree of
Islamicization.
At the beginning of the Condominium when Cromer, on
p
i+th January 1899, gave his speech at Omdurman to Moslem notables
In the North announcing the establishment of the Condominium and
assuring them against the proselytisation of their children by
Christianity, he had already tried with Kitchener^ to convince the
Christian Missionary Societies to concentrate their missionary
1. Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1869, O.U.P.
1961, pp. 9-10.
2. Earl of Cromer, Modern, -bgypt, Vol. II, London, 1908, p. 115*
3. Below, Ch. Ill, p.
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efforts to the South. The 22nd parallel of latitude was fixed
as the northern frontier of the new state, while on the other hand,
the Southern frontier was left undefined."*" Cromer thought that
any danger from religious fanaticism in the Sudan could be
mitigated and perhaps altogether averted, by imposing seme
reasonable and salutary checks on the freedom of action of missionary
bodies
At the early stage of the Condominium the educational
policy of the Sudan Government towards the South was not clear to
all of the responsible people. But soon the issue came to be
raised. This happened when the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal wrote to
the Director of Education telling him that they had opened a school
for the sons of soldiers and civilians of the province and had
charged one of the employees of the Mudiriyya to teach them. So
the Goveimor asked the Director to sanction the sum of 300 milliemes
per month to be paid to that employee against the budget of the
Department of Education, and requested him to send 23 books for
elementary reading.-^ The answer was an unexpected refusal from
the Director of Education who gave a sharp "no"^ and explained that
he could not approve of that as a charge against his budget as he
knew nothing of what the Mudir was doing or of the efficiency of
1. Ibid., p. 117#
2. Ibid., p. 314.5.
3. Letter from V.A. Boulnois, Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazal. This letter
is undated but from subsequent correspondence it seems to have
been written early Jan. I9OI4. or late in Dec. 1903. Box 103/7/2
DBA.
14.. Letter from James Currie, to the Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazal, dated
3.I.OI4., Khtm. Box 103/7/2DRA.
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the teacher or of what the children were taught. The Mudir of
Bahr-al-Ghazal felt very strongly about the reply he got. He
attached the letter with a complaint to the Secretary General
describing the answer as "anything but encouraging and almost
wanting in civility".1 He asked the Secretary General if he
could see his way to getting any encouragement given to educating
2
boys in the Bahr-al-Ghazal.
The Secretary General sent Boulnoia* complaint to
Currie under a private cover and Intimated that his sympathy was
with Boulnois, as he thought that Currie's reply, though not
*3
intending to hurt, was somewhat wanting in fuller explanation.
He reminded Currie that it was the Director of Education that
fftidir3 would look to for advice and assistance, and being unacquainted
with the Director's view on the subject, it was only natural they
should think that a school of any kind was better than none at all.
Currie asked the Secretary General to convey to the Mudir his very
great regret that his letter should appear to him discourteous.^
Currie affirmed that nothing was further from his
thoughts than to express any want of confidence in the Mudlr of
1, Letter from W.A. Boulnois Kaim, to the Secretary General dated
3.1.0i±. Wau, Box 103/7/2 BRA. It should be noted that both
Currie's letter (2) above and this letter are dated 3«l*0k»
The distance between Wau and Khartoum is too long to be
oovered within one day. Both are copies of the original found
in Vlngate Papers. The dating may be due to a typing error on
the part of the person who was typing the copies for VTingate.
2, Letter sgd. Nason, to Currie, The Grove Khartoum. Date struck
off on copy. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3, Ibid.
1+. Letter from James Currie to the Secretary General, Khartoum,
el.l.Olj.. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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Bahr-al-Ghazal or put any obstacle in his way. But he considered
education in the South was a very large question and till the
Government as a whole decided what its general policy was going to
be it was far better to do nothing. Gurrie also added that he
had only £E1,C0Q per annum for the vernacular education of the whole
Sudan. He doubted whether any portion of that should be spent at
_ -i
the time in Bahr-al-Ghazal. The Secretary General though willing
to convey the message as requested, was not satisfied about the
decision. To him the point at issue wasj was it not better to
2
teach a little than nothing at all?
To the Secretary General the answer was clear. Provided
a Mudir could produce a man whom he considered capable of carrying
on, what in the Bahr-al-Ghazal would be the most elementary class
of teaching, surely that ought to be better than letting children
run wild doing nothing and he could hardly Imagine that the
expenditure of £E5 per annum including books could be wasted. As
to their being non-Moslems, the Secretary General argued that the
Mudir had stated that they were the sons of soldiers and civilians,
presumably employees, who in most cases did profess Islam and were
liable to come down to Khartoum where they would hope to carry on
their education at the Gordon College or other schools. These
arguments, rational and plausible as they appeared to the Secretary
1. Ibid.
2. Letter from Secretary General, P.J. Nason, Lewa to the Director
of Education, Khartoum, 31.1.01+. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter from Boulnois to Secretary General, 3.1.01+. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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General, were not In harmony with the hi^xer policy of the
Government towards education in the South, a policy which only
Ourrie and the Governor General seemed to know about.
The Secretary General was not to be kept in the dark
any longer. Currie intimated to him that the Governor General was
preparing a note on the matter.'*' Currie also justified his stand
on the ground that as a matter of principle he did not like giving
educational grants-in-aid in places that he could not inspect and
knew nothing about. This was not because he distrusted Mudlrs but
because educational organisation had not been in their line and he
could get better value for his money in places that he could keep
under inspection. He also emphasised that the Sudan Government
es a whole had not till then made up its mind vrhat it was to do in
the matter of education in the South. Till they had done so he
did not want to be committed to any line of policy. He rather
doubted if all the considerations had occurred to the Mudir in the
ease of the Bahr-al-Ghazal school. For if the teacher he was
employing was a Moslem, Currie explained, the net result of his
teaching would tend towards Islam. But as he was aware of the
views that were held by the Governor General on the subject he
wanted them to be well understood before anything was done. The
2
Secretary General was briefed by the Governor General as well and
consequently he wrote a brief letter to the Governor of Bahr al
1. Letter from Currie to the Secretary General 2.2.04# Knartoura,
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter Sgd. F.J. Nason Lews, S.G. to the Mudir Bahr-al-Gnazal
3.2.04, Khartoum, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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Ghazal that the Governor General had expressed his intention of
writing to him on the subject as it was a most important one.
Boulnois, the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal, got a private
letter from Wingate, the Governor General.'*' The letter was ample,
revealing and heartening. It was heartening to learn that Gurrie
had been told by the Governor General, who saw their correspondence
over the school, that a little more courtesy in his wording would
not be amiss. On the other hand Gurrie was defended because of
considerable financial difficulties and for his strong but reasonable
views over not starting an educational system in Bahr-al-Ghazal
without more fully understanding the requirements. The Governor
General had, however, compromised matters by arranging that Gurrie
should give Boulnois the sum of £E1Q for the current year for
experimental purposes.
The most revealing part of the letter was in the part
where the Governor General confided to Boulnois that the question
of education in the Southern Provinces presented certain difficulties.
For instance all preliminary class books in Arabic contained
plentiful references to the Prophet, and the Governor General was
not at all keen to propagate Islam In countries in which it was
not the religion of the inhabitants. As a Governor General,
Wingate asserted that he did not intend interfering with religious
beliefs and preferred to leave all that in the hands of the
Missionaries. Boulnois was told that he would shortly have the
1. Letter marked Private sgd. R. Wingate, G.G. Office, j£hartoum to
Boulnois 3-2.014., Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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Roman Catholic Bishop of the Austrian Mission with him. Another
point revealed to Boulnois was that of the language question. The
language of Bahr-al-Ghazal, Wingate told him, was not really Arabic
and therefore if any foreign language was to be taught, it ought to
be English. These were the reasons why Wingate was inclined to
deal with the question of the school in a very tentative manner at
first.
The Governor General suggested to Boulnois to get one
of his Syrian Christian translator^ form a class and teach the boys
simple reading, writing and arithmetic, without using the usual
Arabic class books and see how it was going to work. Wingate
promised that within a year's time he could send up Currie to
establish a school on special lines, with the object of eventually
developing an industrial school. While allowing Boulnoia to run
this experiment, Wingate reminded him also that the views he had
expressed on education in the Southern Provinces were entirely
private and should not be made known.
In November that year Win gate went on a tour of
inspection to Bahr-al-Ghazal where he inquired about the school
at Vau. But he seemed to have been worried by what he found. The
headmaster who was also the translator of Bahr-al-Ghazil District
Office was named Ahmad 'Izzat1 which meant he was a Moslem and
so, judging by the names, were all the twenty-nine boys at the
2
school.
1. See Return of Boys Bahr-al-Ghazal Grammar School l8.ll.Oi4,
Wau, Wingate Papers, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Ibid.
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Wingate ccrs/eyed this in a memorandum to the Governor
of Bahr-al-Ghazal reiterating his former views.1 Although he
admitted that much credit was due to the Governor and the two
masters in charge of the Wau School for the instructional progress
that had been made, he was inclined to think that in view of the
exceptional situation in the Bahr-al-Ghazal, and the variety of
nationalities and religions of the Province, the education question
ought to be considered most carefully.~ "A false step in the
early stages may involve the Government subsequently in much trouble
and difficulty".3 This remark proved to be, for more than half a
century, one of the most prophetic ironies in the history of the
Sudan.
In the return of boys attending the school, furnished
by the headmaster, the Governor General observed the following
numbers of nationalities^" represented: 1 Ga'all, 5 Dinkas,
11 Gebelawie, 3 Hubiatis, 3 Karaohawis, 1 Furawi, 1 Gorawi, 1 Niam
Niam, 1 Nubawi. He classified them as 14 speaking Arabic as their
mother tongue-' and the remainder spoke some Arabic but their mother
tongue was one of the many languages peculiar to the Bahr-al-Ghazal.
1. See letter from Wingate to Boulnoia Governor Bahr-al-Ghazal,
dated 3.2.04, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Memo, from G.G. Jur River to Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazal 21st Nov.
1904, Box 103/7/2 BRA.
3. Ibid.
4* Ibid. Wingate used the term 'nationality* as it was used in the
returns of the headmaster which stood for the tribal origin
of the pupil.
5. The actual number on the headmaster's "Return" wa3 13.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
33
He also noticed that they were all reported as being Moslems but
he thought it was doubtful whether, before they went to school,
more than half of them belonged to the faith of Islam. If the
Governor General had looked at the names of the childrens' parents
he oould have found that the parents too had Moslem names whioh
they, most likely, had acquired before their children went to
school a few months prior to his visit.
Wingat e thought that if the existing system continued
and the school increased largely - whioh in all probability would
have been the case, he thought there was no doubt that every boy
would eventually become an Arabic-speaking MosTem with a smattering
of English. This was so very evidently undesirable to him that
he did not need to go into the objectives in detail. He found it
sufficient to say that to the majority of the inhabitants of the
Bahr-al-Ghazal Arabic was just as much a foreign language as English
and considerably more difficult, and it was not the object of the
Sudan Government to "Mosleraise" all its subjects. This argument
came to be used later on in reverse after the end of the condominium.
Such being the general lines and apprehensions, wingate then turned
to the application as regards the requirements of Bahr-al-Ghazal.
He thought that from an educational point of view it
did not appear to be necessary to strive for a high standard for
the actual inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazal. For though it was
the object of the Government to fill many of the minor posts with
actual inhabitants of the province, he had no doubt that the
Khartoum and other schools would eventually turn out a sufficient
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number of moderately educated Inhabitants who would be fitted to
take such posts, but In his opinion the system In Bahr-al-Ghazal
should be to provide a certain number of trained artisans,
carpenters, blacksmiths, etc., who in addition to a knowledge of
their trade should also have a moderate knowledge of reading,
writing and very simple arithmetic.
As far as he had been able to judge from what he
described as a very cursory inspection of the Province, the
educational requirements appeared to him to divide themselves up
into two distinct divisions.
1. To design a system of education for the children of the Moslem
officers, soldiers, employees and merchants collected at Wau.
These were those who came to be called later on Northerners.
2. To provide a sound industrial education for the children of
non-Moslem parents, i.e. local inhabitants of the Bahr-al-Ghazal.
These were representing the group that came later on to be called
Southerners.
In order to deal with (1) which he evidently regarded
of some urgency, vingate proposed to transfer as soon as possible
to Wau a regimental school fcr the Battalion quartered in the
province, supplementing its teaching capacity by transferring the
existing local masters to the regimental school as well as such
boys of the local school whose parents desired them to continue
their studies on regimental school lines. By so doing he thought
the immediate requirements of the parents would be satisfied and a
useful class would be formed from which boys could be dram for the
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appointment of Wak11 -Buiuk -Am In^ and some of the minor clerical
appointments. An amalgamation of the regimental school system
with the system which was then in vogue in the local school would,
he thought, provide a sufficiently flexible system and one which
would continue to provide the limited requirements for some years.
The existing school somehow disappeared and the regimental school
2
was not transferred as we shall see later.
As regards (2) Vingate was of the opinion that the
development of an industrial education was the thing that would
satisfy the requirements of Bahr-al-Ghazal more fully than any
other system. The fact that there were some workshops at Wau in
which various trades could be taught, allowed him to think the
initial organisation would be greatly simplified.
He proposed therefore that such local boys as were
then serving as apprentices in the shops, with the addition of such
boys from the local school who desired to take up an industrial
education, should be formed into classes (about two to begin with)
and whilst one class was in the shops the other would be receiving
the simplest elements of an entirely non-sectarian education (i.e.
reading, writing and simple arithmetic only) under the direction
of a non-Moslem instructor. This wingate promised to endeavour
■2
to procure." The medium of instruction he thought should be if
1. A soldier to whom a clerical job is assigned.
2. Draft telegram to A.G. from Wingate dated 21.11.1904, asking for
transference of school to Battalion Wau, Box 103/7/2 DRA. Also
later correspondence between Hill and Civil Secretary, letter
BGP 336/06 Box 103/7/2 DBA.
3. Draft telegram to Lord Cromer from Wingate dated 20.11.1904
"ref.. Vau School does Lord Cromer approve project for procuring
teacher for Industrial Side". Box 103/7/2 BRA.
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possible the mother tongue of the boys hut as this might not at
first be feasible probabljp a lingua-franca, in which the technical
expressions would be in English, would eventually be evolved. This
would necessitate very simple instruction in English during school
hours.
As regards religious instruction, wingate proposed that
so far as the industrial school training was concerned, the
Government should not initiate religious instruction of any sort.
He had no doubt that such instruction would eventually be undertaken
by the various missionaries who were establishing themselves in the
country.1 Thus Wingate was paving the way in Wau for the
Missionaries before they went there.
Within two years of Wingate*a visit the Industrial
School had been started at Wau under Roman Catholic priests. In
the meantime Boulnoia died and various changes too^ place amongst
2
the govMinors of the Province in a short period. Hill who became
Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal towards the end of 1906 noticed that
there were a quantity of children In Wau belonging to the Battalion,
— (Jehadiyya)and civilian population settled in Wau and there was no
school at 'Wau except the Mission School, which as far as he could
make out taught a few boys a little English.^ Hill complained to
the Civil Secretary^ that the Imam of the Battalion at Wau remained
1. Memo, from G.G. Jur River to Mudir Bahr-al-Ghazal, 21st Nov. 1901}.,
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Wingate letter to Hill, dated 21st Feb. 07, Box 103/7/2 MA.
3. Letter from H. Hill, Miralai, Governor Bahr-al-Ghazal B.G.P.




at Khartoum or Omdurraan and so there was no Battalion School at
Wau. He thought, like Boulnois and Naaon before him, that it was
a pity that a number of children should be loafing about all day,
when they might advantageously be taught something. Hill asked
if the Director of Education could do something such as supplying
a teacher and the necessary books, slates etc. for Hill could supply
the pupils to the number of 20 to 30 or possibly more, and could
put up a school hut. The education would have to be free.
It seemed that it was not only the new Governor of
Bahr-al-Ghazal who was not acquainted with the Governor General's
views on education in the South but also other senior officials
in Khartoum to whom he was applying for help. The assistant Civil
Secretary asked the Adjutant General for information if there was
any intention of a Battalion School being opened at Wau.The
Acting Adjutant General answered that it was quite possible that a
Battalion School would be opened at Wau, but even if this was done
the Imam would have enough to do to instruct the boys of the
2
Battalion, and would not be able to give any other instruction.
The Civil Secretary, who also seemed to be in the dark about the
Government policy, asked Currie if he were in a position to offer
any assistance to Bahr-al-Ghazal.-
1. Letter II, Sgd- H.H. Wilson, Kaim, Asst. Civil Sec. for C.S. Khtm.
28.1.07. Adjutant General Egyptian Army, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter III Sgd. C.H. Townsend, Kaim, A.A.G. for A.G. Khtm.
30.1.07# to the Civil Secretary, Box IO3/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter C.S./Aran./19 Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum, 31st
January 1907. To Director of Education, Khartoum, Sgd.
P.R. Phipps, Civil Secretary, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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Currie apologised that he was not in a position to
help in the education of the Southern Provinces. But he asked
Phipps to inform the Governor that any eligible boy of decent
parents that he wished to send he would accept with pleasure.
Currie knowing the Governor General*s views on the subject suggested
1 2
that he should be informed of the matter. This was readily done,
and Wingate had once more to clarify his views to the new governor
of Bahr-al-Ghazal and to the Civil Secretary.-^
Wingate felt that as the subject was of such far
reaching Importance, it was best to write to Hill semi-officlally
in explanation.^ He told Hill that when he inspected the Province
in November 190lf he carefully went into the system of education to
be devised with Boulnois and fes a result of their deliberations he
c
wrote out a memorandum a copy of which he enclosed to Hill. More¬
over, Wingate thought that for various reasons the policy he laid
down in that memorandum had not been carried out in its entirety.
But as affairs became more settled he hoped it would be possible to
work steadily along the lines which were laid down.
Wingate pointed out that the school to which Hill
1. Letter A.D.K.19. Education Office, Khartoum, 2nd Feb. 1907 to
Civil Sec. sgd. J. Currie Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Note to Private Seoretc *y, forward for the information of H.E.
The G.G., Khtm. 5.2.07 sgd. H.H. Wfilson, Kaim, A.C.C. for C.S.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. See note at foot of letter A.D.M.19 above opp.clt. The note
sgd. R. Wingate, Khtm. 21.2.07. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
if. netter from R. Wingate Khartoum 21st Feb. 1907 to Sir H. Hill,
Bart., Gov. Bahr-al-Ghazal Province, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
5. Copy letter marked Private Sgd. H. Wingate G.G. Office,
Khartoum to Boulnois 3• 2. 01}.. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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referred in his Memorandum was the Technical School to which
Wingate referred in his, and the teachers whom Wlngate had
promised to obtain for it were the Roman Catholic Missionaries.
Those priests, he revealed, were paid by the Government, and the
school was really a Government School and not a purely Missionary
establishment. He saw no reason why that system should not continue
and be further developed, but he fully realised the importance of
the points that Hill brought to notice, namely that children of
Moslem parents had no opportunity of obtaining instruction.
He explained that it waa the delay in the despatch of
the Battalion School to Wau, which had delayed the execution of this
portion of the project. Wingate reminded Hill that the Battalion
School was meant (in addition to its Battalion functions) merely to
provide instruction for the children of those Moslera parents who
had scruples about allowing their children to attend the technical
school in which the Roman Catholic priests gave instruction.
However, Wingate suggested another way of dealing with
the Moslem children if their parents wished. This was based on
the Missionary Schools system in Khartoum which Wingate thought
could successfully apply to Wau if Hill thought it was desirable
to do so. He asked Hill to consider the Wau Technical School as
a Missionary School, in so far as the attendance of Moslem children
was concerned, and he could if he wished apply to it the rules that
were applied to the Missionary Schools in Khartoum. A copy of those
rules was enclosed from which Hill could see that attendance at
religious instruction of children attending the school was not
kO
obligatory. Hill waa told that the adoption of this principle
might overcome any qualms of conscience which parents of Moslem
children might have, and might enable him to temporarily overcome
his difficulties pending the arrival of the Battalion School at Wau.
Wingate reminded Hill that the question of devising a
system of education in the provinces of the Sudan which were more
pagan than Moslem was a very delicate one, and required most careful
treatment. He also asked him to understand that the meraoraiidum of
21st November, 1901}., as well as the letter, were for his entirely
confidential information, and he should hand them over, when the
time came, to his successor as secret documents, as the time was not




Hill replied that although he had not seen the former
memorandum before, he thought he had suggested much the same as
regards the Moslems. He explained that in his application for a
school he had never meant to include the inhabitants of the Bahr-al-
Ghazal. He thought the only thing to do was to wait for the
Battalion School. Thus he was not inclined to try the Khartoum
experiment with the Missionary school. Of the latter he thought
that the technical instruction was decidedly good but as regards the
other department of the Missionary school, teaching English etc., he
was privately of the opinion that very little was done.
1. Wingate letter of 21st Feb. 1907# and enclosure to Hill. Box
103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter from H. Hill, Mir. Governor Bahr-al-Ghazal, Lau Post
30th March 1907 to H.E.G.G., Khartoum. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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What struck Hill was that technical education was
what the Mission devoted themselves to. He felt that the method
of training which the Governor General had laid down should have
been carried out, but he felt quite sure in his own mind that the
boys in the technical school were not taught anything else, i.e. one
day writing etc., and the next day technical work. He intimated
that Just as he left Wau the Mission had been severely reduced by
deaths and a new party of priests and lay brothers had arrived, so
things were no doubt unsettled.
Hill thought that none of the missionaries he met up
in Way were capable of teaching English, as he found it veiy
difficult to understand the "Head Priest" there. This was undoubt¬
edly due to the fact that the Roman Catholic missions were staffed
by Austrians, Germans and Italians. To remedy the situation Hill
suggested that the Superior at Wau should be told to furnish a
report as to hours of work, study and attendances at both schools.
This would show whether the terms of the memorandum were being
carried out. If that was done through the Roman Catholic Bishop
at Khartoum, then Hill could be informed to see that it was carried
out in the School at Wau.
He explained that he fully understood the situation1
which he took briefly to be, the Government did not want to maKe
more Moslems, it wished to give technical instruction to the
inhabitants, through the medium of their own language, while
1. Wingate letter to Hill, 21st Feb. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DBA.
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teaching than a certain amount of English, reading and writing
and a little arithmetic. Religious instruction could be given
to those whose parents desired it in the Missionary School.
Children of Moslem parents would be taught in the Battalion Sohool
when it arrived in Wau.
The next stage came about three years later in 1910
when the Bishops of the different missionary bodies met to disouss
the problems of teaching English in their schools whereas government
work was done in Arabic. The result of their deliberations was
communicated to the Governor General by Bishop Gwynne1 of the C.M.S.
Gwynne told Wingate that Bishop Geyer of the Roman Catholic Mission,
Mr. Shaw of the American Mission and he himself had had an
important consultation a fortnight before about the question of
teaching the natives in the pagan Provinces of the Sudan Arabic or
p
English. Bishop Geyer stated that as long as the Government
business was transacted in Arabic there was no desire for English.
Mr. Shaw's idea was that if the natives were taught Arabic, it
would bring in a strong Islamic influence.
Bishop Geyer' agreed, but stated that unless the
Governors of the Provinces in the pagan part would encourage the
employment of English speaking natives, it would not be worthwhile
for his missionaries to teach English nor would there be any demand
for this from the natives themselves. So Gwynne suggested to the
1. Letter sgd. from Llewellya H. Gwynne to Wingate "My dear Sirder",
The Clergy House, Khartoum, Sudan, 26.12.1910. Box 103/7/2 DiiA.
2. Ibid.
3. R. Hill, A Biographical Dictionary, p. 13i+«
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Governor General that if the Governors would, as far as possible,
encourage the use of English as the medium through which business
with the natives was to be transacted, it would be an inducement
on the part of the natives "to learn our language and would give
Christian Missionaries sane slight chance against the overwhelming




One day after Gwynne had written his letter, Wingate
wrote another private letter to the Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal^
with a copy to the Governor of the other Southern Province at the
time, Upper Nile.^ To both of them copies of Gwynne's letter were
enclosed. Wingate told his Governors of the South that he did not
need to recapitulate the reasons which induced him to suggest in the
first instance that Arabic should not be taught to the natives in
the mission schools and his opinion in that respect was unchanged.
On the other hand, Win gate told his Governors, that he
fully recognized the difficulties pointed out by the missionaries
themselves as to the obstacles to obtaining Government employment on
the part of the pupils without a knowledge of Arabic as long as
Arabic was the official language. What Wingate wished the Governors
to do was to consider very carefully whether any such method as that
1. Letter from Gwynne to Wingate 26.12.1910 Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Ibid.
3. Wingate letter, Khartoum 2?th Dec. 1910 (private) to gl Miralal
Pel Iden Bey, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
if. Wingate letter Khartoum 27th Dec. 1910 (private) to El Miralai
0\<ren Bey, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
suggested by Bishop Geyer and Bishop Gwynne, as to making English
the official language, was feasible. His own view was that if
the new system was started very quietly and tentatively - without
any fuss and without putting the dots on the l*s too prominently -
the desideratum could become a fait accompli almost before anyone
had realised that a change had taken place. He thought it was very
muoh easier to deal with an accomplished fact should opposition be
eventually raised.
Another point which Win gate considered even more
private and confidential was also raised by the Bishops. They
asked for the recognition of Sunday as the day of rest and holiday
in the Southern districts.* Owen, the Governor of Upper Nile, was
emphatic as to the danger of doing anything of the sort at any
stations along the river, though he thought that in the interior
of the Enclave a very tentative effort might be made in that
direction on the grounds that during the Belgian occupation of the
country Sunday and not Friday was the recognised holiday. Wingate
asked Feilden, Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal at the time, whether he
thought that a similar system might be very gradually Introduced
Into some of the very remote districts of his province, especially
in the South.
Wingate fully understood that it was a big and
important departure which might lay the Government open to severe
criticism as well as an attack on the part of the extreme Pan-
Islamists, but, after all, he told his Governors, they ought to
1. Ibid.
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remember that the bulk of the inhabitants of both provinces were
not Moslems at all, that the whole of Uganda had accepted
Christianity almost without a murmur, and that furthermore English
was a very much easier language to learn than Arabic for those
people. This was the beginning of what Game to be known in the
1920s as the Southern Policy.
The Bishops though united in seeking a chance against
the overwhelming advantages that Islam seemed to have had in the
Southern Sudan, were not without their differences and strife over
what would replace it. In 1912 while wingate was taking his
summer holiday in Britain, he had an interview with the C.M.S.
representatives who wanted to open missionary stations at Yambio
and at Meridi; so he had to cable to Khartoum that he was unable
to accede to a farmer request made to him by Bishop Geyer to take
over the Asande country in exchange for the Southern iaiclave."^
This was within the Government policy of trying to divide the
region into spheres of influence between the churches.
The 1914 War brought this strife into the surface.
The Government of/Sudan set up a committee to investigate the
2 /
position of the Austrian Mission in/Sudan during the war. The
committee recommended that the members of the mission should be
allowed to stay-^ in Sudan. When Win gate passed the report to
Bishop Gwyrine who spent the War period in England and France,
1. Letter from Wingate 22nd July 1912 to Crawford. Box 103/7/2DHA.
2. S.O. Report by the Aliens Committee as to the Austrian Mission,
Cairo, 1916.
3. Ibid., p.5.
Gwynne*s reply was: "I must confess that I should rather have
preferred to see the German and Austrian Missionaries turned
wholesale out of the country. They are all under the thumb of
Berlin, and, moreover, it has to be remembered that in the case
of the Roman Catholics they cannot help being influenced by the
Vatican, which is notoriously pro-German".The remark about the
Roman Catholics and the Vatican was directed against the Italians
who came to be in full charge of the Roman Catholic missionary
2
work in the Southern Sudan in 1913, and continued to be so.
In the same year 1916 Wingate left the Sudan but the
policy he had initiated towards the South continued during the War
years and in the aftermath. What came to be known in the 1920s
and after, up to 19k7$ as the "Southern Policy" was no more than
an effective implementation of the guidelines given by Wingate
during the early years of the Condominium. Paradoxically enough
it was during this period that the Government Department of
Education came to be more actively Involved in the educational work
that was carried|xby the Missionaries in the South. This was the
time xifhen the Sudan Government started to be worried about the
political development in Egypt and its impact on the educated
Sudanese in the North. In the North the policy came to be "Native
Administration", and subsidised Khalwas instead of schools. In the
South the policy was subsidised missionary education and effective
1. Gwynne*s letter, Ardgowan, Greenock, 2nd Sept, 1916, to "My
dear Wingate", Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2, S.G., Reoort by the Aliens Committee, p.l. para 3,
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measures to Isolate the South from the North; by the erasing of
Islamic and Arabic Culture.
It was in 1926 that the Director of Education submitted
to the Governor General a comprehensive memorandum on education in
1
the South namely Bahr-al-Ghazal and Mongalla Provinces. The
proposed policy of co-operation between the missionaries themselves
and the Government seems to be also in response to the general
policy of the British Government towards missionary education in
East and Tropical Africa after the Phelps-Stokes Commission Report
2
of 1922." The proposals put forward by the Director were for:
1. A Government school at Wau In close connexion with the
Italian (Roman Catholic) Mission School which should educate boys
for Government Service up to a standard equivalent to the Second
Year of the Gordon College Secondary Course.
2. A subvention for a school belonging to the C.M.S. at Juba,
which aimed at the same standard.
3. A subvention to ten central schools In the Italian (Roman
Catholic) sphere, to seven In the C.M.S. sphere and to five in the
open sphere.
1. D.E.S./29-24A, Khartoum, 10th January 1926, Secret, to Civil
Secretary, S.G., Khtm., for submission to his excellency the
Governor General. Sgd. J.W. Crowfoot, Director of Ed. Copies
to P.S. & C.S. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Rolando/Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London
1966, pp. 263-28?:
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It. Subventions in respect of Technical training and.
Publications.
The Director also explained that hitherto great
difficulties had hindered the Government from doing much towards
the spread of education in the South, not least among them the
multiplicity of languages spoken there and the absence of any
native script. During the few years that had passed, progress
had been made in all directions and in educational matters, in
particular, a new situation was created by the labours of devoted
missionaries, iiglish and Italian, who had reduced many of the
native languages to printed form. He also observed that there
were two types of education in the South at the time and he thought
it was the business of the Government to make both types more
effective.
There were two types because the two provinces of
Bahr-al-Ghazal and Equatoria, with the exception of a relatively
small area, had been parcelled out in two exclusive spheres
between the G.M. S. and the Italian Catholic Mission.1 The
educational methods and ideals of the two societies were very
different, there was the difference between Catholicism and
Protestant ism plus the difference between English and Italian
traditions. The Director of Education, ana the Sudan Government,
saxtf that there was nothing to prevent co-operation with both major
1, Other relatively smaller missions were the .American United
Presbyterian Mission in Upper Nile, Sudan, Interior Mission in
Upper Nile, Sudan United Mission in the Nuba Hills Area in
Southern Kordofan. See Map (1).
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missions. His recommendations were the outcome of his
deliberations with the heads of the two missions after visiting
some of their schools. Each of the two spheres had two needs
in common, they both wanted technical guidance by an educational
expert and they both wanted financial help.
The Director of Education also reported that Arabic
was still the vernacular in Wau, and he proposed that it should
be retained as the medium of instruction so long as necessary but
written in the Latin Script, the Arabic script should be taught
only in the highest classes to those who would need it for
Government work. This change he thought would in itself save much
time and energy, and it was advocated independently both by Father
Benetti and Archdeacon Shaw. The staff should be recruited from
Syria until a native staff was available. Similar views were
advocated by Mingate in 1901;, 1907 and 1910. For them to be
suggested again indicates the difficulty of eradicating Arabic
encountered over more than 20 years, so at last a compromise was
suggested of writing it in Latin alphabet with the use of a
Syrian, presumably Christian, teacher.
Towards the end of the year 1926 the first Inspector
of Southern Education was appointed.'1" The new inspector,
Mr. N.B. Hunter was first sent to Uganda to study the methods
adopted there, under Mr. E.R.J. Hussey who was seconded from the
Sudan Department of Education in 1921; to take up the post of
1. Crad 2991, G.G. Report 1926, p. 73* para 279.
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Director of Education in Uganda. In December Mr. Hussey
accompanied the new inspector on his return to the Sudan and made
a tour in Mongalla and Bahr-al-Ghazil Provinces preparatory to
presenting further recommendations on the questions involved. The
major problem that presented itself was the infinite variety of
local languages and their orthography1 so preparation for a
language conference were started.
p
The language conference was held at Rejaf In April 1928
and was attended by Sudan Government officials, the Director of
Education, Uganda, the Provincial Commissioner Northern Province
Uganda, and a representative of the Belgian Congo Administration.
Many representatives of mission schools in the Sudan, the Belgian
Congo and Uganda were also present. The Conference was greatly
helped by Professor ,fe3termann, the Director of the International
Institute of African Languages and Cultures. The Director of the
Sudan Department of Education gave the opening address on behalf
of the Governor General and in his address he asked the
participants to confine themselves to the use of Latin alphabet
to the exclusion of Arabic both for political reasons and for a
practical reason since the teachers being European missionaries
would not know it anyway.^
A uniform orthography was adopted, and useful resolution*
1. Cmd 3284. G.G, Report 1927, p. 81, para 353* Cmd. 31+03.
2. Cmd 31+03 G.G. Report 1928, p. 1+9, para 1+37, Omd 3697*
3. S.G. Report of the Rejaf Language Conference, 1928, London, 1928,
p.5« Correspondence in connection with preparation for the
Conference and the proceedings in File 17.J.1. MEA.
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passed on the selection and compilation of text-books and the
provision of vernacular grammars. Amongst the resolutions was
one pertaining to the appointment of a linguist. In August 1929
a linguistic expert Dr. A.N, Tucker was appointed. He was of
considerable help in the selection of vocabularies and grammar
in the group languages and in settling certain difficulties
arising from the adoption of the new orthography. This facilitated
the selection and compilation of text-books which were used in
the Southern schools. Ey 1930 four school text-books were in the
press, and the publication of some others *jss awaiting the
decisions of o special committee set up by the Education Department
2
on which mission authorities were represented.
The decade that followed the Rejaf Linguistic
Conference was a decade of implementation, through the production
•5
of more text-books in the language groups that had been selected.
The Eush School which is sometimes called the Village School where
these text-books were of greatest use came to be well established
as the basis of school education in the south.^ The Bush School
was a school where the Southern child spent the first two years of
his schooling learning in the vernacular. This was, and still is
a most important missionary contribution to education in the
X. Cmd. 3697 G.G. Report 1929, p. 90.
2. Crad. 3935 G.G. Report 1930, p. 95-
3. G.G. Reports, 1929. p. 90j 1930, p. 95; 1931, p.76; 1932, p.80}
1933, P. 71; 1931;, p. 72; 1935, p. 78; H3E, pp.88-9;
1937, PP. 82-3.
4. Sir al Khatim al Khalife, "Education in the Southern Provincea",
paper in Philosophical Society of the Sudan, Proceedings of
Conference on Education in the Sudan 1963, p." 38.
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Southern Sudan. Apart from the increase in the number of the
"Bush Schools", and some elementary girls schools no substantial
increase was made in the education in the South during this
decade. Three intermediate schools that were there before the
Rejaf Linguistic Conference"'" were not added to and they were about
the highest a Southern child could, reach. Indeed in some years
in the thirties attendance of pupils in both intermediate and
2
elementary vernacular schools decreased. This could be explained
by the missionaries chief interest in proselytiaation hence their
concern with the Bush School rather than upper higher forms of
education, and by the Economic Depression which meant that there
was much less money to be spent on education by both government
and missionary societies. Last but not least it could also be
e:?q?lained by the corresponding "Native Administration" policy
which was rigorously pursued by the Sudan Government at the time
in the North. Having lost confidence in the educated elite in
the North the Government was unlikely to have better hopes of
creating a Southern counterpart. All that it needed was a
sufficient, though less qualified, number of Southerners to replace
the Northern employees who were to be "gradually but effectively
weeded out of the South",^ as an implementation of the "Southern
Policy".
1. Cmd. 3403. G.G. Report 1926, pp. 93-4, and subsequent annual
G.G. Reports to Cmd. 589$ G.G. Report 1937* pp. 82-3*
2. Cmd. 5575. G.G. Report 19 36, pp.88-9, para 362; Cmd 5281.
G.G. Report. 1935. P. 75;Cmd. 5019. G.G. Report. 1934. p. 72.
3. C.S./I.C. I. 25th January 1930, Govt. Archives Khtm., Cmd. 4159,
G.G. Report 1931, p. 78, para 331.
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In 1937 the Director of Education carried out an
extensive tour of the schools in the Southern Provinces where
he discussed with the missionary societies personnel in charge
of the schools and with the administrative officials plans for
the improvement and expansion of the Southern School System.3"
This no doubt influenced the 1938 Government programme for the
South as the Government decided to start opening its own schools
in the South, at the same time increasing the subventions to the
missionary schools. The latter meant an increase in Government
supervision and control. The outbreak of the World War
hampered the execution of the programme but deliberations
continued. In 191*2 a Southern education conference was held
at Malakal. The discussions covered a wide range of subjects
and helped to provide a clear picture both of the existing
position and of the lines of future development.^
After the War the situation improved for both
missionaries and Government though staffing difficulties continued
but the position eased in 191*1* with the return of four fathers
and three sisters to the teaching cadre of the Verona Mission, and
the new arrival of four other fathers who were followed in a year
by those who were detained in Europe during the war. The Government
also started its programme by opening in 191*1*, two Government schools,
a central school under a British headmaster at Abwong in the Upper
1. Cmd. 5895, G.Q. Report 1937. pp. 82-3-
2. Cmd. 9098, G.G. Report (191*2-1*1*) , p. 121*.
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Kile Province, and a village school at Tonj. In 191+5 the
Government effected more direct control of Southern education by
the creation of a new post of an Assistant Director of Education,
South,"*" This was matched by increased grants to the missions
totalling over £E2,0G0 to cover 75 per cent of the cost of the
p
new salaries.
The year 191+6 was a peak for the nationalist movemmt
in the North. The pressure of this movement together with the
Post-War Colonial policy led the administration to think of
educational expansion in the South which up to that time did not
go further than the three Intermediate schools that were there
since the 1920s. In 191+5 there had been only 16 boys at Primary
teacher training courses and secondary scPools in Uganda and 6 more
were added at the end of the year. As for higher education there
was only one student at Makerere College in Uganda. This was felt
by the Government to be an unsatisfactory position and that 1 steps
ought to be taken to provide local institutions'.^ The nationalist
movement was increasingly aware and critical of the Governments
policy in the South and blaming it for Its backwardness as well
as accusing it of planning to sever it from the North so that it
would be linked with the British East African territories. The
Graduates Congress in 1939 asked for more education in the South
and the integration of the education in the South with that in the
1. Cmd. 7316, G.G. Report 191+5, p. 125.
2. Ibid., p. 126.
3* G.G. Report 191+5, p. 125.
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North.1
In 19i*2 the Graduates Congress Memorandum to the
Government Included amongst other things, "The abolition of the
ordinances on •closed areas' and the lifting of restrictions
placed on trade and on the movements of the Sudanese within the
Sudan and the cancellation of subventions to missionary schools."
Thus in 191+6 while the Sudan Government was still discussing the
future of the South, a Sudanisation Committee was set up in
March 191*6 a sub-committee of which was authorised to visit the
South. The Civil Secretary informed the Governor of Equatorla
on this occasion that "the progressive Sudanisation of our
governmental machinery is today a matter of the greatest political
and administrative importance." Thus a Five Year Plan for the
development of education in the South was approved in 191*6 together
with a Ten Year Plan for Education in the North. The Southern
Plan was to provide for a large extension of education at all
levels and was planned to be effected both through the agency
of the missions and by the establishment of government schools.-*
Under the new Development Plan, it was agreed that as
qualified teachers became available, all the old i*-y©ar elementary
school® would be developed into 6-year primary schools. The
teachers for these schools were to be provided by the two new
primary teachers training centres which were opened during 191*6
1. Below Ch.V, p. 21*2 .
2. Governor Equatoria to District Commissionerss Torit, Juba, Yei,
Moru, 7,ande, Vau, Hombeck and Tonj, May 25th 191*6. C.S./I.C. I.
Govt. Archives, Khartoum.
3. Cmd. 7581. G.G. Report 191*6, pp. 131.
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by the Church Missionary Society at Yambio and by the Verona
Fathers Mission at Bus sere. The whole development of primary
schools in the South was to hinge on the progress made by those
two centres which were to be self-governing bodies managed by
i
boards of governors with both mission and government representation.
The idea of expanding the elementary school to a six year primary
p
sehool seems to have been Influenced by the Brown Plan which was
suggested primarily, at the time, though never implemented, for
the system in the North. It was to cream off the intermediate
school pupils at the end of their second year so that the most
able amongst them be given a six year course of academic secondary
education comparable to the English sixth form.
A reform that was effected in the South was the arrival
towards the end of 19^6 of the new headmaster of Bussere Intermediate
School and of an additional assistant master. Both laymen and
trained and experienced teachers. Their arrival was in accordance
with the new agreement made with the Verona Fathers Mission that
the school should in future have three British masters. This was
to ensure that the standard of English as well as other subjects
in the Roman Catholic School was on a par with the other two
intermediate schools in the South which were run by the Church
Missionary Society.^ In this year the Government also opened the
1. Ibid., pp.132.
L
2. Mr./Brown was the Deputy Head of Bakht er Ruda Institute for
eddoation and later on Headmaster of Hantoub Secondary School
up to 1955*
3. Cmd. 7561. Q.Q. Report 19U6, p. 132.
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new building of Atar Boys Intermediate School, the first Govern¬
ment intermediate school to be opnned in the South in about half
a century of Condominium rule.'*' The official report describing
this stated jubilantly that with the admission of the new class of
226 "the first intermediate class proper was started."
Vhile these educational developments were ocourrlng,
some major political developments were taking place both internally
and externally; Labour Government in Britain, Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations over the Sudan and an increasing worry among the
nationalist movement in the North about the future of the Sudan both
North and South. The Sudan Government was revising the Southern
policy and this culminated in a Circular** to the Governors of the
Provinces as well as the Directors and Heads of Government
Departments.
The Civil Secretary referred to a former Despatch of
i+th August 19h5^" where in paragraph 2 three possible political
futures for the Southern Sudan were discussed. The crucial
sentenoe is: "It is only by economic and educational development
that these people can be equipped to stand up for themselves in
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. CS/GCR/I.C.I., Civil Secretary^ Office, Khartoum, 16 December
191+6 Sgd. J.W. Robertson, Civil Secretary. Copies were also
sent to Sudan Agent, Cairo, and Sudan Agent, London. Subject:
Southern Sudan Policy. Marked Secret. Archives Khartoum,
cyclostyled for limited circulation in Fourteen Documents on
The Problem of the Southern Sudan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Khartoum and N.lf., 1965.
1+. Despatch No. 89 of l+th August, 191+5» Ibid.
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the future, whether their lot be eventually cast with the Northenn
Sudan or with East Africa or partly with each." Sir James
Robertson, the Civil Secretary, explained that since the despatch
was written in 191+5 and since the deoisions on policy which it
recorded were taken, not only had further decisions on policy for
the South been taken but great changes had taken place in the
political outlook for the Country as a whole. He stated that what¬
ever might be the final effect, inside the Sudan, of the treaty
negotiations which were taking place at the time between the
Condominium Governments, it was certain that the advance of the
Northern Sudan to self-government, involving the progressive
reduction of British Executive authority, and public canvassing
of the Southern Sudan question, would be accelerated. He argued
that it was therefore essential that policy for the Southern Sudan
should be crystallized as soon as possible and that it should be
crystallized in a form which could be publicly explained and
<L-
supported and which should therefore be based on sound and construc¬
tive social and economic principles. These principles should not
only bear defence against fastidious opposition, but should also
command the support of Northern Sudanese who were prepared to take
logical and liberal points of view: while the relief of doubts
in the minds of British political and departmental staff who had
the interests of the South at heart was also pressing and important.
The Civil Secretary persuaded his colleagues that he did
not suggest that; the future of the two million inhabitants of the
South should be influenced by "appeasement of the as yet immature
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and ill-informed politicians of the Northern Sudan. But it is the
Sudanese, Northern and Southern, who will live their lives and
direct their affairs in future generations in this Country."1 He
thought that the British efforts should therefore be concentrated
on initiating a policy which would not be only sound in itself, but
which could be made acceptable to and eventually workable by patriots
and reasonable Sudanese, Northern and Southern alike.
He said that apart from the recent rapid political
development in the North some other conclusions had further emerged
since the Governor General*s 1945 despatch and enclosures were
written. The East Africa*s plans regarding better communications
with the Southern Sudan had been found to be nebulous, and
contingent on the Lake Albert Dam. The Civil Secretary remarked
that whatever the possibilities, there was no reason to hesitate
between development of trade between the South and East Africa and
development of trade between the Southern and the Northern Sudan.
The chance of succeeding depended, he thought, upon confining them¬
selves to the one aim of developing trade in the South, and between
the North and South.
In education, he believed that "while the South may hope
to have/ secondary school, it cannot hope to support post-secondary
K
education", which he thought that Southerners should get at the
Gordon Memorial College. Arabic was not essential there, but he
thought it should be taught to Southerners as a subject from inter¬
mediate school level upwards. As for the distinctions in rates of
1. Civil Secretary*s Circular, Despatch No. 89 of l+th August 191+5*
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pay and other conditions of government service, the artificial
rules about employment of Southerners in the North, attempts at
economic separation, and all similar distinctions, they were
becoming more and more anomalous as the growing demand for
Northerners to be employed in Southern Development Schemes, the
rapidly growing communication and travel between North and South,
and the very application of the policy of pushing forward in the
South, broke down the previous isolation of the Southern Provinces
1
and strained those distinctions further.
Thus the Civil Secretary attempted to indicate the
reasons which had led him to think that an important decision on
Southern Policy should then be taken. As the biennial report to
the British Government was due early in 1947 he proposed, subject
to the comments on his circular, to ask the Governor General that
In his report he should ask the British Government to approve that
2
two of the alternatives mentioned before should be ruled out as
practical politics at the time. He thought that it might in
future be proved that it would be to the advantage of certain of
the most southerly tribes, e.g. of Oparl or Kajo Kajl, to join
up with their relatives in Uganda. He also surmised that it might
be that the feeling which then existed among a few, of what he
described as "the wisest Northern Sudanese", that they should not,
when self-governing, be asked to shoulder the financial and
communal burden which they believed the South would always prove
1. Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of l+tb August 1945*
2. Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of 4ti!l August 1945*
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to be, may become an important political policy among them. But
he advised his colleagues, that they should work on the assumption
that the Sudan, as it was constituted, with possibly minor
adjustments, would remain one.
The Civil Secretary concluded that they should there¬
fore re-state their Southern Policy and do so publicly, as follows:
"The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the
Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the
Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that
geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the
present time) to render them inextricably bound for future develop¬
ment to the Middle-eastern and Arabicised Northern Sudan: and
therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic
development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future
as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the
Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future." He thought that
certain changes of detail, in each sphere of Government activity
in the South, would have to follow the approval of a policy so
defined. He asked his colleagues to suggest briefly the major
points. He asked them to consider the matter carefully, consult
the senior members of their staffs upon it, particularly those who
had experience in the South and forward their views to him as
briefly as possible. The views of any individual member of the
staff which a Governor or a Director wished to forward separately
with his comments were welcome. They were permitted to ask for
1. Civil Secretary's Circular, Despatch No. 89 of ij.th August 19^5.
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the views of Senior Sudanese in whose judgement and discretion
they had confidence.
Finally the Civil Secretary asked his colleagues to
bear in mind that urgency was the essence of the problem. "We no
longer have time to aim at the ideal: we must aim at doing what
is the best for the Southern peoples in the present circumstances".*"
After some discussions the policy advocated by the
Civil Secretary was finally endorsed by an Administration
Conference that put forward seme proposals for the Implementation
of the new policy. After this the celebrated Juba Conference was
held on 12th and 13th June 1947 under the Chairmanship of the Civil
Secretary. It was attended by the Governors of the Southern
Provinces, the Director of Establishment, seventeen Southern Chiefs
and mission-educated men and six Northerners, who were Gordon
College educated. This was the first time that Northern and
Southern Sudanese participated in a Conference to discuss the
future of the Sudan and the relationship oetween the North and
# 1
the South.
The terms of reference of the Conference were:
"(1) To consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration
Conference about the Southern Sudan.
(2) To discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being
represented in the proposed assembly, and if decided to be
advisable, to decide how such representation can best be
1. Ibid
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obtained in the present circumstances; and whether the
representation proposed by the Sudan Administration Conference
was suitable.
(3) To discuss whether safeguards can be introduced into the forth¬
coming legislation setting up the new Assembly, to ensure that
the Southern Sudan with its differences in race, tradition,
language, customs and outlook is not hindered in its social
and political advancement.
(4.) To discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern
Sudan should be set up to deal with Southern affairs from
which representatives might be appointed to sit on the assembly
as representatives of the Southern Sudan.
(5) To consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration
Conference in paragraph 13 of their report which deal with
matters not strictly relevant to the political development of
the Sudan, which the Conference recommended as essential if
the unification of the Sudanese people is to be achieved."
The Juba Conference concluded that it was the wish of
the Southern Sudanese to be united with the Northern Sudanese in
a united Sudan, that the South should therefore be represented
in the proposed Legislative Assembly; that the number of Southern
representatives should be more than thirteen as had been
recommended by the Sudan Administration Conference, that they
1. Civil Secretary's Memorandum on Juba Conference, May l>th, 19k7»
C.S./I.C. I. Archives Khartoum; the Development of British
Policy in the Southern Sudan 1699-1%7 by Dr. Mudathir Abdel
Rahim. Reproduced by Central Archives, Ministry of Interior
Khartoum 1965.
64
should be elected by Province Councils in the South and not by
an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan; that trade and
communications should be improved between the two regions and that
steps should be taken towards the unification of the educational
policy in the North and South.
The creation of the Legislative Assembly in 1946 was
accompanied by the appointment of the first Sudanese Minister of
2
Education whose policy towards the South was partly outlined by
the Juba Conference and the preceding Civil Secretary*s Circular.
In 1949 the Legislative Assembly passed a decision that Arabic
should ultimately become the common language of the Sudan. This
decision focusaed public attention on the problem of Southern
education, and a comprehensive plan to cover the five years 19>l-56
came under preparation.-^
Again a main feature of that plan was a further
substantial increase in mission subventions which was also
accompanied by a tightening of control and the appointment of more
Ministry of Education officials to ensure direct supervision of
mission schools and the proper spending of subventions/1" Under
this plan the missionary societies were required to consolidate
1. Ibid., The Record of Discussions of the Juba Conference C.S./
I.C.I. Govt. Archives, Khartoum.
2. Cmd. 8181. G.G. Report 1948, p. 138.
3. Cmd. 8434* G.Q, Report 1949, p. 142.
4. Sir al Khatim al Khalifa "Education in the Southern Provinces",
p. 37- Philosophical Society of the Sudan, "Education in the
Sudan" proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference 10th -
11th Jan. 1963, Khartoum,
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their educational work already in. hand rather than to embark on
new schemes of expansion. The plan had thus reversed the roles
of Government and Missionary Societies in the field of education
by establishing the position of the former as the major partner.
Relatively larger sums of money were made available under the plan
for the construction of Government schools at the elementary,
intermediate and secondary levels. Another major and significant
feature of the Five Year Plan was the new language policy which
stipulated the teaching of Arabic as a main subject in all schools
in the Southern Provinces. This policy was received with a mixed
feeling of apprehension and hope.*
Before the plan was finished events were accelerated by
the political development that took place outside and inside the
country. The 1952 Coup d'etat in Egypt, the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement of 1953# the Parliamentary election in November and
Leeember 195k* the setting up of the Sudanis at ion Committee as part
of the preparation for self determination and the incident of
August 1955 when the Equatoria troops at Torit broke out in mutiny
killing 250 Northerners including many teachers and Government
officials.
The educated Southerners felt that they benefited very
little from the results of the Sudanisation of administrative posts.
2
The deep disappointraent fostered amongst them could not be
1. Ibid.
2, Joseph Oduhu and William Dongo, The Problem of the Southern Sudan
London Institute of Race Relations, 0.U.P. 1963* p. 2'£.
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explained away by the traditional Civil Service oriterion that was
used; as promotion wa3 based on the qualifications of the person
and his standing at the time in the Civil Service, and not on any
regional, provincial or tribal considerations. This contributed
to arousing Southern fear and suspicion of Northern domination
which was deepened by the fact that the two parts had been ruled
almost separately under the British Administration for about half
a century. The fears and disappointments exploded in the
Southern incident of August 1955 when the Southern troops at Torit
broke out in mutiny that led to serious loss of lives. Southern
politicians in Parliament announced that they were aiming to
establish an autonomous South linked only in a federation with
the North. This was unacceptable to Northern public opinion which
identified it with the only too recent British Southern policy and
labelled Its advocates as products of "missionary schools" who used
"federation" as a disguise for "separation".
In the elections held in 1956 the new Federal Party was
able to return forty members out of the i+6 seats allocated to the
South. The triumph was a clear indication that the more extreme
points of view were gaining ground and finding ardent advocates
amongst the Southern educated elite. The mutineers who escaped
to the bush after the 1955 incident were continuing their activities
in the South. Southern Federalists were pressing for a Federal
Constitution rather than a unitary one and the Northern politicians
were deeply involved in manoeuvres over holding power in Khartoum.
During this turmoil of events the array took over in November 1958
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and put an end to the Parliamentary and democratic dialogue
between the Southern and Northern educated and elected
representatives.
During these eventful years in the field of politics
some basic developments were taking place in the field of education
as well. The teaching of Arabic as a main subject in Southern
schools was accompanied by a Government decision to retain the
vernacular^in the syllabuses but that they should be written in
Arabic characters instead of the Latin Alphabet. For this
purpose a linguist from Cairo University was appointed by the Sudan
Ministry of Education to do for Arabic what Professor Westervaan
and Dr. Tucker and the Christian missionaries did for English after
the Rejaf Linguistic Conference in 1928. Dr. Asaker appointed
some of his former Sudanese pupils to help in his work and to carry
it on after him."*" Dr. Asaker and his colleagues faced linguistic
problems similar to those faced by their predecessors. They found
out that modifying some Arabic symbols to represent the non-Arabic
p
sounds would work satisfactorily. The problem was the laok of
teachers who would be able to teach the vernacular by using
Arabic as a medium of instruction. The teachers training centres
1. Personal Communication from Dr. Khalil Asaker who later on
became Professor of Arabic at Cairo University, Khartoum
Branch. Also Yousif el-Khalifa Abu Bakr, "The Medium of
Instruction and Lingua-Franca in the South", Philosophical
Society of the Sudan, Education in the Sudan, Proceedings of
the Eleventh Annual Conference lOth-lltti January, 19&3,
Khartoum 196 3, PP • 116-122'.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
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at Meridi and Billing for elementary school teachers hoped to
provide towards this.^"
But the whole question of the medium of instruction
and the use of the vernacular in the Village or Bush schools came
under consideration in the report of the International Commission
2
on Secondary Education in the Sudan in 1955» The Commission
after scrutinizing the educational situation in the South and the
future of Arabic in the country concluded that "there can be little
argument in favour of English being particularly suitable as the
medium of instruction in the South. In faot, Arabic speaking
teachers from the North will be more capable of teaching Arabic to
the young children of the South than Italians, for instance in
teaching English, and they will be as good as English teachers
are in teaching English."
On the question of the vernacular the Commission also
noted that the missionaries had decided that the medium of
instruction, at the elementary level should be the vernacular, and
at the post-elementary should be English, while Arabic was the
lingua franca of the people. The Commission thought that it was the
responsibility of all sehools whether Government or missionary, to
provide teachers of Arabic and it should not be difficult to do so
since the Billing and Meridi training schools were training for that
1. Report of the International Commission on Secondary Education in
the Sudan, Appointed by the Sudan Government. February, 1955$
Khartoum, 1957•
2. Ibid., p. 4.8.
3» Ibid., p. 5.
69
purpose. They also thought that with a little effort some of the
Bakht er ftuda students could learn Dinka in order to be able to
teach Arabic in Dinka schools and use it for conversational
*!
purposes in the lower classes.' They thought "it would be a
waste of time and energy to try to teach the children of the south
in their own vernacular, in which they would not be able to pursue
any reading after they leave school." They tried to equate the
situation with that in the Red Sea Hills, the Nuba Mountains and /
the Egyptian children in the region of Nubia from Aswan Southwards
where the people have their own vernacular.
This is where the Committee had failed to note the
difference in the political background between the North and the
South and the impact of over half a century of European Christian
missionaries and the problem posed by the anxiety felt by former
missionary school pupils who would naturally fear, though perhaps
with no valid reasons,that they would be rendered useless in their
own country. This feeling was probably one of the main reasons
behind the political tension between the North and the South. It
was not a question of what would happen to those who were to go
to school but wnat would be felt towards this change by those who
had already left, few as they were?
The Commission drafted a programme for the Arabioization
of the Curricula and medium of instruction in the South.^ They
suggested that the change from vernacular to Arabic in the elementary
2, Report of International Commission on Secondary Education, p.52.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 32.
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schools did not need to be abrupt. It could be effected in the
course of two or three years, during which it would be possible
to devise a number of appropriate methods of teaching Arabic as a
foreign language in the first two years, and to use it as a medium
of instruction in the remaining years . They noted that this had
already begun. As regards the intermediate school they thought
it did not need to wait to begin the teaching of Arabic till it had
been taught and used as a medium of instruction in elementary
schools. Since all government intermediate schools had already
begun teaching Arabic, this should continue for two or three
years till the elementary school leavers had had their education
in Arabic. These could be taught the intermediate syllabuses in
Arabic. After another four years, leavers from intermediate
schools would have had their education in Arabic, and could,
therefore, start having their secondary education in Arabic. In
this way, the secondary schools of the South would be able to begin
using Arabic as a medium of education after a maximum period of
seven years. Intermediate schools would be able to use Arabic in
teaching after three years, while elementary schools, where this
had already begun at the time, would be able to teach all classes
in Arabic after three years.
The Commission described this scheme as simple and
natural, avoiding all unnecessary complications resulting from
trying to give life to vernaculars which could not develop as fully
fledged languages. They concluded that "If the children of the
South are to be Sudanese citizens, every barrier in the way of
putting them on a par with their compatriots should be removed
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as soon as possible."^
Two years after the submission of the report and
one year after independence the Sudan Government decided to take
over the missionary schools in the South, as it had taken charge
of the Ahlia Schools in the North. The news of the tatfe-over was
given by the Minister of Education to a Conference of representatives
of the missionary societies which he nad invited to Khartoum in
February 1957* The Minister thanked the missionary societies
2
for their rormer efforts in the field of education and wished that
they would co-operate with the Ministry in the process of handing
over. He intimated that, as the missionaries were aware, it was
the Government's considered policy to take direct and full charge
of education in the Southern provinces . The minister then spelt
out the process of the implementation of this policy. He said it
was his decided policy to take immediate steps as from the beginning
of the academic year for taking full charge of all village schools
in the three provinces a3 v/ell a3 all the boys* elementary education.
As regards the girls* elementary schools, though it was the
Government's intention to be ultimately in charge of them, the
minister realising the difficulties, particularly of the staffing
problems, expressed his intention of a gradual plan for taking them
over.
1. Report of the International Commission on Secondary Education, p.53»
2. Text of the Minister of Education's speech at the conference in
Khartoum in February 1957» Appendix F(l) p. 185• The Sudan Cross¬
roads of Africa, by Beshir Mohammed Said, London, 1965* N.B. The
Minister of Education was Sayed Ziada Osman Arbab who continued
to serve as Minister of Education from 1956 to November 1962.
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The six mission vernacular teacher training centres
also came under the proposed plan but he thought the majority of
them had become redundant and should therefore be put to other
educational use. As for the three mission intermediate schools
they were to continue until such a time as it would be practicable
for the Government to take them over. He hoped that this would
be possible within one or two years. The same would be the case
with the three technical schools until they were visited by the
staff of the Khartoum Technical Institute and reported upon. The
Minister described the policy as consistent with the right of every
sovereign state to educate its children, and announced his decision
to open three Government intermediate schools in the South that year.
On religious instruction he assured the representatives of the
missions that, "Every facility will be given in all schools for
religious instruction according to the boys' and girls* beliefs
and the Church will continue, in agreement with headmasters and
Province Education Officers, to advise on the spiritual needs of
boys and girls in schools. In other words the taking over of
the schools by Government has nothing to do with the missions'
efforts in the field of religion."*
The Minister's address gave rise to a number of comments
and questions to which explanations were given by the Minister and
2
the senior civil servants who attended with him. Then the
1. Ibid.. p. 188.
2. Text of deliberations of the Minister of Education conference
with the representatives of the Christian missionary societies,
Said, pp. 93-98.
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representatives of the Church Missionary Society, the American
Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission welcomed the policy after
the clarifications made by the Minister and his staff and
promised full co-operation in the process of transference. This
was acknowledged by the Minister in the debate on the subject in
the House of Representatives.* The representatives of the Roman
Catholic Mission, which was to be affected more than the others,
took a different stand. They were more reluctant to accept the
new policy and asked for a separate meeting the following morning.
In that meeting the Roman Catholic Mission representatives put
forward a memorandum and explained their point of view as regards
p
the Government policy. Bishop Baroni 3poke first, giving the
bishops* views on the scheme in general. He raised the question
of whether the take-over was meant to include the ownership of
school buildings and property? The Minister replied that he did
not intend to go deep into that question at that stage, but if the
mission's representatives liked it the figures of subventions paid
since 1927 could be produced and in the light of this fact it might
not be difficult to argue where the ownership lay.
After that Bishop Baroni brought forward the question of
lease terras and said that he and his colleagues were only trustees
and were not therefore in a position to give away the buildings and
1. Text of the Minister of Education's speech in Parliament on
18th June 1937, and the debate that followed it. Proceedings of
the House of Representatives, Sudan Parliament, 18 June, 1937.
Said, p. 190.
2. Minutes of the meeting between the Minister of Education and
representatives of the Roman Catholic Mission held at Khartoum
10 a.m. ll+.tn February 1937# Said, p. 98.
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property without reference to the Holy See, but the Government
could rent them in legal terms. The Minister pointed out that
there was no need to question the ownership of the buildings. The
important point was whether tne church would allow the Ministry of
Education to use the scnools for the education of Sudanese boys
without prejudice to the rights of either Government or Church.
Bishop Baroni agreed that that was a good and
satisfactory arrangement and that they were ready to discuss the
details of handing over the schools. He added that they had
already prepared proposals as a basis for discussion and he produced
a written note which was distributed to the members. The note
opened with the following words "In the three Southern provinces
the management and administration of Catholic schools (but not the
property of them) could be transferred to the Government Education
Authority, by agreement with the Holy See, under suitable
P
guarantees, through an Act of the Sudan Parliament.
The Minister suggested that this passage be deleted as
the question of ownership could only be decided by the Sudan
Government and with the party that signed the lease contract. The
Holy See, he added, was no party to the contract. This tvas followed
by a rather long Legal discussion about the bishops* right to
negotiate on behalf of the Holy See and the legality or otherwise
of the Minister of Education negotiating with His Holiness the Pope
on such matters. The Director of Education intervened by saying
that he expected the meeting to discuss the details of handing
over, but he thought this first proposal undermined the whole scheme.
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The Minister asked whether it could be agreed that the admini¬
stration of the schools was an individual affair for the Minister
and not a bilateral one? He stressed the point that the Holy See
was not a party in any lease contract.
Bishop Baroni replied that it was not a question of
contract but a basic right under international law. The Minister
answered that it did not come under the laws of the Sudan and that
international law was not binding. To this Bishop NWson 3aid that
international law should be binding in so far as it affected freedom
of religion. Here the Director of Education referred to Section 5(1)
of the Constitution which was quoted in the Minister's speech as
guaranteeing the freedom of religion. The Director added that the
Minister's speech was quite considerate when it stated that "The
question of ownership of property is left in abeyance*; 'the
bishops accept in principle the policy declared*; and 'it is for
the bishops to put up matters discussed at the meeting to the
Holy See".
In the light of these points and of the Government
statement that the administration and management of schools was an
individual responsibility of the Minister of Education and not a
bilateral one, the meeting proceeded to discuss the individual
items of the note.
(a) 'A reasonable rent should be paid from year to year by the
Government Education Authority to the Church Authority for
the school buildings of the transferred schools.*
The Minister suggested that the Government could enter
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the premises as a 'tenant at will* until the question of ownership
was settled. The representatives of the Church demanded an
explanation of the term before they could give their agreement.
This was explained as meaning that the Government enters the premises
without paying rent but it can be removed at the will of the Church
provided the question of ownership is settled in its favoujj?^ After
some discussion it was agreed that the Government would for the time
being occupy the buildings with the consent of the Church as a
'tenant at will'. If the ownership was determined in favour of
the Church, the Government mignt be asked to pay rent or vacate
the premises.
(b) 'All the schools so transferred should be held, maintained, kept
in repair and managed by the Government .Education Authority.*
(c) 'A Church Representative should be included in the National
Education Council, in each Province Education Committee, arid
in each District Education Committee on the same ba3is as any
other member of the said Council or Committee."
The Assistant Director of Education for the Southei*n
Provinces explained that education committees in provinces and
districts did not exist yet and the question of forming them would
not arise before the councils were warranted by the Ministry of
Local Government. The "National Education Council" also was as
yet not constituted. The present practice, he added was that the
Province Education Officer and the Mission Education Secretary
agreed on all points of how re1igious instruction should be
catered for. He assured them that in point of fact the Province
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Education Officer never ignored Church representation in the
matter.
Bishop Mason said that when they referred to Committees
they meant that they might be formed from the Province Education
Officers and the Education Secretaries, and that it was not only
religious instruction they were thinking of, but the general
atmosphere of the school. The Government side agreed that should
a "National Educational Council" or province and district committees
come into being, representation of the Church would be welcomed to
give the Church's point of view with regard to religious instruction.
(d) 'Catholic teachers in their training courses should be given
full religious training and, before graduation, should pass an
examination set by the Church representative.'
The Assistant Director of Education for the Southern
Provinces pointed out that in practice such a proposal would not
work well. He explained that a teacher might one day say that
though he was a devoted Catholic he did not like to teach religion.
A discussion followed in which some amendments were suggested.
Finally it was agreed that the proposal should be as follows:
"Teachers eligible for appointment to the transferred
Catholic schools should be given full religious training; and if
they have to teach religion, they should pas3 an examination set
by the Church representatives in the training centre before
graduation." Then they moved to the folbwing item.
(e) 'Before appointing the teachers of religion to the transferred
Catholic schools the Government Education Authority should
7d
submit their names to the Church Authority for approval.'
It was agreed that proposal (d) in its amended form covered this.
(f) 'To avoid conflicting ideologies or friction within the schools,
the Church Authority should be able to request the withdrawal
of those teachers whose character, conduct, or outlook should
prove oxTensxve.*
The meeting agreed to this provided the charge could be proved.
(g) 'The Headmasters of the transferred Catholic schools should
be Catholic.*
After a short discussion this was amended to reads
"The headmasters of the transferred elementary Catholic schools
should be Catholic for the next three years and whenever possible
in future."
(h)'The majority of the teachers of the Catholic transferred
schools should be Catholic.'
It was agreed that this be accepted with the insertion of "whenever
possible" at the end.
(i) *In these schools priority should be given to Catholics and
adherents, although others should be accepted too.*
It was pointed out that this contradicted the principle
of equal rights for all children and indicated that there was
discrimination on the part of the Church and the Government. In
practice the great majority of pupils in Catholic areas would
continue to be Catholics; but the door should be open for
competition. The meeting dec'ded that this proposal should be
omitted.
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(j) 'The time set apart for religious instruction, for religious
services and for school holidays in Catholic transferred schools
should not be less than that so set apart according to the use
and tradition of the former management of the schools. The
curriculum and text-books for religious instruction should
(continue to) be fixed by the Catholic Church Authority. A
priest appointed by the Church Authority should be allowed to
enter the schools at all times set apart for religious
instruction or observance, for the purpose of supervising (and
assisting in teaohing) and for prayers (through contacting the
headmaster). The Government Education Authority should give
facilities for the holding of religious examinations in every
such school (which is the present practice).'
This was accepted with the insertion of the phrases between brackets,
(k) 'Only Catholic religion should be taught in Catholic transferred
schools.'
After a short discussion it was agreed that, at the
time, there was no need for this proposal as non-Catholics did not
present a problem. Should such a situation arise in future, the
"Church Authority" should agree with the Assistant Director of
Education for the Southern Provinces to provide facilities for
teaching religion to non-Catholics.
(1) 'Parents should have the opportunity of choosing the school
they prefer for their children.'
This item was accepted.
(m) 'vhere there is a sufficient number of pupils who ask for a
8u
Catholic school, as may be certified by the Catholic Church
Authority arid ascertained by the Government Education Authority,
the latter should provide for them a new school, to be held,
maintained and managed by them subject to the conditions
applicable to Catholic transferred schools, except for property
and rent.'
This was amended to reads
'Newly-opened schools which are attended by Catholic children
should be subject to the conditions applicable to transferred
schools wherever possible.*
(n) 'Provision should be made for some Catholic transferred schools
to be headed and staffed by religious personnel, while being
run and administered as Government owned schools.*
This was discussed at some length and amended to read:
'Religious personnel qualified for teaching may be employed
by the Goverament Education Authority, taking into consideration
that they should live as a community whenever possible. *
Other demands on the Catholic bishops memorandum were:
2. 'Provision should be made for some private (fee-paying)
Catholic schools to be established in due course.'
This was accepted after deleting "in die course" and substituting
"After the lapse of three to four years."
3. 'The management of transferred schools should pay
scrupulous attention to the behaviour of pupils and teachers
to eliminate the possibility of interference with the running
of the mission. *
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It was agreed that the Government would observe this strictly.
4. *Any complications which might arise in any of the
Catholic transferred schools, especially those which are in
the Church compound, should be considered and solved by a
board of representatives from both sides.1
This was accepted.
It should be noted that the medium of instruction and
the nationality of the teachers were not referred to in the
Catholic bishops memorandum or in the discussions. The Government
attitude seems to have been to try to allay the fears of the Church
over the issue of religious freedom and to give the guarantees
required towards that end. It is also evident that the Government
was Interested to emphasise its rights to be in charge of the
education of all the children in the country. To the Government
this was the practice of sovereignty and the duty of unifying the
country through the unification of the system of education.
The attitude of the missionaries in the field was
expressed by The Messenger, a Roman Catholic newspaper published
in the South. In an article published on February 15# 1957# the
day after the Ministers meeting with the Catholic representatives
in Khartoum, the Messenger wrote.^ "Our Catholic schools have
been founded at the cost of great sacrifice to give these children
a good Catholic education. Parents are under a grave obligation
1. The Messenger, February 15# 1957# cited in the Republic of the
Sudan, *Expu1sion of Foreign Missionaries from the Southern
Provinces," Ministry of Interior, Khartoum, I96I4.. Mohamed Oraer
Beshir, The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict, London,
1968, p. 77.
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to send, their children to Catholic Schools, and the law of the
Church insists that they may not send them to non-Catholic schools
without permission frcan the Bishop. In these days when the
state is endeavouring to claim complete control of education, we
wish to make it clear that no Catholic can ever admit such a
claim. The Church has been given a speoial mandate and right by
Christ to share in teaching mankind. Parents have the right as
well as the duty to educate the children given them by God. These
rights of the Church and the parents must therefore be respected by
the state." This was a manifestation of the conflict between the
administration and the missions In the Southern Sudan. The
Government was basing its argument on its rights as an independent
sovereign state, while the Church was relying on theological
arguments, each of the two arguments started from a completely
different premises and was right in relation to its own system of
logic though unacceptable to the other side.
The implementation of the new policy was not an easy
task and had naturally created a number of problems.^" The main
problem was the language problem. With the introduction of Arabic
the children had to learn the Arabic script, which is different
from the Roman script, and to grapple with new problems of
pronunciation. The position was particularly difficult at the
transitional stage because in some schools the child was expected
to learn three languages, his own vernacular, English and Arabic.
1. Sir al Khatim al Khalifa, "Education in the Southern Provinces".
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It was also found out that the Village School should be retained
as the base of education in the South. The Village School was
started by the Christian missionaries as a school teaching a two
year course of reading, writing, arithmetic and scripture using
the local vernacular, written in Latin alphabet, as a medium of
instruction. The reason far this was that when the missionary
societies appeared on the scene in the Southern Provinces, they had
to find a way of getting at the scattered population, and a simple
mud and grass building where catechiats could meet was the
solution and it was these catechumenates that gradually developed
into what came to be known as the Village School.
Thus it was found that the village school was the most
practical and inexpensive way of teaching reading and writing in
an area of scattered population such as the Southern Provinces.
It also had the other advantage of not taking the children away
from their homes and local environment for at least the first two
years of their schooling, after which they could go on to a central
elementary baarding school to complete their four years of education.
So it was found that the village school would fit into the proposed
new plan for education in the Sudan which was supposed to provide
for six years of schooling in the first stage instead of four."*"
Marafdi Teacher Training Institute came to do for
elementary education In the South what Bakht er Ruda was doing in
2
the North and drew extensively on the experience of the latter.
1. Ministry of Education, A New Plan for Education In The Sudan,
Khartoum, 1961.
2. Ma jailat-bakht er Ruda, October, 1959, Khas bil'Id al-flddt,
"bakrit er Ruda waj-jannb", Sir al Khatira al Khalifa pp.32 * 33;
"Ma'had Maridi" by Hassan Abbas pp. 76,77] Ahmed Hamid el
Faki, p. 15.
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The same was done in relation to the intermediate schools.
Paradoxically enough it was secondary education that posed the
least problem as the only secondary school was established by the
Government and hence run on the same lines as the secondary
schools in the North. This was made all the more easier because
English was the medium of instruction in the Northern secondary
schools at the time.1
In June 1957 the Minister of Education gave a speech
2
in Parliament explaining his policy as a natural development of
the grants-in-aid that were increasingly given to the missionary
schools since 1927 and as a result of the recommendations of the
Ministerial Commission for the South and of his personal satis¬
faction after visiting the South. He paid special tribute to the
Church Mission Societies, the American Mission and the Sudan
Interior Mission as "having displayed particularly good spirits
in the taking-over procedure." It could be noticed that he left
out the Catholic Mission from any particular reference. He
reiterated the advantages of a nationally controlled arid unified
system of education and the immediate advantages for the people
of the South in terms of number of schools and jobs. The latter
were summarized as:
1. The existing 51 boys' elementary schools, which were
1. English continued to be the medium of instruction in the
Secondary Schools until 1965 when it was decided to change over,
gradually, into Arabic.
2. The text of the Minister of Education's speech in Parliament on
18 June 1957* and the debate that followed it. Proceedings of
the House of Representatives, Sudan Parliament, lo June, 1957*
Khartoum, 1957.
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being taken over, would eventually be run as schools with double
third and double fourth years and consequently their output would
be doubled. This meant that the experience in the North with
-T
"al-wadrasa-dhat-ar-ra*alg" which was used to promote sub-grade
school children to elementary schools, this experience was trans¬
ferred to the South to promote village school children to
elementary schools.
2. The number of elementary teachers serving in them would
be increased by the same proportion and they would all be
Southerners.
3. A great number of the existing mission teachers would
have the chance of promotion to headmaster posts open to them.
If. It was not intended to make any transfer of staff
except where necessitated by reason of promotion. The schools
would therefore retain their character and atmosphere.
5. Nine intermediate schools would be opened within
three years time. It was decided to open three of those in
January 1958.
6. The number of supervisors, teachers in charge of village
schools, would be increased and they would all be Southerners.
7. Normal expansion would also proceed according to the
plan which would be drawn for the South as an underdeveloped region
on the recommendations of the Ministerial Jommission for the South.
8. Southern Sudanese Fathers and Brothers would be
eligible for employment as teachers.
The execution of the take-over was"*- estimated to cost
1. Ibid.
86
£2,070,036. Capital expenditure on new schools and replacement
of some unsuitable mission schools was estimated at £1,208,077*
On the personnel side over 850 masters in the elementary and
village schools were taken over into Government service which meant
a substantial increase in their salaries. It was obvious that the
decision was a political and not an economic one.
In October 1959 Education in the South was dealt with in
the Minister of Education's long address at the 25th Anniversary of
Bakht er Ruds.* The Minister said that although he talked about
the educational situation and policy for the whole Sudan, the
increased attention paid to education in the South necessitated a
special place in his address for the elucidation of the Government
policy towards education and its development in the Southern
Provinces. This was almost one year after the military had re¬
placed parliamentary Government in Sudan. But the person and office
of the Minister of Education was not changed, nor was there a change
of policy. So it was rather an account of what had be si dene since
February 1957» The Minister said that two years or more had
passed since the beginning of the taking over of schools from the
missionary societies in the Southern Provinces. The taking over
of those schools and the consolidation of work in them and its
organisation along new lines was the most important activity the
1. It is interesting to note the change of tone in this address
with the addresses of the same minister when he was addressing
the Bishops or Parliament in 1957 with reoognised Southern
representation. With the Missionary representatives the
emphasis was on religious freedom, in Parliament it was on the
benefits and chances open for Southern teachers and children,
in Bakht er Ruda Address, the emphasis was on Arabicization and
unifi cation.
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offices of the Ministry in those provinces had undertaken during
the past two years. He stated that it was possible to say then
that the policy which was drawn up by the Ministry in February
1957 aa regards the missionary schools had been fully carried out
and that the Ministry was , at the time of his address, fully and
directly supervising those schools.
On the expansion, the Minister said that though the
execution of the policy on the taking over had absorbed most of the
efforts of the education offices in the South during the past three
years, this did not deprive the Southern Provinces from their share
in expansion. For boys in intermediate schools, technical
education included, the chances had almost doubled while the number
of places in elementary schools had increased to a considerable
extent, so that more chances were provided for increasing numbers
of village school pupils to follow up their education. The
Ministry, he told the audience, was exerting great efforts in
encouraging girls* education to catch up with boys* and he hoped
that Meridi Intermediate Girls' School would play an important role
in th&t respect.
The iraplementation of that policy, the Minister was glad
to tell his audience, "led to remarkable progress in the field of
education and spread in it a new spirit that enabled him to hope
that the young generation would be brought up in a true national
spirit and would be given the education that would enable them to
contribute in the building of a happier future for the country.3"
1. Ibid., p. 22.
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So the education offices in the South continued their efforts and
worked relentlessly towards the achievement of two important aims
which he specified as (1) the Arabieization of the syllabuses until
Arabic became the language of instruction in all the subjects and
(2) the unification of the curriculaja»xunti1 it became similar to
what was being taught in the North through the introduction of the
Bakht er Ruda Syllabi in the Schools of the South.
Towards the first aim, he thought, a good distance had
been covered as Arabic was then taught in all the elementary,
intermediate and secondary schools as a main subject included in
the entrance examination to the latter two. It was also used as
a medium of instruction in an increasing number of schools
especially in Upper Nile Province where the number of the elementary
Arabic schools1 reached twenty-three out of a total of thirty-four.
The Minister also told his audience that the progress of
Arabicization was satisfactory as there were boys' intermediate
schools teaching "the Northern Syllabus and in Arabic" in each of
Malakal, Bor, Rank, Wau, Juba and Meridi. There was also an
intermediate technical school temporarily opened at Kosti. Some
progress was also made in this direction in girls* schools as
there were elementary Arabic girls schools in each of Juba, Torit,
Wau, fiumbek, Tonj, Khar Shsmam, Malakal (two schools), Kadok
and Kaiker.
The Minister expressed his hope that the coming few years
1. Arabic schools means schools run on Northern lines.
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would witness speedy progress in the spread of Arabic language in
the village schools as the Ministry had made great efforts at the
Institutes of Tonj and Malakal in the training of village school
teachers so that they would be able to teach Arable and to teach
part of the Bakht er Ruda elementary school syllabus. There were
at the time over a hundred teachers at TonJ and Malakal training
for this purpose and also an equal number of 3outhern teachers were
attached to the schools of the Northern provinces, in the past two
years, far a period of a whole year. Vfoen they returned to the
South they had a sufficient knowledge of Arabic with which they
were able to teach in all the classes of the elementary school.
The second main aim towards the achievement of which
the ministry was diligently working, was the unification of the
curricula through the Introduction of the Bakht er Ruda syllabuses
in the South until the system of education in the South would be
unified with that in the North. So that there would be one school
atmosphere and one educational environment for all the children in
the Sudan with no difference whether they were in its Southern or
Northern part.
The Minister emphasised the role of Bakht er Ruda and
its valuable effects in the field of education in the Southern
provinces. These had led to the introduction of many improvements
in the system in both the administrative and pedagogical aspects.
"The tours of inspection arranged by the staff of Bakht er Ruda had
the greatest and best results in raising and improving the standard
of work in many ways." "The training courses that were provided
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at Bakht er Huda and Billing for some headmasters arid teachers
from the South had a profound meaning as it lad strengthened
their spirits, renewed their vitality and braodened their horizons
in a way that enabled them to turn to their work a fuller grasp and
greater zeal to cope with their responsibilities,"
This policy outlined in the Minister's address at
Bakht er Ruda's anniversary showed how education came to be viewed
as an important vehicle for the creation of national unity. The
confusion of unity with uniformity had led to the adoption of the
use of the Bakht er Huda Curricula in the South in spite of
environmental differences. This uniformity is one of the problems
for other parts of the country in the East and in the West as well.
The policy did not tackle the problem of the former educated
Southerners. Though nothing was done to hamper their careers,
nothing was said or done to allay their fears. Such a policy in
trying to save the future led almost to the losing of the present.
The old educated Southerners came to think that "The old southern
elite is now considered 'illiterate* by Sudanese standards.""*"
The existence at the time of a military regime which
suppressed recogaised opposition aggravated the situation in the
South particularly among the educated Southerners who came to view
the stepping up of Arabiclzation in education and Islamicisation
among the pagan chiefs as attempts to assimilate the South and
alienate them, while handing over the leadership to traditional
chiefs, j Some of them left the country and started to organize
1. Oduhu and Deng, The Problem of the Southern Sudan, p. ij.7.
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opposition from outside. The activities of the self-exiled
Southern leaders and the internal troubles .in the south came to be
viewed by the military government as sponsored by church
organisations abroad, particularly the Roman Catholic Church, and
instigated by the foreign missionaries in the South. Thus a
series of restrictions came to be imposed on missionary activities
in the South. This culminated in the military Government
announcing on February 27, 1962, the expulsion of all Christian
missionaries from the Southern Sudan.1 At the time there were
617 Christian missionaries working in the Sudan, 503 Catholics and
Hip Protestants belonging to Church Missionary Society, American
Presbyterian, African Inland and Sudan Interior Missions. Those
affected by the expulsion were 272 Verona Fathers and 29 Protestants.
Those working in the N rth were allowed to continue their
educational and other activities. The expulsion of the missionaries
resulted in the Government getting bad publicity abroad and the
Southern leaders of opposition getting more support.
In the meantime, political events in the Southern Sudan
were taking a new turn. The Array's repressive measures in the
South drove thousands of Southerners outside the 3udan into Uganda,
Kenya, Ethiopia and Central African Republic. The leading educated
Southerners and former Parliamentarians who fled the country formed
into organisations, the "Sudan Christian Association" and the *Sudan
African Closed Districts National Union". The latter, In a
1. Mohamed Oraer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict.
London, 1968, pp. 81-82.
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petition addressed to the United Nations in 1963, declared that
its policy was independence for the Southern Sudan. Independence
was demanded, according to this petition, because they had failed
to obtain federation.* SCANENU changed its name in 196 3 to SANU,
but there was no change in aims. Its headquarters were
established at Leopoldville in the Congo. Its activities
consisted mainly of petitioning the United Nations and the
Organisation of African Unity, supplying information on events in
the Southern Sudan to journalists and organisations and helping
the refugees.
Inside the Southern Sudan the troubles which were
conspicuous in the schools, spread Into the countryside. In 1963
the Anya-nya terrorist organisation appeared on the scene. The
Anya-nya was composed mainly of ex-soldiers of the Equatoria Carps
who fled to the bush after the mutiny of 1955 and others who were
released from prisons on completion of sentence or as a gesture
of good will by the military regime from time to time. The
format ion of the Anya-nya resulted from discontent with the 'more
peaceful attempts by the leaders of the Sudan African National
Union to reach a settlement'. Its activities were directed
against Northerners as well as Southerners who co-operated with
the Government. This resulted in many innocents being killed
either by army operations or Anya-nya activities. Hence the
exodus of thousands of refugees from the South to neighbouring
countries. Northern public opinion was becoming restless over the
1. Ibid., p. 83-
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situation in the South. Even memhers of the Central Council
which General Abboud had established early ^n the year, questioned
the wisdom of the policy which was followed by the military
Government in the South. The government at last decided to
investigate the problem on a wider basis. A Commission of Enquiry
was appointed in September 196if consisting of nineteen Southerners
and thirteen Northerners. The Commission was asked to study the
factors which hindered harmony between the Northern and Southern
parts of the country and to make recommendations with a view to
consolidate confidence and achieve internal stability without
infringing the Constitutional structure or the principle of a
Unitary Government.
SANU criticism of the Commission was that "In the first
place, half of the Southern representation is selected from among
illiterate and semi-illiterate chiefs, thus showing no genuine
attempt to include the Southern intelligentsia. Secondly, under
the terms of reference, the Commission is officially prohibited to
suggest or recommend anything infringing the present constitutional
structure, on the principle of a Unitary Government. Thirdly,
the Government pretends to find the root cause of political conflict
while deliberately ignoring the Southern political leaders!"''"
It was not only Southern political leaders wno felt
themselves Ignored but also Northern political leaders felt the
same towards the military Government. The intelligentsia in the
1. SANU, "Memorandum presented by SANU to the Commission of the
O.A.U. for refugees." Published in M.O. Beshir, The Southern
Sudan, p. 86.
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North was also resentful of the army rule. This was particularly
clear in the University of Khartoum where opposition to the
Government repressive policy in the South came not only from the
annually increasing numbers of Southern students but also, and
no less vehemently, from their Northern colleagues. Statements
of denunciation were issued by various student political groups
and in the session that began in July 1961*. the South became the
dominant issue in the students political activities. Serious
discussions on the subject started to emerge inside and outside
the University. This took the form of leaflets, wallpapers,
articles in the press, or pamphlets by individuals or groups.
The Government*s general invitation to the people to
contribute ideas towards a political solution for the Southern
problem was immediately taken up by the University of Khartoum
students who organised a public seminar on the South. Amongst
the participants were some of the University lecturers one of
whom summed up the spirit of the meeting by saying that the
existence of a military dictatorship was incompatible with the
search for and attainment of a political solution. This alarmed
the Government and public discussions were prevented. The
students decided to defy the Government and called for another
seminar on the South despite repeated warnings by the military
government. The students gathered for the discussion on the eve
of the 21st October 196i|, clashed with the police and one of the
students died as the result of the police shooting during the riots.
This set off violent demonstrations in Khartoum which culminated in
95
a general strike throughout the country. Within a week's time
the military regime was overthrown.
The selection as Prime Minister of Sir al Khatim al
Khalifa, a former Assistant Director of Education in the South,
known for his wide knowledge of Southern affairs and problems,
the appointment of Clement Mboro, a Catholic Southerner, as Minister
of the Interior in charge of security all over the Sudan, was an
indication of a genuine desire on the part of the North to reach
a peaceful solution. The overthrow of the military regime was
welcomed by SANXJ, and no time was lost by its leaders to renew
their contacts with the new Government. In a memorandum addressed
to the Prime Minister, the Southern political leaders in exile
expressed their desire to return to the Sudan on the following
conditions. ^
"(a) That a General "mnesty be declared by the
Government for all the refugees most of whom may choose to return.
(SANU) would be prepared to encourage the return to the Sudan.
(b) That SANU be recognised as a political party to
fight the coming general elections on the policy of a Federal
Sudan. Since SANU do not differ with the Southern Liberal Party
on the issue of federation, the two may merge into one party
representing the Southern Sudanese.
(c) That a written guarantee by your Government that
none of the refugees and SANU leaders will be victimised, be
1. Letter from Sudan African National Union (SANU) to Prime Minister
of the Sudan on political relations between North and South,
Nove. 1964, published in M.O. Beshir The Southern Sudan, Appendix
10, pp. 151+-158.
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deposited with the Secretary General of the Organisation of African
Unity (O.A.U.) in Addis-Ababa and with the Secretary General of the
United Nations in New York.
(d) That a round-table Conference between all Sudanese
Political Parties with representatives from the Judiciary,1 the
2 3
University and the Trade UnionJ leaders be convened to discuss the
general lines of a working constitutional relationship between North
and South. In the capacity of observers and advisors, the
Secretariat-General of O.A.U. and the neighbouring African countries
including U.A.R. should be represented at the Conference.
(e) That Colonial laws, such as the 'Closed Districts
Ordinance' which restricts freedom of entry into the South by non-
Southerners and foreigners be repealed. While we agree that
entrance into the Sudan be controlled through the normal laws of
immigration, we do not agree that the Closed District's Ordinance
and the 'Missionary Societies Act, 1962* are necessary. The Act
restricts religious freedom for Christians, contrary to the
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is
not religious freedom to require anyone to obtain a permit of
baptism from a secular Government as it is the case under the Act.
(f) Accept the fact that the Sudan is an Afro-Arab
State with two distinct personalities, cultures and temperament,
Negroid and Arab, quite apart from the religious and language
question. Neither Islam nor Christianity can unite the Sudan, nor
1,2,3. In recognition of their r le in overthrowing the military
regime.
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can the Arabic language, all of which have been given considerable
stress in recent years. Unity in diversity is the answer to the
Southern problem and this can be found in a federal constitution.
The Southern struggle which is essentially political embraces
Southerners of all creeds - Christians, Muslims, Pagans, etc.
There should be no fear for the federation which has
helped to keep together different peoples in many parts of the
world. Two thirds of the world is in fact federated. The two
greatest world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are
federations. In Africa we have the example of Nigeria.1 Forced
control of the South using the old abandoned Colonial tactics of
delay or assimilation is the surest way of breaking up the country.
(g) Accept the fact that both North and South have
inherited bad historical relations of which nothing has been done
in recent years to prove that history cannot repeat itself. The
Sudan Is so vast a country (nearly 1 million square miles) that no
power in the world can unite it by force. Only full equality,
equal opportunities and mutual trust can keep the Sudan United,
not by involuntary merger of cultures but by giving those different
cultures full and free expression. This is necessary for self
realisation, self fulfilment and satisfaction which are vital for
loyalty and good citizenship. Those who can best guard the
Northern borders of Sudan with other Arab countries such as U.A.R.,
Libya and Saudi Arabia are Sudan Arabs themselves. For the
1. This memorandum was written in November 19614-, when Nigeria
was still a Democratic Federal State.
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Southern Borders, only the Southern negroes if satisfied of their
citizenship can best guard the Southern frontiers with other negro
countries. It is therefore useless to transfer educated Southern¬
ers to the North for political reasons and bring Northerners in
their places. Worst still is the question of nominating Arab
merchant settlers into Southern councils and to represent the
Southerners in Parliament as was the case before the Army take¬
over in N vember 1958*
Nominating a Southern puppet to a high ministerial
post or to a Governorship does not solve the problem either.
What the Southerners want is to satisfy the needs of the few who
have chosen to serve their own interests, but a general
constitutional guarantee which makes good positions in Government
or business a matter of right and not privilege. It is important
that a Southern Minister must have the confidence of the Southerners
as well. Without a constitutional guarantee any Southerner
holding any post can easily find himself reduced to the status of
a messenger once he fails to fulfil the superficial unconstitu¬
tional interest of his employer.
(h) Another Colonial practice which should be abandoned
is the policy of 'divide and rule*. Many educated Southerners are
called by the Northerners half-educated 'mission boys', and the
local Southern tribal chiefs who do not even possess half education
are preferred by the Government to do jobs for which they are not
qualified. j?or example, the Committee of 25 recently set up by
the Government of General Abboud to investigate the Southern problem
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consists of 13 well educated Northerners while of the 12 Southern,
members, half are tribal chiefs who can hardly write their names
and cannot be expected to follow complicated proceedings. Is
this not cheating? Even Britain which is a Colonial power has
recently condemned the abuse of tribal chiefs in Southern Rhodesia
for political reasons.
The above points are made with the full knowledge that
we too are human beings and can make mistakes, but they are made
with a sincere desire to find a lasting solution in the North-South
political conflict. We are not racialists because we are aware
that races have been mixing over the centuries with the result
that few can really trace their original blood. It is mainly
constitutional justice that can create nations.
The Northerners must realise too that the South has
never been given the right to self-determination in their relation
with the North, a right which the North fully exercised in their
relation with Egypt. The South was not represented at the Cairo
Agreement of February 1953 where all the Northern parties were
represented and gave their approval for the signing of the
transitional Constitution by Britain and Egypt. This constitution,
then called Self-government Statute led to the declaration of
independence 195&.
As if to compensate the Southerners for having denied
them representation at the Cairo Agreement, the Northern Political
Parties unanimously passed a resolution in Parliament on December
19, 1955* expressing that the question of federation would be given
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•full consideration* by the Constituent Assembly which was to
draft a permanent constitution. The Northern Political Parties
failed to keep their promise in the Constituent Assembly. They
could not make up their minds about the federation and after much
confusion and delay, General Abboud seized power in the bloodless
coup d*etat of November 17# 1958. Some political parties were
understood to have connived with the Army for the take-over to
deal with the South but we are now disillusioned through bitter
experience.
We have forced the Army to climb down and we are back
to where we stopped in 1958. We now have the transitional
constitution of 1956 and we are going to elect a Constituent
Assembly to enact a permanent constitution. So far so good,
but are w© going to have enough courage to break the vioious
circle? Surely the North can do without the South, and vice versa
for the South, but this extreme may be avoided by thinking straight
and more honestly. A Central Government should be set up to
deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Currency Control while
State Governments will exercise the powers not assigned to Central
Government. In this way Northern merchants in the South who
consider themselves as little governors under the existing system
will stop politios and concentrate on economic development. Under
a federal system they will know their bosses ar-e in the South and
not in Khartoum.
!• See, The Problem of the Southern. Sudan, by J. Oduho & William
Deng. pp. 37-38.
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The argument that the South could not federate because
It lacked economy and education can no longer apply, judging by
the present standards elsewhere in Africa. Authoritative reports
by economic experts known to some of us have ranked the South
among the best economic potentially rich countries in Africa. It
first needs development which cannc : be had fully without settling
the political questions. The Southerners can no longer be told
whether they have the wealth or not because they know it. However,
there is a good saying that * freedom has no price1. We are
convinced beyond doubt that the Southerners would prefer freedom
in poverty to slavery in wealth. During the last Parliament
closed by the military coup, it was most discouraging to see
Southern Members of Parliament being put under Police Supervision
when they returned to the South during recess. The same thing
did not happen to their colleagues in the North.
Finally, we would like to add that our attitude is
absolutely without prejudice to African Unity and olose co-operation
between African and Arabs. None of us can doubt the great amount
of good being done at the United Nations by the Afro-Asian Block.
It Is because of our desire for Unity that we want to eliminate
mistakes which may endanger unity. As we have seen unity can also
be federal."
The memorandum of SANU concluded that "If however our
>
humble presentations are disregarded by the new civilian Government
that has long been awaited, and now that we have made our position
clear to the world, we are prepared to tighten our belts and to
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continue the struggle. We will continue to draw the attention
of African and Arab countries to the problem in the Sudan and we
will go to the United Nations. Refusal to grant our demands for
full participation in the Government of our country will render us
powerless to prevent extremists from resorting to armed resistance
when driven to despair. The resulting situation could harm
political relations and economic progress in the African countries
particularly our nearest neighbours."
The new Government lost no time in accepting the idea
of a Round Table Conference between Northern and Southern political
parties. The Government was in close touch with the Southern
Front, a new political organisation which was formed mainly by
educated Southerners in Khartoum as representative of the Southern
opinion and was invited to join the National Government. The two
Southern ministers in the Cabinet and the Southern member on the
State Council spoke in its names. The Southern Front was
considered SANU*s representative inside the Sudan but later on it
became a separate political party.
On December 10, the Prime Minister made his awaited bid,
and responded to SANU*s memorandum by declaring a general amnesty
to all Sudanese who had fled the country since January 1955 and to
those who were tried in Absentia or wanted for trial on any
political charge. He appealed to the refugees and the leaders
in exile to return to the Sudan.
The months that followed were spent on the difficult
task of bringing the more militant groups in SANU and the SOUTHERN
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FRONT to the Conference table with the Northern political parties
inside the Sudan."'" This was dene in March 16-29, 1965, when the
Southern educated political leaders met their oounterparts from
the North in Khartoum at the Round Table Conference held on March
16-29, 1965. Whatever the assessment of the Round Table Conference
might be and whoever might be responsible for its failure to
reach a final solution for the problem of the South and its
relationship with the North, jet it certainly succeeded in
starting a dialogue between the Northern and Southern political
p
leaders. A glance at the list of participants in this dialogue
reveals its underlying feature. It was not only a dialogue
between two regions of the country but also a dialogue b etwean
different systems of education.
1. M.O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict, p. 69.
2. Ibid., Appendix Ilj., pp. 165-66.
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CHAPTER III
MISSIONARY" EDUCATION IN THE NORTH
After the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, the Christian
Missionary Societies thought that the way was open to Torae new 5J
links and achieve the old missionary dream of a chain of
missionary stations (from the Cape to Cairo) which had been
advocated by J. ICrapf, the pioneer C.M.S. Missionary in East
1
Africa. The Church Missionary Society and the American Presby¬
terian Mission, both of whom had long experience of work in
Moslem lands, were ready with plans for advance.
On Lord Kitchener's return to Ihgland in 1898 after the
reconquest and while he was advocating his plan for the Gordon
Memorial College, a deputation from the C.M.S. waited on him to
bring before him their plans far the Sudan. They were met with
a refusal of permission to undertake missionary work in the Moslem
Sudan "on the ground that nothing must be done to arouse Moslem
fanaticism", especially as the country had just been reconquered
from the Mahdists who had come to power in 1885 on a wave of Moslem
religious revolt. However Lord Kitchener, as well as Lord Cromer,
?
raised no objections to missionary work in the southern pagan Sudan.
At the C.M.S. Centenary meeting an 2nd May 1899 the
Secretary of the C.M.S. thrilled his audience when he declared:
1. W.W. Cash, The Changing Sudan, London, 1931, p. 78.
Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa, London.
2. J. Spencer Trimingham, Secretary, Church Missionary Society,
Northern Sudan, The Christian Approach to Islam in the Sudan,
O.U.P., 191+8, p. 12.
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"The Committee are preparing to send pioneer parties
into the vast Sudan by the two routes through which it is most
accessible. At Tripoli a small band are studying Hauaa, and will,
God willing, shortly proceed up the Niger for the Hausa States;
and from Cairo in the autumn of the year it is hoped a party will
go up,,the Nile to occupy some places in the equatorial provinces
of the Eastern Sudan. The Committee anticipate that, in answer
to many prayers, the existing interdict on missionary work among
the Mohammedans of the Upper Nile will shortly be removed."3"
The Rev. Llewellyn H. Gwynne was the first C.M.S.
missionary to be sent to the Sudan. He sailed on 3rd November,
1899. When he arrived in Cairo the British authorities would
not allow him to proceed further until the country was pacified;
but on the Khalifa's death? he and Dr. Harpur, the head of the C.M. S.
Hospital in Old Cairo, were allowed to go, on the strict under¬
standing that they were not to apeak to Moslems about Christianity.
Since Missionary work was ruled out and it was impossible at the
time to proceed south, Lord Kitchener asked Mr. Gwynne to act
as chaplain to the troops, there being then no Anglican civilians
in the country. In this way Mr. Gwynne succeeded In gaining the
confidence of the administrative authorities and it was to this
1. Quoted by Trimingham, Ibid., pp. 12-13. I was unable to make
use of the C.M.S. Archives, London, as It was closed for a long
period.
2. The Khalifa was killed on November 2^., 1899. See Cromer, Modern
.ngypt, Vol. II, London, 1908, p. 105.
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early anomalous position as a missionary of the G.M.8. and chaplain
to the administration that he was praised for the happy relation¬
ship between the two branches of the Church of England in the Sudan -
the English Civil population and the work of the G.M.S.
This anomalous and seemingly influential position
continued to be held by Owyrrne for forty-seven years till his
retirement in 191+6.1 But this same position must have made
possible close identification of the Christian missionary work
and British political domination in the eyes of the Moslems of
the Sudan. His long stay, his single-mindedness, his conservative
temperament and his isolation from simple contact with the Sudanese,
as he was surrounded by the British Community in Khartoum, must
nave made it difficult for him and consequently for the C.M.S.
activities in the Sudan to cast off nineteenth century Christian
missionary attitudes toward Islam of hostility and outright
condemnation and to replace them with the increasingly under-
2
standing and sympathetic attitudes towards Islam and other religions
which developed in the Christian missionary movement in the
twentieth century.-^
However, Dr. Harpur, who arrived with Gwynne in 1899,
was allowed to do a little medical work in a mud hut on the edge of
1. When Gwynne retired in 191+6 he had become Anglican Bishop of
Egypt and the Sudan.
2. G.E. Harrison, The Christian Approach to the Musiem, London,
1959.
3. Triraingham, The Missionary Approach, pp. 1+5-55*
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Omdurman, but was hampered by the reputation of •poisoner*
amongst the local Moslem inhabitants who refused to respond to
his work. He returned to his work in Cairo after less than a
o.
year's stay and was succeeded by Dr. Charley Hall.
The United Presbyterian Mission went through a similar
experience. The Rev. Kelly Giffen was their pioneer missionary.
He and Dr. Andrew Watson took a preliminary tour in the Sudan in
1899 to survey the field. In Omdurman they found Mr. Gwynne and
Dr. Harpur, with whom they lodged, thus beginning the era of co¬
operation between the C.M. S. and the American Society which came
to be an important feature of Christian mission work in the Sudan.
On their return to Cairo they reported on the need for an
immediate forward move, and suggested that the Arabic-Speaking
Injlli (Evangelical) Church of Egypt might adopt the Moslem Sudan
as its sphere of missionary enterprise. In 1900 the Rev. Kelly
Giffen and Dr. H.T. McLaughlin, with an Injili pastor, the Rev.
Jabra Hanna, were appointed to the Sudan. As they were about to
leave, the administration, as with the C.M.S., refused thea
permission to work in the North, but promised to grant them all
2 ■
facilities for work beyond, in the pagan parts of the Sudan.
1. Ibid., p. 13, p. 15.
2. This included the Nuba Mountains area which though lying
administratively in Southern Kordofan, which is Northern Province,
they are also lying south of Line 12° latitude which was defined
as the technical boundary between the North and the South, see
L.M. Sanderson, "Educational Development and Administrative
Control in the Nuba Mountains Region of the Sudan" Article in
Journal of African History IV, 2 (1963).
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They proceeded, however, with their wives to Omdurinan, where
they began to gather the members of the Injlli Church who were
working in the Sudan into congregations. Leaving Mr. Hanna to
organize the Injilis they pressed up the White Nile for a survey
which resulted in the reeounnendation that work should be started
amongst the Shiluks on the Sobat River, and eventually in 1902
they set sail to found the station at Doleib Hill. Soon the
Government began to relax their restrictions on the missionary
activities in the North. The prohibition against conversation
with Moslems about religion was withdrawn in 1903**
The relationship of the Catholic Church with the Sudan
was older than that of the Protestant missions. The first
Catholic girls' school in the Sudan was opened at El Obeid in
Kordofan in 1871 by the Catholic Missionary Society which was
a
headed by Monsigaor Daniel Comboni. The next one was opened at
Khartoum in 1873 "by Monsignor Daniel^ Comboni, too, in the Church
compound. Both schools worked until they were destroyed in the
2
Mahdist revolt after the fall of El Obeid and that of Khartoum.
After the reconquest the Catholic missionary work restarted in
1889 and in 1900 the start was given to two Catholic girls*
schools, one in Khartoum, under the name of St. Ann's School, and
the other at Omdurman under the name of St. Joseph School. Both
1. Trimingham, The Missionary Approach, p. 1J+.
2. "The Catholic Church and Education in the Sudan", A paper
presented by the Catholic Vicarage at Khartoum, published in
the Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference of the
Philosophical Society of the Sudan, Khartoum 1963, p. 126.
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of them had a boarding seotion but most of the girls were day-
pupils. Both included kindergarten and elementary classes at
the start, and later added the intermediate course. The Catholic
schools were allowed fet such an early period as they were intended
to provide education for the Catholic community in the Sudan and
not for evangelical missionary purposes.
It seemed that with Catholic schools being opened and
the Gordon College started in the North, the C.M.S. and the
American Mission could not help exerting pressure to get permission
for educational work in the Northern Sudan. Especially so, as the
Gordon College, in order to attract Sudanese students, introduced
the teaching of Moslem religion, and to dispel the reluetance of
Moslem parents to send their scans to the College, the Sudan
Government at the time sent to Cairo a delegation of members of
the Education Department, Mr. Currie, the Director of Education
and Principal of the College, and Mr. Crowfoot, the Deputy to the
Director of Education, to persuade Sudanese students at al-Azhar
to come to Sudan and alter the College. Having succeeded in
persuading some from al-Azhar they also attracted some of those
who had been studying in the mosques in Sudan.*
This policy which was followed in the establishment
of the Gordon College was resented by the missionary societies
who thought that "Gordon College, though launched as a memorial to
1. Sheikh Abu Bakr El Melaik, "A talk given in Arabic at the 11th
Annual Conference of the Ph.Soc. of Sudan. Proceedings of the
Eleventh Annual Conference, p. 23.
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a great Christian with the money of those who wished to honour
him as such, became the chief Government and Moslem training
institution, Moslem festivals were honoured, Friday was made the
weekly holiday, so that Christian officials had to work on Sunday,
and missionary work was forbidden."1 Lord Cromer 3uraraed up his
reasons for the Government policy towards missionary activities
in the Northern Sudan in his Annual Report for 1901}.:
"In the Northern portion of the Sudan ... it would not
for the present, be possible, without incurring great danger, to
adopt so liberal and tolerant a policy as that pursued in Egypt.
The population of the Sudan generally is as yet far too ignorant
and uncivilised to be able to distinguish between the action of
the British Government in their corporate capacity, and that of an
individual European, whether of British or any other nationality.
If free scope were allowed to missionary enterprise, it would not
only be wholly unproductive of results but would also creates
feeling of resentment, culminating possibly In actual disturbance,
which far from advancing would almost certainly throw back the
work of civilisation, which all connected with the country, whether
or not connected with missionary enterprise, have so much at heart.
Under these circumstances, I stated in my annual report
for 1902 that both Sir Re/ inald Wingate and myself were of opinion
that *the time was still distant when mission work could, with
safety and advantage, be permitted amongst the Moslem population
1. Trimlngham, The Missionary Approach, p. 16.
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of the Sudan.* We both remain of that opinion. It is impossible
at present to assign any precise limit to the duration of the
existing restriotions. From the point of view of British
missionary enterprise, these restrictions are so far practically
unimportant in that a large field of activity, which they have as
yet, owing to want of funds, been unable to occupy has been
opened out to them in the Southern portions of the Sudan.
To a certain very limited extent, an exception to the
application of the principle above enunciated has been made,
within the second zone, in the oase of Khartoum. The population
of that town is not wholly Moslem. There are many Christian
residents of various denominations. Moreover, being the seat of
Government, the action of any missionary bodies can be carefully
supervised; whilst the Moslem population, being in immediate
touch with the governing authorities, can more readily comprehend
the policy adopted than those residing in the outlying provinces.
Further, an active demand for education, which the Government is
unable to meet adequately from its own resources, exists, on the
part of both Moslems and Christians. Iftider these circumstances,
permission has been given for the establishment of mission schools
at Khartoum. It is for She heads of those schools to deeide on
the amount of religious instruction which shall be afforded to the
pup Lis. The duty of the Government is limited to providing that
any Moslem parent - or parent of some Christian denomination other
than under whose auspices the school has been instituted - shall
clearly understand the conditions under which secular instruction
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is imparted, before he sends his child to .the school. Regulations
having this object in view have accordingly been framed.
In 1905 the Church Missionary Society opened a girls*
school in Khartoum, and the American Mission opened a school for
boys In Omdurman. The Sudan Government, aware of the difficulties
that might arise from the establishment of missionary schools In
the predominantly Moslem North had already laid down "the
conditions under which Mission Schools ought to be conducted in the
Sudan":2
"(1) Before Mohamedan children are permitted to attend
a Mission school the Director or- Head of the School will satisfy
himself that the parents or guardians understand that the school
is a Christian school.
(2) The full consent of parents or guardians must be
obtained by the Director or Head of the school before any pupil is
given religious instruction, no matter of what nationality or
religion the pupil may be.
(3) When religious instruction is being carried out
no other children, except those whose parents have given the
necessary consent must be present.
(4) The school shall be open at all times to the
Inspection of the Governor General or his representative.
(5) The Director or Head of the school will be held
1. Report on the Administration, Finance and Condition of the
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1904, PP. 50-51» **"
2. S.G. "Conditions Under Which Mission Schools Must Be
Conducted In the Sudan." Wlngate papers, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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responsible that the above regulations are strictly adhered to.
It must be clearly understood that the permission to carry on the
school Is dependent on the regulations being observed."
However, these regulations turned out to be an
anticipation of what might take place rather than a prevention of
it. Many Moslem parents particularly in Khartoum were keen to
send their daughters to school. The Government with its limited
financial resources thought it fit to coneentrate on boys
education in the newly established Gordon College, and to leave
the field of girls* education to the private enterprise of the
missionary societies after having laid down the regulations for
them. But Moslem parents had no option or alternative schools
for their daughters and they had a feeling of embarrassment and
sensitivity towards the missionary schools and fears of their
proselytizing their daughters, as we shall see later.
Representations were made to the Government regarding
the opening of a girls* school and some complaints were lodged
alleging the teaching of Christian beliefs to Moslem girls in
missionary schools. Dissatisfaction with this seems to have
filtered to the Government through both the personal and the
official channels. By 1906 the Sudan Government started discussing
the possibility of official inspection of missionary schools by
the Director of Education. The Governor General had the right
to do this as was stated in the Conditions. But Lord Cromer in
Egypt, who was also the superior of the Governor General of Sudan,
thought it was unwise to do so. So Wingat© with a new situation
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arising thought it fit to convince Cromer before he started
exercising his right of inspection. He wrote a letter to Cromer
on 16th December 1906 saying:
"My dear Lord Cromer,*
You will remember some time ago that we discussed this
question and that you wrote that in your opinion it was undesirable
that Mission Schools should be subject to Government inspection
unless they were pecuniarily supported by Government.
"The number of Mission Schools in the Sudan has
inoreased considerably since the matter was previously considered
and I think rightly the Director of Education is somewhat perturbed.
In consequence of his representations I summoned a Committee
consisting of Messrs. Sterry, Currie and Bonus to report on the
question, and I now forward the result of their deliberations. I
think their suggestions are sound, but I do not like to carry
them into effect without previous consultation with you. Would
you therefore kindly let me have your views."
p
The views of Cromer on this subject were disposed to
concur with those of Dunlop-^ his Director of Education in Cairo.
A memorandum prepared by Dunlop was enclosed in Cromer's reply to
Wingate.
They thought that the fourth paragraph of the Conditions
1. Sir Reginald Wingate letter to Cromer 16th Dec. 1906, W.P.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Extract from letter by Cromer to Wingate, 7»1.1907, W.P. Box
103/7/2 DRA.
3. Dunlop letter to Cramer, 4th Jan. 1907* Ministry of Education,
Cairo, W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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meant that inspection should only be utilized with a view to
seeing that the first three conditions, relative to religious
instructions, were carefully carried out. It was placing a
strained construction on it to use that inspection in order to be
satisfied of the efficiency or otherwise of the private school.
They also thought that once the Government got on to those lines
of inspection the schools would almost certainly ask for grants-in-
aid, which Cromer could not see how they could well be refused.
Yet Cromer was worried about the Moslem critics end urged Wingate
on the importance of a limited inspection for that particular
purpose. "... I hope the inspection is carried out, or if this
has not been done, that it will be carried out in time for me to
deal with it in my Report - with a view to ascertaining that in
each individual case the first three of the conditions are
rigorously complied with. If this is done, it will be a conclusive
answer to the Moslem critics." ^hile Cromer was anxious to get
an answer to the Moslem critics with the minimum of inspection,
Dunlop in his more elaborate memorandum was anxious that the Sudan
Government should not involve itself in regularly Inspecting the
missionary schools because If the Mission schools were compulaorily
brought under Government Inspection, the inhabitants might come to
regard then as in scene sense Government schools and hostile critics
would not be slow to misrepresent Government as having directly
associated itself with proselytizing agencies.
Dunlop further thought that the time was singularly
inopportune for the Sudan Government to assume respons Lbility for
116
the work of the Mission schools. The Sudan Government would not
for many years be itself able to meet all .educational needs and
in the days of small things there might be something to be said
in favour of the policy of not despising the humble services which
even inefficient schools might render to the cause of education.
Dunlop thought that it was possible that Government inspection would
ban many of the mission schools in Egypt as inefficient but it
should be reco^iiaed that they had supplied some elements of
education to thousands of lads who would possibly otherwise had
received no education at all. He thought that even in countries,
e.g. England, India and Egypt - where Government inspection of
Private schools was not compulsory, inspection to test efficiency
was indissolubly associated with some system of .grants-in-aid. So
Dunlop concluded that if the mission schools did not apply
voluntarily for inspection, he doubted whether any real or
permanent advantage could be derived from enforcing it.
Wingate, however, passed Dunlop's memorandum to
Sterry, Currie and Bonus as his Committee in charge of the question
of missionary schools inspection. He asked them to reconsider
their decision in the light of the further views submitted to them."1"
In his reply to Cromer Wingate thought that the Committee had
considered the question in all its bearings and with special
reference to the conditions prevailing in the Sudan which - both
politically and educationally were so entirely different from those
1. wingate to Cromer letter 26th Jan. 1907 (V.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA^
1X7
prevailing in Egypt. He also thought that the members of the
Committee had had the advantage of a matured Independent opinion
on the purely educational aspect in Sir Henry Craik (former
Secretary to the Scottish Education Department) who was in
Khartoum at the time and was recently in South Africa. Wingate
thought that valuable hints could be drawn from the results of
allowing private and missionary schools in South Africa to grow
up entirely uncontrolled by Government.
The reply of sterry, Currie and Bonus to Dunlop
memorandum was, however, more elaborate than that of wingate.
They said it was true that the policy of imposing Government
inspection with a view to testing educational efficiency was
considered three years before1 and discarded but they argued that
conditions in Sudan had changed much in three years. Also whm
that policy was discarded it was not, they believed, on account
of its intrinsic demerits, but because it was not considered
opportune to introduce it. They also believed that it was not
perhaps clear to Mr. Dunlop that at that time the Mission schools
would offer no objection whatever to educational inspection,
provided that Government intimated its intention of imposing it.
The Director had on more than one occasion been asked to inspect
in a private capacity, but had always declined because he felt
that he would be putting himself in a false position if the schools
could say that they were subject to inspection of the Director of
1. Letter to H.E. The Goveamor General (Wingate) Sgd. James Curri e,
(Sgd.) Ernest Bonus, Headed, Sudan Government, Education,
Khartoum, 2nd Januaxy 1907, W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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Education but at the same time there was no obligation on them
to meet his views or remove causes of criticism. With Government
inspection it would be otherwise.
They also could not admit that compulsory inspection to
test efficiency could bestow any kind of right to financial subsidy
or grant. The argument, they contended, was only valid in England
because the place of the schools subsidised would otherwise have
to be supplied by the Government. The Educational programme of
the Sudan Government did not involve assent to the proposition
that all its subjects must be compulsorily educated.
Mr. Dunlop's statement of the policy pursued in Britain,
they thought, was not quite convincing. In England, they argued,
no doubt a child's parents could send it to any school they
pleased, and in theory anyone could open a school. But the
Education Department was charged with the duty of seeing that each
child's attainments were on a level with the general compulsory
standard obligatory on all, and the onus of showing that this was
so rested with the child's parents, and in default they were open
to prosecution.
As regards his contention that at home inspection
implied a grant in aid, they said it was not uniformly so and
provided an illustration within their knowledge, that every
secondary school in Scotland was state inspected and of these
schools only a small proportion were state aided and that the
inspection was much appreciated. On this particular point, they
said, they applied to Sir Henry Craik, late Secretary to the
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Scottish Education Department, who was at the time in Khartoum.
So they were quite clear as regards the facts.
Further, they stated, they were by no means sure that
a system of subsidies in one direction at least might not be a
proper policy for the Government to adopt.
They could conceive the foreigp population in Khartoum,
who did not occupy the same position as in Egypt as regards
taxation and rates, demanding educational facilities for their
children with considerable insistence, and so they did not see
that it might not be sound policy on both administrative and
financial grounds to ask for instance, the Austrian Fathers or
the C.M.S. to undertake the task.
Their answer to Mr. Dunlop's question, whether it was
not a singularly inopportune time for the Government to assume the
responsibility for the work of the mission schools was, that the
responsibility in any case did already lie on the Government by
virtue of its very existence. Surely, they thought, it was
because the Government had recognised this responsibility that
three years before it insisted on controlling the religious teaching.
They assured the Governor General that it was far from
their intention to advocate a policy in any degree unfriendly or
hostile to the mission schools, nor had they any intention of
disparaging the efforts of any miss on school however modeet.
Their only desire was to promote educational proficiency and to
put the Education Department into a position in which it could be
possible for it to assist in that direction. They saw no reason
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to suppose that that Department would be unreasonable in its
demands as in any case it was fully controlled by the Governor
General.
They argued that it might be, as Dunlop had stated,
that a poor education was better than none at all, and ihat it
would be a mistake to despise the day of small things, but with
the teaching of one body at least they were by no means sure
that there was not a danger of wrong teaching as distinct from
weak teaching.
They considered that in view of what had taken place
and was taking place, at the time, in South Africa, that the
effects on Blacks of American missionary school teaching coupled
with an ultra democratic outlook on things social, ougfrt to be
very carefully watched, and, if necessary, firmly controlled.
"Ethiopianism" in South Africa derived, they understood, from an
American Presbyterian Missionary body. They warned that that
movement had been thJ^ driving force behind the late rebellion in
Natal and that .American coramerical enterprise, influence and
teaching were certain in the near future, to be present in force
in the Sudan. They understood that the Governor of Natal had
written a special report to the Colonial Office on this subject,
and they asked the Governor General to consider i;he advisability
of obtaining a copy of it and noting its conclusions.
They thought that if it was not made plain that the
Sudan Government Intended to have the supreme control in all schools,
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there was a very distinct danger that such schools might become
centres of influence and intrigues of a kind calculated to raise
extremely awkward questions of jurisdiction. They recalled that
immediately after the reoccupation of the Sudan a proposal was
made to establish French sc cools at Khax*touxa. This they feared
might be repeated by applications for the foundation of scnools
by various European nationalities.
Then again, they brilliantly forewarned that, if
Egyptian Nationalist schools of the type that was only too common
in Egypt, were to be established in the iudan, the Government
ought to be armed with powers that would enable it to exercise a
close observation over what was being taught, and the text books
that were being used.
They believed that it was of great importance that no
undue distinction with regard to Government inspection between
different classes of schools should be allowed to arise. They
also regarded the questions they raised were all of immediate
practical importance. The Greek Community in Port Sudan had
already petitioned the Governor General for leave to establish a
school. The terms of the permission granted in this case, thought
the Committee, would practically tie the hands of the Government
so far as other applications were concerned.
e this dialogue was going on between Cairo and
Khartoum, Moslem opposition to what was being taught had reached
the Arabic press in Cairo when on December 17th a fiery article
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was published in Al-Mu'ayyad,A under the title "What is Behind
the Hill". The author, who singled his name as "Arrival from the
Sudan" vehemently attacked Lord Cromer and Sir Reginald Wingate
for deceiving the Egyptians in their reports of 1904 about the
missionary schools in Khartoum. He described their words as
"ointment for the wounds of the Muslims in Khartoum which
facilitated to them the admission of their girls into the Missionary
Schools deceived by the mirage of promises given to them ... that
the girl will not attend in the place of prayer nor be taught any
of the Christian religion like her comrades the Christians but
when the girl leaves the bosom of her parents and enters the school,
she becomes in the hands of the priests and nuns like the dead
in the hande of the washer who turns him as he wishes." He then
proceeded to mention a story of what had happened while he was in
Khartoum on Bairam last. *A party of Moslem notables discussed
the matter of the girls schools in the presence of Mr. Currie the
Director of Education and requested him to start a school for the
Moslem girls in Khartoum in which they can learn what is good and
necessary for them. In his answer to that he expressed his
confidence in the Missionary schools and especially of that school
under the direction of Mr. Gwynne (the offioial Chaplain of the
Government Palace). When he was answered that that school teaches
the Moslem girls the Christian religion and make them attend the
Christian prayer without parental consent in spite of the guarantee
AI-Mu*ayyad 17.12.1906. Official Translation given in W.P.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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given to them, Mr. Currie was suspicious about the truth of that
and asked for proof. In evidence a daughter of the owner of the
house which goes to Mr. Gwynne*s school was brought in and the
Director asked her about going to the prayer and she 3tated that
she and all the girls in the school attend the prayer without
exception and that they learn the religious studies. He asked
her to say to him the prayer and she began by saying "Our Father,
which art in heaven" up to the and, without making the least mistake
in a letter of it while she was totally ignorant of "Bismillahi el
Rahman el Rahim" and did not know any word of the "Kuran Fstiha".
The author concluded that the shadow of good relations
between the missionary schools and the Moslem people which appeared
to the Governor General had in those days begun to shrink for
the schools began changing the girls* religious dye and thus
deviated from the guarantees given to the parents. The result
of this was that many Moslem parents in Khartoum had kept their
daughters in the houses and prevented them from going in to those
schools preferring that their girls remain ignorant rather than
have an education which would convert them from the religion of
their fathers and mothers and become sharpest weapon for severing
the relation between the girl and her kinsfolk as well as between
her and the sons of her kind and the result would be evil and misery
on her near relations. The author warned that "this was little of
much of what was hidden and pledged that time would guarantee its
publication."
12k
This fiery article was received with great concern in
the official circles. Wingate thought that it was a severe
attack and might be an opening of a campaign."1" The intelligence
service in Khartoum, started the search for the author and
various people were accused at first, the Grand Kadi was accused
by some, another employee at the Works Department called Hassan
2
effendi was accused by another report. But it did not take long
before Wingate could establish that "it was the late qadl of
Khartoum whom he described as "has been behaving in a very-
unsatisfactory manner for some time" and whose resignation had been
accepted by the Governor General and had returned to Cairo a few
days before the article was published. He gave his name as
Sheikh Ismail and asked that perhaps Boyle might- keep his eye on
him. The article was also shorn by the Governor General to both
Currie and Gwynne. Gwynne thought that the article was part of
the agitation against British influence intorduced into the Sudan
from Egypt which aimed not so much at the education of the girls
as the weakening of British prestige amongst the people of the
•3
Sudan.J He also added that he had proof that Hassan Effendi
of the Works Department had written a letter to a Cairo paper
agitating for Government Moslem Schools. Gwynne also thought
that the inevitable consequence if the Government yielded to this
1. Letter from Wingate to Cramer dated 29th Dec. 1906. Box 103/7/2
DRA.
2. Letter from Llewellyn H. Gwynne to Wingate dated Dec. 29th 1906,
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Letter from Gwynne to ■ ingate, dated Dec, 29th 1906, W.P.
Box 103/7/2 BRA.
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agitation, would be to lose from hia influence in the school
all the Mohamedan Sudanese girls under pressure from local
Mohamedan opinion. He suggested that it would be sufficient to
answer the attack on the Government by stating "We have no funds
for the education of girls at present", and "asking as you are
dissatisfied with the education given in the English School why
not open a Mohammedan School for your own girls? If Europeans
can provide money and ladies for Khartoum surely you who value
the education of girls so highly can provide the necessary funds
and teachers."
Currie had a different attitude on this issue.^ He
stated that in October last a petition, very influentially
supported, was presented asking that a Government Girls' School be
opened in Khartoum. The majority of the signatories were no
doubt Egyptian officials anxious that means of education for their
daughters should be brought within their reach, and at the same
time preferring the non-Sectarian atmosphere of a Government School
to that conducted by missionary managers. Since then, Currie,
at the direct-on of the Governor General instituted some enquiries
as to how far that feeling extended, and had to report that in his
opinion it represented a demand that would every year become
persistent and to which the Government should inevitably give
very sympathetic consideration. Qsurrie indicated that personally
he would prefer that the Government should not undertake this task
1. Extract fro® Annual Report of Education Department, 1906,
W.P. Box 103/7/2, DRA.
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for some little time, but a good deal depended - he thought -
on the attitude adopted by the managers of the missionary schools.
Currie thought that If the recommendations of the
Committee which was form ad of the Acting Legal Secretary, Mr. Sterry,
himself and Mr. Bonus were accepted by the Governor General and
the managers would evince willingness to adopt what had been
suggested, then Moslem public opinion would be satisfied for sane
little time, and a breathing space would be afforded in which the
Government could study the question. If this was not possible,
i.e. the inspection of missionary schools by Government, then he
saw that the Government had no other option than to open a large
Kuttab for girls in Khartoum, and he was prepared if directed to
make a beginning In a few months, though this would be in his
opinion the second best course, and rather adopted on compulsion.
He also suggested that if it were desired, it would also, as an
experiment, be possible to begin at Ruffa'a, where the very
efficient local Kuttab was in Currie's own words "under an
extremely competent and interesting local man who is very anxious
to be allowed to try the experiment. The inhabitants of the
place too have petitioned repeatedly to the same effect." Currie
couldn't see that any possible harm could accrue from starting
something at Ruffa'a. The local man referred to by Currie was
undoubtedly Sheikh Babikir Badri the leading Sudanese educator
especially renouned for his pioneering work in the field of
women's education. Sheikh Babikir was at the time indiarge of
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the boys elementary school at Ruffa'a and was requesting the
Government to help him open a girls school as well. He wrote
in his autobiography on this period."1" "That on the 4th of February
1906 I was visited by Mr. Crowfoot the Deputy Director of the
Department of Education. I told him that I asked the Director to
open a girls' school in 1901+ and he patted on my shoulder and said
'You are mad'. Then I asked him again in 1905 and he did not
answer me and today I repeat my request telling your excellency
that I have eleven girls in my own house who deserve to be
educated and I am the son of the Department of Education and if
the Department does not help in this I feel it has done me
injustice." Then Sheikh Babikir Badrl asked to be given ten
pounds by the Department to build a room for the school.
Mr. Crowfoot told him that this would be done after his return to
Khartoum. Crowfoot left: for Khartoum but Sheikh Babikir received
a personal letter from Currie saying that he could not help in
opening the sohool in spite of Sheikh Babikir's insistence. But
if Sheikh Babikir was going to open the school in his own house
under his own nam© and acoounts then Currie had no objection to
that. Sheikh Babikir took the burden and the responsibility of
starting the school which Currie in his report recommended to
be started or subsidized as an experiment.
Wingate, however, seemed to be more inclined towards
Gwynne's side, so he stressed in his report that when money was
1. Babikir Badrl, Ta*rlkh Hayati, Vol. 2, pp. 54* 55» 60.
Khartoum, 1961.
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so urgently required in other directions they could not do any¬
thing at the time. Though he saw that something should be done
when they could afford it. He also mentioned that he had just
been obliged to refuse Currie funds for the expansion of his
secondary school which ranked in comparative importance much higher
than the girls school. He therefore thought that there was a
good deal in Gwyrme's suggested reply and asked Cromer if he could
agree so that something could be drafted for the papers in that
sense. Wingate considered the matter to be a very delicate one
on which he hesitated to embark on any independent action without
the concurrence of Cromer.
Some things were drafted for the papers. These were
in the form of articles defending Government policy in the Sudan
and refuting what had been published in Al-Mu*ayyad. One of them
put a case for a review of the situation as regards girls education.
This was a mild article which although it did not attack the
Government yet it expected it to do something. A statement was
published in Cairo in Al-Muqafjtam newspaper^stating that "were
the opposers to look, even a little at the conditions which the
Sudan Government made for the admission of the students into
the missionaries schools they will see that she has taken all
the necessary means so that no place would be left for complaint."
Then all the five conditions governing missionary schools in Sudan
2
were stated. In Khartoum articles were published in SI Sudan Times,
Al-Muqat^am, No. 7.1.1907«
Jarldat as-Sudan, 10.1.1907., SI Sudan Times, 10.1.1907.
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signed by unnamed authors. One under the name of an Egyptian
Moslem, which attacked the author of Al-i'fu'ayyad article and
accused him of "betraying his own people for when he published his
much regretted tirade he knew that a few enlightened members of
the Moslem community in Khartoum were In communication with the
education authorities with a view to establishing a Moslem female
school under the auspices of the Government. And so instead of
encouraging this praiseworthy move, the correspondent of Al-Mu'ayyad
did everything in his power to thwart it." Not satisfied with
what he had dene so far, he ascribed the article in Al~Mu*ayyad
"to one of the members of the Committee who had been, as
previously stated, with the Education Authorities." This state¬
ment gained credence among those interested in the matter although
it was void of any foundation.
The writer then referred to the educational work of
the missionary societies for which he had unstinted praise. To
them, he said, "We owe a great deal and, although we endeavour to
have our own schools for the education of our children, we have
great pleasui'e in recording the valuable aid the missionaries
render to the cause of knowledge." The writer closed his article
by expressing a hope that those interested in the matter would
realise that the educated and enlightened classes of Moslems were
far from desiring a conflict with other creeds. They appreciated
the efforts of the Government to spread knowledge in the country
which they hoped would be crowned with success.
The long article was published with a lengthy
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introduction by the editor and in a later number of El Sudan Times
a week later3" the fowner article by an Egyptian Moslem was again
praised as "having met the highest esteem of the wise persons and
all who love the peace and the good." The editor replied to the
admirers of the unknown author that his name could not be revealed
because this was the author's wish. It was also emphasised in
P
the same number that "We have seen the conditions of the Govern¬
ment with the Missionaries' Schools in this country for the
acceptance of the students, boys or girls, and in these conditions
the Government have taken the necessary arrangement in order not
to leave a place for complaint, we have also learnt that the
conditions are in force and that the Government representatives
are visiting those schools and assuring that they are carrying
the conditions out,"
-i
Again on the 21st of January - four days later, a
summary of a message was published described as having been
written by "a polite and well educated Christian" in which he
said that the missionaries never failed to make every father and
mother understand thoroughly what was taught In their schools to
avoid the possibility of any doubt or mistake. The rest of the
summary was a defence and praise of the missionaries particularly
the lady who was the head of the British School for Girls in
Oradurman for whom the author and the editor expressed their special
regards.
!. £1 Sudan Times, 17.1.190?.
2. Ibid.
3* £1 Sudan Times, 21.1.0?.
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While this press campaign was going on, Cromer asked
for investigations'*" and a report. The Governor General asked
2
Archdeacon Gwyrine to submit a report on the C.M.S. schools and
H
also asked Major Phipps, the Civil Secretary, whom he described
as independent of the Department of Education indicating that the
question of "Inspection of Missionary Schools" discussed earlier
was not yet settled. The Sudan Government indicated that it
wanted to be very tactful to avoid being regarded as taking a
unilateral course of action without the concurrence of Cromer.
Gwynne had already stated in his note that the C.M. S. school
curriculum included - religious instruction, reading, writing
In Arabic and English, geography, arithmetic, sewing, and if
necessary music. He had also stated that religious instruction
was not compulsory and that "At the express wish of the parents
the children of the Moslems retire into a separate room during
the teaching of the Gospel and prayers.
But according to Gwynn© "such confidence have the
parents of the girls placed in the teachers that out of 66 only
four are not allowed by their parents to attend prayers."^ As
for the Omdurman Girls' School which was opened on November 15th
1. Cromer Letter to Wingate, 7th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Gwynne till this time was Archdeacon, he was made Bishop on
11th October 1908. See letter to Gwynne by W.B. George Francis
Popham, Bishop of the Church of England in Jerusalem, and the
East. Box 420/3 DRA.
3. G.G. (Wingate letter to) Cramer 26th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DBA.
4. Note by Rev. L. Gwynne entitled "The Work of British Missions in
Sudan" marked "C" enclosed in Wingate letter to Cromer, see 3
above. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
5. Ibid., p. 2.
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1906 at the request o the Inhabitants "in less than two months
the school has twenty scholars j individually each parent has
been visited by lira. Hall who has carefully explained the conditions
and work of the school. So far not one has objected to their
children attending religious instruction and prayers, showing
that they have ©very confidence in the teachers.
fehether it was a matter of confidence in the teachers
or a yearning for the education of their children and a lack of
alternative schools was a matter for reflection, some of which was
don© by Lord Cromer when he read Owynne's note and compared it
with Phipps* figures. Phipps reported that in the inspection at
Khartoum of the various schools of the missionary bodies working
in Sudan, he found that *in each Gase the conditions under which
those schools were permitted to be carried on by the Sudan
Government were not only thoroughly understood but were carefully
adhered to by those in charge.* Major Phipps also said "I was
given to understand that owing to the recent publicity given to
certain views on the management of Mission schools, special visits
had been made to impress on parents their ability to forbid
religious teaching, but these visits seem to have produced only
reiterated expressions of gratitude to the school superintendents
for the much appreciated opportunities of education, as well as
the strongly asserted belief that nothing but what was best for
«2
the children had ever been or would ever b© taught."
1. Ibid., p. 3»
2. Letter dated 19th Jan. 1907. headed "Inspection of Mission
Schools in Khartoum", addressed to "His Excellency the Governor
General" (Enclosure A) see wtngate letter to Cromer 26th Jan.
1907. uox 103/7/2 DRA.
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Major Phippa also had letters from the managers of
the various mission schools assuring him that the conditions were
fully adhered to and carried out.'*" Phipps however seems to have
done some inspection of the schools but he had not undertaken
thorough investigation of the matter, instead he relied in this
report on what he had seen at the schools and what had been
written to him or what he had been "given to understand" thr-ough
his interviews with the school staff and children. He did not
interview parents or oomplainants. Ungate in his letter to
Cromer expressed his belief that "the majority of the managers
would welcome such inspection as they now realized that in so far
as the present agitation in regard to religious instruction is
concerned, they have the support of the Government. They are
only too ready to appreciate the fact that their position in
the country is immensely strengthened as long as they retain the
2
goodwill and support of the Government."
Cromer compared the note of Gwynne with that of Phipps,
particularly the table provided by Phippa giving the numbers of
Moslem children in each school and those who did not attend
r
1. Letter from American Mission, signed Sowash, Khartoum, Jan. 20,
1907. Letter from Bishop Geyer 16 Jan. 1907. Austrian Mission
letter from G.M.S. 17th Jan. 1907» signed A. Bewley, W.P. Box
103/7/2 BRA.
2. Wingate to Cromer 20th Jan. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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1
religious instruction amongst them. Oromer seemed to be
perturbed by the figures provided, and was not satisfied by the
p
accompanying notes, so he telegrammed Wingate not ing that from
the report of the Civil Secretary of January 19th there were
thirteen Moslem children educated in Austrian schools none of
whom received religious instruction. On the other hand out of
the 74 Moslems in American and Church Missionary Society schools
all but three received religious instruction. The contrast of
the figures was remarkable, and he asked if there was any
explanation? The explanation as Wingate remarked was too
lengthy to telegraph^ and had to go by mail.
But before V/ingate's telegraph reached Cairo Cromer
sent another telegram^" pointing out that Gwynne in his memorandum
said that four Moslem children did not receive Christian religious
instruction while the figure given by Phipps was two. The next
1. Mission Schools Visited by the Civil Secretary at Khartoum.
No. of No. of No. of Mohamae-








13th Jan. 190? American Boys
16th Jan. 1907 Austrian Boys
16th Jan. 1907 Austrian Girls
17th Jan. 1907 C.M.S. Girls
V.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Tel. from Lord Oromer, Cairo, to sirdar Khartoum, No. 14. dated
30th Jan. 1907. W.P. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
3- Telegraph No.15 from Sirdar to Lord Cromer. 2nd Feb. 1907 (Copy
of both this and Cromer's above were given to Currie) W.P.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
4. Tel. No. 16 2nd Peb. 1907. from Lord Cromer to Sirdar. Box
103/7/2 DRA.
135
day Wlngat© cabled Cromer telling him that PhippE* figure was
correct as two children left subsequent to Gwynna's Memorandum.A
Lord Cromer was also reassured that a full report in reply to his
former telegram of January 30th was leaving by the day's mail.
Cromer got in the mail a brief note from Phipps and
a considerably longer one from Gwynne with a covering letter from
P
Vlngate. Phipps* explanation was that the Austrians never had
cared for Moslem children as they had plenty of Catholic children.
The children of Moslems who had gone there were of parents very
superior socially and wanting a European education, and consequently
more particular about the non-attendance at religious teaching.
On the other hand Phipps explained, the C.M. S. for Girls and
American for Boys represented the private Moslem school. The
latter being a rival of Gordon College and other Government schools,
although it had a lower standard and was practically the Coptic
school at Khartoum. At the C.M.S. and American Schools where no
European children went the religious question never assumed any
importance as the Moslem parents were sooially inferior. This
Phipps thought might be the real reason.
Gwynne, however, had a cane explanations of his own.
1. Tel. No. 16 3rd Feb. 190?, from Sirdar to Lord Cromer. V7.P.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Letter from ivingate to Cromer dated 2 Feb. 1907, enclosed letter
from Phipps dated 2 Feb. 1907 addressed to Wingate, enclosed
letter frora Gwynne Feb. 2 1907 addressed to the Governor General
(this last one is in Gwynne's handwriting and seems to be the
rough note of the letter). W.P. box 103/7/2 DRA.
3. Gwynne's letter to the Governor General, Khartoum. Feb. 2, 1907.
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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He explained that the Roman Catholic school was opened for
European children of whom there was a large number, particularly
Italians and of Catholic Syrians who were also numerous in
Khartoum, He also thought there was a diffidence on the part of
European parents to have their children taught side by side with
Moslems. This Qwynne professed to know from the fact that when
they first opened the C.M.S. Girls* School at Khartoum nearly all
were Christians, children of Europeans and Copts and when the
Roman Catholics opened their girls school all the Europeans were
withdrawn from the C.M.S. School and sent to then. Since then
from time to time European parents had sent their children to the
C.M. 3. School and had invariably withdrawn them not wishing to be
taught in the same classes with the Moslem children. He went on
to say that the Chu reh Missionary School was opened for the children
of the Sudan. They made no special provision for Europeans.
If any cared to come they had to attend the ordinary classes and
learn Arabic and sit at the same desk with children of the
Egyptian officer or the little negro free scholars. It did not
occur to the Archdeacon to think that probably the reason that
prompted the Roman Catholics to set up their own school was the
nature of the religious instruction given at the C.M.S. School
and they tended to withdraw their children whenever they found
vacancies in the Roman Catholic School which was in accordance
with their faith.
Gwynne reiterated his conviction that there could be
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no possible misunderstanding on the part of all the Moslem parents
that although the C.M. S. School was Christian their girls were
exempt from religious instruction if they so wished it. In
support of this conviction of his he thought that "The fact that
in the Roman Catholic School all the Moslems withdraw from
religious teaching is a sign to my mind that Moslem parents In the
C.M.S. Schools are for the most part perfectly contented with the
religious instruction given to their children. For they send
their children to a school where nearly all the Moslems attend
religious teaching whan they might if they so wished, easily
send than to the Austrian school where all Moslems do not attend
Christian teaching". The weakness of this argument was evident
because when the only option it left for Moslem parents was to
take their children to the Roman Catholic School in which places
would not be easy to find for all the children, or else they had
to suppress their genuine wishes and express their acquiescence
towards the religious instruction given to their children at the
C.M.S. schools.
Gwynne also mentioned an episode that happened to him
a week before when he went to Atbara to hold a service for the
British community. He was asked by the Egyptian officers to
meet them at their club to talk over with them the possibility
of starting a school for their girls. There were ten or twelve
present all of them Egyptian officers - officials of the Govern¬
ment and parents of about fifteen children. They said they
wished him to start a school like the C.M.S. School at Khartoum.
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They wanted an English lady to superintend. They would
guarantee £25 a month. They wished it to be a school for the
better class children. Gwynne said, "I asked them did they
understand that, if the G.M.S. supplied a teacher, Christian
teaching and prayers for half an hour every day would be one of
the rules?" "They said, they did." It should be noted that
neither did Gwynne say nov did the officers understand that this
was optional. One of the Bimba3his who spoke said, "for six
years he studied in a Jesuit School in Egypt, was as much a Moslem
now as ever he was though he attended every day prayers." Gwynne,
however, lid not wish this to be published for it "might bring
upon the petitioners the disapproval, perhaps the enmity of their
fellovr Moslems."^"
»
Cromer having gone through all this, realised that the
situation in Sudan had grown so serious that something ought to be
done about it. His earlier notions about "Missionary School
Inspection" had to be modified to meet with those of the Sudan
Government. He also had to go a step further to meet the demand
of Moslem parents. So he gave the green light to Vingate*" to
enter into negotiations with the school managers with a view to
establishing compulsory inspection on the lines suggested by
Wingate and his colleagues.~ But he strongly recommended Wingate
1. Gwynne's letter to the Governor General, Khartoum, Feb. 2. 1907*
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
2. Tel. from Lord Cromer, Cairo to Sirdar Khartoum 6th Feb. 1907*
Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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not to force inspection on the missionary schools for there was
much opposition. Cromer went on to say that on political
grounds he thought that the establishment of a Government Girls*
School at Khartoum was very necessary and should even take
precedence over a Secondary school as it would close the mouth
of Moslem criticism.
wingate found the approval of inspection to his taste
and he had little doubt that the Church Missionary Society and
Austrians would gladly accept and he could endeavour to obtain
the concurrence of the American Presbyterians, without forcing
it on them."5" But he was somewhat alarmed by the idea of opening
a Government Girls* School at Khartoum. So he conveyed to Cromer
that for this part he would be bringing Currie with him to Cairo
to talk over future educational requirements including the Girls*
School which he also hoped to see started as soon as they could
2
raise the funds required for it.
While delaying the one serious question of a Government
Girls* School until the proposed meeting in Cairo, Wingate
embarked upon tackling the question of inspection which he thought
might solve the whole problem. He passed the telegrams to Currie
and asked him^ to give his views on the scope of Government
1. Tel. from Sirdar Khartoum to Lord Cromer, Cairo, Jth Feb. 1907.
No. 22. Box 103/7/2 BRA.
2. Ibid.
3. Letter, Wingate to Currie, 8.2.1907* marked private. Box
103/7/2 DRA.
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inspection and the method of applying it so that they would be
with him as he intended to be shortly interviewing the managers
of the mission schools. He impressed upon Currie to keep the
matter strictly confidential pending the result of their
negotiations with the management and the trip to Cairo.
Currie thought'" that the inducement which could be
held out to the managers of the missionary schools to make them
accept Government Inspection was to point out to them that the
alternative to no inspection was competition with Government
Schools and that the Governor General was finding considerable
difficulty in resisting the forces that urged him to that course,
and without submission on their part he had no other course open
to him. Currie thought it was impossible to lay down the scope
of inspection at the moment. But his idea was that every school
ought to undergo formal inspection once a year. Due notice ought
to be given to the managers as to the inspection, i.e. no
inspections were to be made without notice.
The managers, as Currie suggested, would also be
liable to be called upon to furnish necessary statistics as to
the number of pupils in attendance, timetables, the number of
their teaching staff, etc. On the completion of the inspection,
the Government Education Office would pass a report on the school
to the managers for their consideration, and a copy of the report
would be sent to the Governor General. If the managers wished
1. Letter from James Currie to Sirdar, S.G., Education Office,
Khartoum, 9th Feb. 1907. Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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any points raised to b© further elucidated, the inspecting
Officer would be directed to meet them in conference, and offer
such friendly advice as he might think desirable.
Gurrie also advised for the emphasis of the fact that
the Government had no desire whatsoever to impose any cast iron
syllabus of instruction on anybody; but they wanted to do what
they could to ascertain that such uniformity was ensured, so as
to make it possible for pupils who desired to enter on a course of
higher instruction profitably to do so.
In addition, Currie suggested that if the reports to
the Department of Education were of a favourable nature, it would
be possible in the future for the Government to leave certain
spheres of work to particular bodies, rather than become confronted
with the necessity of establishing institutions \Aiich would
virtually do the same work. He concluded that his Department
would of course deal in all cases with the managers of the schools
and not with individual headmasters and headmistresses.
Gwynne, seems to have been kept in the dark about
Cromer's suggestion to establish a Government Girls' School,^ but
his advice was sought by Wingate on how the Americans were to be
approached. They had been his main obstacle up till then.
Gwynne suggested that the best way to approach the Americans was
2
to show goocwill and give certain guarantees. This was by asking
their co-operation^ in the education of the Sudanese, and explaining
1. Letter from Maclnnes to Sir Reginald Wingat-e dated March 19,
1907, Box 103/7/1, BRA.
2. Gwynne*s letter to Sirdar, Feb. 28 (1907) year not written but
suggested by text and sequence of events. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
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clearly that the Governor General wished to help them as far as
possible. He was also to assure than that the regulations were
not made to harass or hinder the work of mission schools but to
make use of them for the well being of the Sudan. They were to
be reminded that the Government had given proof of their willing¬
ness to help mission schools by dropping the old regulation
requiring written consent of parents before a child could receive
religious instruction when it was reported by the missionaries to
be found unworkable.
Gwynne suggested that the Americans should also be
assured that the inspection was to be of the highest and easiest
description not with a view to criticise or hinder but as far as
possible to help with advice and suggestion. In addition they
were to be told that the inspection would give the Government s.
handle to silence the Egyptian nationalist movement that was
crying out for the closure of all mission schools if it could.
Moreover they should be assured that the inspection would be
carried out by an Englishman and no 'native* would be allowed to
inspect a mission school. The benefit of inspection was to
be shown in that it would do away with competitive cramming
examinations for Government employment, and scholars in mission
schools would have equal chances with scholars in Government schools
if the teaching In the mission schools came up to the standard
required. Some agreement seemed to have been reached between
Wingate and the managers before Win gate and Currie left for Cairo
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to discuss the situation with Cromer.
Cromer was oonvinced that a Government girls* school
3hould be established for political reasons if not for anything
else. He communicated this to Maclnnes of the Church Missionary
1 2
Society, Cairo who lost no time in writing to Gwynne"" in Khartoum.
Maclnnes also tried to get in touch with Wingate in Cairo to
ascertain if a matter such as this might have some bearing on a
plan made by the Church Missionary Society to erect a boarding
school at Khartoum. Gwynne*s response was much sharper than
Maclnnes as he wrote a strong letter to Wingate. He said he
had been rather upset for a couple of days by the news sent to
him by Maclnnes that the Government intended to open a school for
girls at Khartoum. This he considered to be a breach of former
Government assurances that they would not touch the education of
girls in Khartoum especially as the conversations over the
Government regulations for mission schools had given the
Government authorities the right of inspection at any time. Gwynne
confessed that he was under the impression that the education of
girls would be left to private enterprise. This he thought would
be a test of Islam to attempt bo do for herself what Christian
bodies were doing without any Government assistance.
Gwynne did not hide his fears that the Government by so
1. Letter from Maclnnes to Sir Reginald Wingate dated March 19,
1907, Box 103/7/1 DRA.




doing would knock out of existence his girls* school as he was
told by a Moslem parent a couple of months before that if the
Government were to open a Moslem school he would not send his
girls there, but Moslem opinion would not allow him to keep his
girls in the C.M.S. school. Gwynne also complained that the
Government would be taking this step even contrary to the wishes
of the Egyptians in the Sudan. To prove this he reminded
Wingate that he had shown him a written request sigaed by leading
Egyptian officers at Atbara asking him to open a G.M.S. school
there. Gwynne argued that they didn't ask for a Government school.
He remarked rather disdainfully that he could not help but rather
feel that because one man shouted and raved in the press in Egypt
they were forced to lose touch with the Sudanese girls whose
parents he submitted were perfectly contented with the teaching
in their schools. Gwynne summed up his opposition to the
proposed school by saying to Wingate "If the Government opens a
school for girl3 in Khartoum our own school will be rendered
useless ... if you bring English teachers to teach in your schools,
ours must be closed."
Wingate who was keen not to upset Gwynne or the C.M.S.
2
in Britain conveyed Gwynne*3 feelings to Cromer. Wingate also
conveyed to Cromer that he anticipated that the missionaries would
. Letter from Gwynne to Wingate dated March 13th 1907. Clergy
House, Khartoum. Box 103/7/1 DHA.
2. Letter from Wingate to Cromer, Gov. General's Office, Cairo,
19th March, 1907, Box 103/7/2 DRA.
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begin to make difficulties about Government inspection, and worse
than that he expected the "C.M. S. people at Home will begin to
agitate again".* So Wingate proposed the postponement of the
girls* school for a time. That evening Wingate had a committee
p
meeting with Cromer to discuss the matter. Gwynne*a letter was
read before the committee which considered that letter to be
"the most convincing argument for the establishment of a
Government School for Girls".^ The plan was to provide accommo¬
dation for boarders and day scholars and to impose payment of
fees, which, though not large, would tend to limit the scope of
Government education to the better classes. It t-jas conceivable
to the committee that there would always be a certain number of
parents who were not In a position to pay the fees and who would
gladly avail themselves of the free education provided for their
girls by the mission schools. The plan for a girls' Government
school ended at that and for a long time to come the only
contribution the Government made towards girls* edcuation was
the decision of Currie in December to pay the expenses of the
small girls* school in Ruf/a'e^ which had been started by the
personal initiative of Sheikh Babikir Eadrl.
1. Xbid.
2. Ibid.
3. Wingate letter to Pindlay, Gov. Gen's Office, Cairo, 20.3.07.
Box 103/7A EHA.
4. Babikir Badrl, Ta'rlkh IJayatl, Vol. 2, pp. 65-66.
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It was not until 1921 that a Government Girls*
Training College for Elementary School Teachers was opened in
Omdurman, and it was not until 1939 that the first Government
Intermediate School for Girls was opened too, in Omdurraan. It
was in 191+5 that a small secondary class was added to the primary
school.1
Bishop Gwynne remained in the Sudan as head of the
Anglican Church and custodian of the C.M.S. schools until 191+6
2
when he retired as Bishop of Egypt and the Sudan. The ability
he displayed in the early years of the Condominium in manipulating
the educational policy in the Sudan, both in the North and in the
South and with men like Wingate and Cromer must have increased with
time and widened into fields other than those of missionary and
educational work.^ He was the Englishman of high position who
stayed longest in the Sudan and he lived very close to the Governor
General's palace which was only a few hundred yards from the
Anglican Cathedral. His services in the Sudan earned him when
1. L.H.Sanderson "Some Aspects of Girls Education in Northern
Sudan" SIR Vol. XLII, 1961.
2. From 1st October 191+5# as Gwynne was due to retire, the
Sudan was constituted as a separate diocese with the
Rfc. Rev. A.M. Gelsthorpe as its first Bishop. Trimingham,
The Missionary Approach, p. 19.
3. Letter from Gwynne to the Emperor of Ethiopia Heille Selassie,
dated 10th Jan. 191+7# Box 1+19, DRA.
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he retired a special contribution towards his pension from the
Sudan Government"1* and a letter of thanks from Mr. Bevin the
British Foreign Secretary at the time, to whom Gwynne replied:
"Dear Mr. Bevin,
It is extremely kind of you on Christmas Bve in spite
of your crowded life to give time to write such an encouraging
letter to me after 4.7 years service as missionary and a missionary
Bishop in Egypt and the Sudan.
It did seem strange after 47 years out there to cotae
home. I loved the Sudanese and Egyptians and know their language,
and am sorry to leave thera.
The dangers ahead of these two countries, as I see them,
are: A too abrupt break with the past achievements accomplished
from the days of Cromer in Egypt and General Gordon in the Sudan
with the close collaboration of the best of the natives themselves.
I have traced the Hand of God from the early days raising up and
using these two great Englishmen and later many others, administra¬
tors, missionaries, soldiers, inspired by them to bring great
benefits on those they govern, and;
The other danger is the sacrificing of the future wel¬
fare and development of millions of peoples for immediate political
expediency.
1.Correspondence, Rt. Rev. Bishop Ge1ftharpe, letter dated 12th
Dec. 1946, to the Rt. Rev. The Lord Bishop of Worcester, letter
from the Civil Secretary9s Office, Khartoum, 10th Dec. 1946*
to the Rt. Rev. The Lord Bishop of Worcester, and relevant
correspondence, all in DRA. with Gwynne*s Papers in Boxes I03,
103/1, 103/3, 420/3, DRA.
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We have made many mistakes by altering our policy
from time to time, the reason for this being outside opinion
from sources which have no knowledge of the needs of the people
of these countries, and by listening to a vociferous minority
led on by ambitious leaders for their own selfish aims.
I do believe God lias a plan for Africa and we have
been entrusted by Him to develop His children by lifting them to
work for that great Continent, with nothing to thwart His plan
ultimately but we can hold up that plan indefinitely if Me mis¬
handle the situation at the present time.
I have always kept clear of the native politicians
feeling it would hinder any spiritual vision but after all these
years of service I am well aware of the weaknesses of this un¬
developed stage.
Although I am 83 I have been braced up by this climate
and, thank God, I am still at work. Any knowledge I possess
(which is of any value) after these many years of experience in
Egypt and the Sudan, I gladly place at the service of the Foreign
Office."1
2
It seems that the Foreign Secretary did not respond
as Gwynne was ageing and the political situation in the Sudan had
been taking a different turn for which the knowledge and Ideas of
Gwynne could hardly be very useful, particularly as the native
1. Typed copy of letter from Gwynne, to Right Hon. E. Bevin,
Foreisyi Secretary, dated 6th January 191+7. Box I4I9 DRA.
2. Letter from Gwynne to Morris dated 2i+th Jan. 191+7, Box 1+19 DRA.
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polltloiana from whom Gwynne, as h© admitted, had always kept
away were now coming to the centre of the scene. A few weeks
later Gwynne was very disturbed when he heard that the Governor
General had stated that the Sudan might be independent in twenty
years time. He wrote to Bishop Gelsthorpe that it was hasty
as it had taken generations of British to develop a genius for
administration and that in "a Moslem country with a religion
that is a brake and not an urge," seventy-five years of Colonial
rule were not enough so he intended to pray with all his powers
"that it may not be so.HoweverISudan became independent in
rv
less than ten years and it is in the field of education, and
particularly the education of women that greater progress could
2
be claimed under National Rule.
Northern Sudanese parents accepted the Missionary
Schools as a second choice for their sons and daughters if they
failed to gain entrance to the Government Schools. Eruptions of
resentment took place from time to time and in different forms
against what was taught or alleged to be taught to Moslem children
at some of the missionary schools, particularly in regard to the
teaching of Christian doctrines or attendance at prayers. In
1927 the Omdurman Ahlia School, the first Boys* Intermediate Ahlia
School to be opened in the country, was set up as a reaction
against the Omdurman American Mission School, which was ordered by
1. Letter from Gwynne to theRight Rev. A. Morris Gelsthorpe,
dated 5th March, 1947, Box 419 DRA.
2. S.G. Ministry of Education, Education Under National Rule,
Khartoum, I960. "
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the Government Department of Education in uhat aama year to make
public its conditions that Moslem pupils who joined it would
have to attend classes in Christian religion aa veil as prayers.^
Circulars to that effeot were handed to the schoolboys to give
to their fathers and guardians and soon copies were stuck to the
doors of shopping places, offices and mosques. A wave of resent¬
ment spread amongst the Moslems and the notables, and the educated
Sudanese began to think of the foundation of publicly supported
Ahlia sehools for the Moslem children whose parents would not
accept the conditions of the mission schools.
The movement for the fxrst Ahlia school was headed by
the Mufti of the time, Sheikh Ismail al-Azhari, the grandfather of
the later Azhari, and by Sheikh Ahmad l$asan Abdal Moneim, a wealthy
Sudanese, who gave up his own house for the opening of the school.
The subscription list was headed by the two religious leaders
Sayea Ali al-Mirghanl the leader of the Ahatmiyya and Sayed Abdal
Rahman al Mahdi the leader of the Angar, and it was soon complete
with subscribers from all over the country. Soon a complete
intermediate school from first to fourth year was started and
staffed by educated Sudanese. This was just after the 1924 revolt,
when the Government was pursuing an unsympathetic policy towards
the education of the Sudanese.
At this time the Government issued "The Education (non-
2
Government Schools) Ordinance 1927 t'he purpose of which was
1. Badrl. Vol. 3, p. 65.
2."1927, Ord. No.7" (15-8.1927), File 918/65 MEA.
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described as "to regulate education in other than Government
schools". It stipulated that "The Director of Education with
the approval of the Governor General may by order in writing
exclude any school or class of school from any or all of the
provisions of this ordinance or of any regulations made there-
under." This was apparently to allay the fears of the
missionary school#, or some of them, and to give a wider scope for
manoeuvre on the part of the Government. But at the same time
the new ordinance put the Government in full control of tne
situation as regards the opening of new schools which, according to
the new law, could not be opened save with the approval of the
Governor General. The same applied to the registration of
teachers, inspection of schools, the giving or withholding of
religious Instruction or even the change of foreign staff. It
3hould be remembered that the staff of the missionary schools at
this time were predominantly non- Sudanese.
The Director of Education was empowered by the new
la., uO close down any school if after inspection he found that it
was being conducted in a manner which he regarded as contrary to
the interests of the pupils or the community. Whether the law was
meant to apply to the missionary schools or to the new Ahlia
school and its like vaa not specified.
However the missionary schools continued to receive
subventions from the Government, a patronage from which the Ahlia
1. "Ibid" Section 2(2).
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Sohool3 and the Ma'had 'tlraia continued to be excluded for a long
time. This special treatment for the missionary schools was
criticised by the Sudanese in the North and the criticism began
to grow as more Ahlia Schools came into being. In 1939 the
first memorandum of the Graduates Congress asked for Government
Schools in the South and the second memorandum of Congress in 191*2
asked for the cancellation of subventions to the missionary schools.
This would undoubtedly affect the missionary schools in the North
as they belonged to the missionary societies which ran the other
schools in the South.
When the Constituent Assembly was formed in 19i+8 and
the first Sudanese Minister of Education under Condominium rule
was appointed, one of his first tasks in office was to attempt to
assume the powers assigned co the Governor General in regard to
the opening of non-Government schools. He raised this point with
the Civil Secretary who replied that he had ascertained that in
principle the Governor General would not be averse to devolving
his personal consent to the Minister in all ordinary applications
arising in the Northern Sudan. But the Civil Secretary pointed
out that there were two types of cases where he would be averse to
the consent being abolished if it meant that the Civil Secretary
would not be consulted on (a) the opening of Mission Schools and
(b) the opening of non-Government Mohammedan schools in the
Southern provinces."
1. Letter SCO/17.A.13 Civil Secretary's Office, Khartoum dated
27th November, 19i*.9. Sgd. E.V. Thomas, Deputy Civil Secretary,
drafted by Sir James Robertson, 9/6/6>» MEA.
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The Civil Secretary argued that Missionary bodies in
the Sudan, whether Christian like the C.M.S., Verona Fathers,
X
American Mission etc. or Moslem like the Aijmadiyya people, had
external affiliations and their proposals could not be considered
as purely local educational matters. Under Administrative
Regulations, the Civil Secretary said he was responsible to the
Governor General for general policy regarding Missions, and he did
not see how he could properly discharge his responsibility unless
he was allowed the opportunity of considering applications for
the opening of new Mission Schools, aid of making his views mown,
and if necessary opposing 'consent1 on political grounds. The
Civil Secretary also wrote that the opening of Moslem non-Govern¬
ment schools in the Southern Sudan must also be referred back to
him for some time to come as, he argued, there was still feeling
about this among Southern Sudanese and Moslem non-Government
schools in pagan areas might raise administrative problems.
He suggested to the Minister that they should take
legal advice as to whether the Governor General could devolve his
responsibility under Section 8(1) of the Education (Nan-Government
Schools) Ordinance 1927, or whether the Ordinance should be amended.
When they obtained the answer they should work out a formula
whereby the Minister would give consent to the opening of all non-
Government schools, except those proposed by Missions or other
1. Though the Civil Secretary said in his letter that the Aijmadiyya
"wished to start here a year or two ago" yet no school had ever
been opened by the Ahmadiyya in the 3udan nor did they have
any known activity in the country.
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foreign agencies (e.g. the Egyptian Government) and except non-
Government Moslem schools in the Southern provinces. Applications
for these schools, the Civil Secretary thought, should continue
to be submitted through him to the Governor-General. He suggested
to the Minister that they could perhaps talk about this when the
Civil Secretary returned from a tour but meanwhile the existing
system should continue.
After two attempts on the part of the Minister of
Education Payed Abdel Rahman All Taha,^" the Civil Secretary suggested
2
a meeting on the 11+th February. They agreed that the Civil
Secretary should consult the Advocate General on the point whether
the Governor General could delegate his powers concerning the
missionary schools to the Minister, but in the meantime the Minister
should proceed with the preparation of his proposed amendment to
the 1927 (non-Government Schools) Ordinance. A week later the
Civil Secretary wrote to the Minister that in the opinion of the
Advocate General - who was British at the time - the Governor
General could not delegate his powers concerning the missionary
schools to the Minister. So the Civil Secretary advised the
Minister to include this point in the production of the amended
•3
ordinance.J
1. Letters dated 13.12.191+9; 22.1.1950, File 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Letters dated 3'Ot.h January, 1950; and 7th February, 1950,
File 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Letter from Civil Secretary^ Office (Sgd. Hawesworth for Civil
Secretary) to Sayed Abdel Rahman All Taha, Minister of Education,
dated 21st February, 1950. 9/8/65, MEA.
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When the draft amendment was completed the Minister
sent it to the Civil Secretary for hia comments and told him
that a certain section was designed to safeguard the Civil
Secretary's interests where Mission schools were concerned but
another section was designed to bring village schools in the
Southern provinces within the scope of the regulations.^"
In the draft, which was an amplification of the 1927
Ordinance, the authority of the Minister replaced that of the
Governor General in all matters regarding the opening or closing
of schools or approval of the appointment of staff. The draft
however contained a clear restatement of the conscience clause,
which was present in the regulations that had been issued at the
2
beginning of the Century under Wingate, Currie and Cromer, and
was restated in 1927 when the Ordinance was first made. But in
the words of a later Secretary of the Church Missionary Society in
Northern Sudan, "As Government officials came more in contact with
missionaries and realized that the methods they use in Muslim
lands are no danger to public security, their attitude changed
and restrictions were relaxed".
Missionary work in the Northern Sudan had been mainly
based on the Protestant Churches, the C.M.S. and the American
Mission, which had from the beginning worked closely together and
avoided duplicating their activities in the educational as well
as other fields. Thus in Orndurraan medical work had been left to
1. Letter dated 8th April, 1950. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Trimingham, The Christian Appz'oach to Islam in the Sudan, p. 30.
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the C.M.S. and boys* education to the American Mission. The C.M.S.
educational work for girls had three centres, Omdurraan, Atbara
(1908) and Wad Medani (1912). The total number of girls in the
various schools in 191+1 was 1,205. The educational work of the
American United Presbyterian Mission consisted in 191+9 of a Boys*
School in Omdurraan, giving elementary and intermediate education,
a girls* school in Khartoum North giving intermediate and
secondary education, and a village agricultural technical school
at Jeraif, on The Blue Nile five miles from Khartoum."'" The Roman
Catholic Mission in the North Sudan, which had recommenced in 1900,
worked mainly amongst Christians in towns where there was a
Catholic minority. Unlike the Protestant Missions they
considered evangelisation amongst the Muslims as unattractive
and subsidiary to other work. 'This may explain the exemption
of Moslem children at Roman iatholic schools from attendance at
classes in Christian Religion and prayer which had been noticed
by Cromer early in the century when the first crisis took place.
In the end the Roman Catholic schools in the Northern Sudan came
to be more numerous than those of any other Christian missionary
•a
society.
The Civil Secretary's reply to the amendments presented
by the Minister of Education was that the Governor General had
1. Ibid., pp. 19-23.
2. Trim Ingham, Christian Approach to Islam in The Sudan, P. 23.
3. S.G. Ministry of Education, Education Statistics 1960-1961,
Khartoum, 1961, pp. 53-61.
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agreed that his personal consent to the opening of new non-
Government schools could be devolved upon the Minister and that
the amendments proposed in the Ordinance appeared to cover that
satisfactorily. But the Civil Secretary had important reservations
to make. Regarding Mission Schools, the Civil Secretary said that
he had two responsibilities, one to see that nothing was dene whiah
might prejudice public security and the other to see that nothing
was done which might bring Sudan Government policy under external
criticism. He thought it was necessary for him if he was to
exercise this responsibility to have some say in "(i) whether
Christian schools should or should not be established in the Northern
Sudan, (ii) decisions regarding reasonable expansion of Christian
Mission Schools in the South, and (iii) in deciding the advisability
or otherwise of the opening of Moslem schools in juxtaposition
to Christian schools in the South."3"
The Civil Secretary thought that regarding these latter
points, the proposed amendment did not entirely meet him, but he
was quite confident that under the existing conditions he had
nothing to fear in this respect though he realised that in a few
years time under a different ministry the position might be
changed. Furthermore, he thought there should be provision for
resolving a disagreement between the Minister and the Civil
Secretary. In practice, he said, such a disagreement could be
settled easily at the time by discussion at an informal council
1. Letter from J.W. Robertson, Civil Seoretary to Director of
Education CS/SCR/17.A.13 dated 13th April 1950.
9/8/65 MEA.
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meeting but he feared this might not always be the case; and he
thought that the Governor General should be the arbitei» in the
event of a deadlock.
By this time the missionary societies had also been
anxiously assessing the prospects of their institutions.
Trimin^iam, the then Secretary to the Church Missionary Society,
Northern Sudan, wrote "Mission institutions will have an increasing
importance in the future. The Government has instituted a twenty-
year policy for the Sudanization of its services. It is inevitable
that Government services will steadily deteriorate for the Sudanese
have not the mental background to maintain western standards, nor
the spiritual background to hold positions of trust with the
integrity that has been shown by British officials. This Sudan¬
ization will mean that Mission Institutions will stand out very
vividly from those of the Sudan Government and will offer a means
of service, and standard of efficiency and moral integrity not
offered by theirs.
The challenge of the Southerners has also led to a
great change of attitude towards direct Muslim evangelism. The
missionaries looked upon their Muslim friends with new eyes. All
kinds of indexes showed them that the work of the past had not been
unfruitful and had had a deeper influence than they realized.
They no longer took it for granted that the Sudanese were too deeply
entrenched in Islam ever to be changed. They saw those who had
received a western education dissatisfied by Islam as a spiritual
basis for life, leaving it for a humanist basis, only to find that
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empty too, yet clinging to Islam as the social environment out¬
side which they would even be more at sea. These challenges
shocked the missionaries to a realization that the greater the
challenge the greater opportunity presented. The work of the
past has shown Muslims that the missionary* s interest in them
is genuine; but if that is so, then the missionary cannot restrain
himself from desiring to share with them the fuller riches that
2
are in Jesus Christ."
The tragedy of the relationship was that while the
Moslems wanted modern education for their children they did not
want evangelization from which, they feared, "the missionary can-
2
not restrain himself" and as it was in missionary schools, more
than in missionary hospitals, that the possibilities of evangeli¬
zation were greater, it was the missionary schools which were
viewed with more than guarded suspicion. Miat kept the schools
going was the need for education and a realization on the part
of the parents of what the missionaries recognized as "The
stubbornness of Islam to Christian influence."' The old history
of contacts, rivalries, and conflicts be ween Christianity and
Islam was underlying these attitudes on all sides, and more
recent history saw a closer association between tabshir
(evangelization) and 1st 1'roar (colonization and foreign rule),
1. J. Spencer Triminghan, The Christian Approach to Islam in the
Sudan, p. 61.
2. Ibid.
3- Ibid., pp. 1+.3-U5-
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as the modern European Christian movement was historically an
aspect of the Western penetration "which forced Islam to a
state of defensive consolidation."'1' In this confrontation Islam
came to be a national and political force to promote the
nationalistic ends.
The missionaries were far from being satisfied with
the results of their educational work as "absorption in
institutional work, has led to Christian aooial service and education
becoming too much an end in itself, and evangelistic work lias been
almost a by-product. It has become so, on the one hand, because
of its conditioning by Government policy and, on the other,
because of the frustration and malaise felt by the missionary as
a result of the apparent ineffectiveness of the direct approach,
assisted by the pragroatist emphasis of Protestant missions.
This was the state of deadlock reached at the beginning of the war.
The effort to maintain institutions under war conditions forced
missionaries to reconsider their place in a country where the
Government is going ahead in a policy of social welfare and
education. They found that it is not enough to teach and heal,
which still leave the Westerner separate from the people. That
led to a realization that the whole missionary policy must be re¬
oriented in the light of the primary aim of Christian missions -
the establishment of the visible Church."
1. Ibid., p. U5.
2. Trimingham, The Christian Approach, p. JLj.9.
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la the reappraisal it was fount, out that the Northern
Sudan, unlike the South, was "almost completely untouched by any
\
missionary activity." Mission work was confined to a few of
2 9
the larger towns, some Christians (Greek, Syrians and CoptsJ)
lived in all other towns and were visited from time to time by
priests of their respective congregations, but they assumed the
aspect of national congregations with no missionary activities.
The post-war policy of the C.M.S. and the American
Mission was that where, for instance, in a town one school was the
only missionary activity, it was far more important that it should
be developed into a full mission station with its varied activities
touching all sides of life than to occupy a new country. Thus the
C.M.S., not seeing its way to develop its work in Atbara handed
over its girls* school to the American Mission in 19i+7; whilst
in Wad Medani, where also it had one girls* school, it proposed
to extend its work with fresh activities in collaboration with the
diocese so that it could become a really Church-centred work.
On the other hand, it was thought that such limitation
did not apply to a newly opened mission or a mission that was
Ibid*» P« 37# London, 1949.
2. Greek schools were opened in the Sudan exclusively for the
children of tne Oti eek community. They, together with the
schools which were exclusively for foreign communities,
Armenians, and Indians, fall outside the scope of this thesis.
According to the Educational Statistica of the Year 1961-62
there were 747 Greek pupils at all levels in 7 Greek schools,
and 4^4 pupils in 7 Indian schools, and 56 pupils in one
Armenian School.
3. Coptic schools are run along Egyptian lines, and Sudanese pupils
are admitted to Coptic schools. The Coptic Church, like the
Greek Orthodox had no missionary activities.
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sufficiently staffed to integrate its existing work and pioneer
in new areas. The American Mission was able to open up new
centres in 1948 by sending missionaries to Gedaref and El Obeid,
both towns in which no evangelistic work had formerly been
attempted. El Obeid was considered especially important because
of the need for someone to care for the Nuba Christians who went
there to work from the Nuba Mountains. A club had been opened
which provided regular classes in basic Arabic and Christian
instruction. No Christian work existed in the Province of
Darfur, and as there was a number of Christian Syrian traders in
al-Fasher, the capital, they had asked one mission at least to
start a Christian school, but owing to more pressing commitments,
the mission was not able to respond. It was thought reasonable
that work should be undertaken there by a mission which also worked
in the neighbouring northern region of French Equatorial Africa."*"
While reappraisal, reorientation and reorganisation
were taking place, political events moved much faster than had
been expected and soon the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
in 1952 introduced the Sudan to the transitional period which
culminated in the declaration of Independence in January, 1956.
About a year after Independence the Government decided to take over
2
the missionary schools in the South and the Ahlia schools in the
North.^ The Government however agreed to leave the missionary
1. Triraingham, The Christian Church in the Post- ar Sudan, pp.37-38.
2. Above, Ch. II, p.
3. Below, Ch. V, p.
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schools in the North to operate as private schools charging
economic fees, similar to the Egyptian schools, the Community
schools and a fe** of the Ahlia schools. The Government made
one condition in sparing the missionary schools in the North from
take-over, and that was to allow Moslem children in the missionary
schools to receive instruction in the Islamic religion. The
Ministry of Education agreed to provide the teachers for this purpose,
and when the missionary schools objected to the teaching of Islamic
religion in the premises of their schools the Ministry met their
objeceion by proposing to give the instruction classes in Islamic
religion in neighbouring premises, most of them schools, which
1
were not owned by the missionary schools or missionary societies.
This was agreed upon. Classes in Christian religion continued
to be taught to Christian children in the schools.
The decision to teach Islamic religion to Moslem
children in the missionary schools in the North resolved the problem
of antipathy to Christian missionary educational efforts in the
Northern .Sudan and the missionary schools came to be viewed as
similar to the other private schools which provided a second
chance for some of the children who were not able to get Into
the Government schools, particularly at the Hitermedlate and the
Secondary levels. They also came to be viewed as providing
Sudanese boys and girls with chances of studying in international
communities, as some of these schools, particularly the .Roman
1. Personal Communication from Sayed Ziada Arbab, former
Minister of Education.
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Catholic sohools, contained a substantial proportion of pupils
other than Sudanese who were of different nationalities and
religions such as Hindus, Jews and Christians. Where there was
a sufficient number of English speaking pupils a special class
was usually formed for them.'*'
By the academic year 1961-1962 there were nine Catholic
missionary schools, nine American Mission schools and nine other
missionary schools, including one C.M.S. , out of a total of 183
2
schools classified as private schools. Pour of the missionary
schools as well as twelve of the ninety-nine Sudanese schools
were in receipt of Government grant-in-aid. The Christian
missionary schools were from the beginning organised along
Sudanese lines and followed the Sudanese syllabus so whex the
Government decided in 1965 that Arabic x^as to be used as a medium
of instruction in the secondary schools, missionary secondary
schools, few as they were, had no greater difficulty in conforming
than had the Sudanese schools. Thus, after resolving the problem
of religious instruction, Christian missionary schools had
virtually became much more akin to Sudanese Ahlia schools.
1. "The Catholic Church and Education in the Sudan".
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference of the Philosophical
Society of the Sudan, Khartoum, 1963# PP« 123-130.
2. Al-Ihsa*-a-t-tarbawl 1961-62, Khartoum, 1962, pp. 78-81.
3. Republic of the Sudan, Ministry of Education, Education
Statistics 1960-1961, Khartoum, 1961, pp. 53-61.
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CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:
FROM THE REC ONQUEST TO THE DE LA WARR COMMISSION
On the 29th November 1898, less than three months after the
reconquest of the Sudan, Lord Kitchener was In Edinburgh receiving
an honorary doctorate in Law from Edinburgh University in the
morning and the Freedom of the City in a yet greater gathering in
the afternoon of that ceremonial day. ^ It was Lord Rosebery who
said to the audience that the Sirdar (Kitchener) had no sooner
gained his historic victory than he turned over in his mind the
thought that, if the British were to prevail against; other contending
2
European powers who would be too happy to take their place or If
they were not once more to be overcome by a dark cluud of "barbarism",
then a beginning should be made in the way of a centre of education,
simple at first, technical in the main, but also giving those
people what they wanted, namely, to take some part in their own
administration.- Lord Rosebery urged his audience "what a dis¬
grace, what a reflection it will be on our enthusiasm for Lord
Kitchener, from the palace to the peasant, If this great and
welathy nation, grateful for the undoing of the past, and glorying
in what he has done at the present does not give her obol and
more than her obol to her more than Belisarius.When Kitchenerts
1. The Scotsman and The Times of 30.11.1898.
2. Allusion to the Fashoda Incident, the claims of France, the
Marchand mission and the French application, immediately after
the Reconquest, to open a French School in Khartoum which was
turned down.
3. The Scotsman 3^»11.1898.
ij,. Referring to the Latin proverb, "Date obolum Belisario"
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turn came to reply to the toast he seized the opportunity to
launch his appeal and explained his project. He reminded his
audience that as a result of his campaign in the Sudan the British
and the Egyptian flags were flying at Khartoum, never, he hoped,
to be taken down. In consequence of that he asked his audience
to go a step further to see what remained to be done in the Sudan.
Kitchener stated that the first task was to civilise the
inhabitants of those vast districts in the Valley of the Nile. He
hoped to introduce and facilitate trade whioh he considered in some
of its aspects as a very large civilising element. Other things
they had to introduce or establish were, government administration,
the giving of justice to the people, and the organisation of a
police force since public security on the frontiers and internally
would have to be safeguarded.
Kitchener also said that they would have to teach the
inhabitants that they should develop their industrial habits in
order to help to pay for the administration. The inhabitants
would also have to attend to sanitary regulations and they would
also be taught that they were not allowed to rob or commit acts of
violence amongst each other. Should they follow guidance on these
matters they could rest assured that the Government would leave
them alone in undisturbed possession of their properties and their
ancient rights. Kitchener told his audience that it was there
that he wished the English race to step in, and give what the
Government could not afford to provide - namely, education to the
children of those poor people whom he described as an intelligent
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race, entirely uneducated. He told them that "The Mahdi, like
every other Oriental despot, put his face firmly against any
form of instruction that might enlighten his people." But
Kitchener assured his audience that the people would take advantage
if the means were placed at their disposal and highly appreciate
the education if it were given to their children.
He reminded them that he did not mean to be understood to
advocate that education should always be free in the Sudan. He
thought that as the country prospered, as he felt it would prosper,
the people would be able to pay for the education of their children.
What Kitchener proposed was that, by the formation of a Gordon
Memorial College at Khartoum, conducted on English lines by English
masters, they should give to those people the education round
which future development might grow. By this, the audience were
told, they 'would in some way be able to pay a debt that they owed.
Kitchener added that much might be said of how Gordon would have
rejoiced had he known that by his death the blessing of education
would be given to the people that he loved, and amongst whom he
died. Much might be said of what this gift would do to abolish
fanaticism and slavery, but he stressed that, as he was speaking
to a hard-headed Scottish audience, he thought he could only say
that if they had been left a fertile property that had been for
thirteen years uncultivated, they would have to spend something
on tilling the ground before they could reap the harvest.
To those who spent large sums in advertising their goods,
Kitchener remarked, surely it should occur that it would be a
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benefit to them if they spent something on teaching the inhabitants
of that new market which had been opened to read their advertise¬
ments. He also a3ked them to remember that if they did not
educate those people somebody else would, and would implant upon
their minds other thoughts and other influences, which might
lead to the greatest difficulties that they might have to over¬
come in that country.
To form a college such as he proposed, Kitchener considered
that £100,000 would be necessary. He did not think it could be
well done for less, and if it were not well done he should not
Cc\.r<z_
coma to have a hand in its formation. Out of that sum he
proposed that £90,000 should be invested in order to provide
permanently for the salaries of those English masters that it
would be necessary to maintain. Kitchener said if the college
were not started on some such firm foundation as that, he felt sure
it could not successfully do the work that was before it and also
he did not think that the college should come year by year to ask
for aid at their hands.
At the beginning the college, Kitchener thought, would have
to be a school for almost elementary education, but as the country
progressed the college would develop towards a higher form of
instruction, and would enable the pupils to take positions as
clerks in the Government departments and posts in the telegraphs,
as tax-collectors, and many other positions in their own country.
He hoped that tne college would develop technical schools of
agriculture and irrigation and engineering, and perhaps, last of
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all, of medicine, and would thus form a worthy memorial of Gordon
and a centre of English education in the heart of Africa.
Regarding the prosperity of the country, he felt sure that his
audience would like to know of the very successful results that
were obtained lately in the Dongola Province. That province was
rated, the previous year, at half its taxes, but without the
least complaint coming to his ears, they had paid in money into
the treasury the entire cost of the administration of the Province.
Kitchener told his audience that it was with the greatest
doubt and hesitation that he came to the determination to make his
appeal for so large a sum as £100,000. But what made up his mind
in the first instance was the great interest and the considerable
pecuniary support he received from Lord Rosebery, as well as from
Her Majesty's Government and Lord Cromer. He told his audience
that he went down to the City to seek advice and help. Some
said it would be easy to get the moneyj others looking at the
largeness of the sum, thought it might be difficult; but they all
agreed that the money would not be forthcoming unless he asked
for it. Kitchener concluded his appeal by saying, "Now I do ask
for it. I ask the people of this United Kingdom, I ask the people
in our colonies, I ask the people in that great English-speaking
sister nation of America to help me to form a worthy Gordon
Memorial College at Khartoum.
Turning to his Scottish audience Kitchener said, "To you
Scotsmen I can appeal with confidence. There is no one that has
1. The Scotsman, 30.11.1898.
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done so much for the civilisation of Africa as Scotsmen, and if
you help in this great work you will be only following in the
footsteps of those who have gene before. Remember Livingstone!
Remember Moffat! Remember Gordon!" This was received with loud
cheers from the audience. When the Lord Provost of Edinburgh
gave the final speech of the banquet he said he could not sit
down without referring in a single word to what was said by
Lord Kitchener with regard to the proposal to found a college
at Khartoum. The Lord Provost said if Great Britain was to
follow up what she had done in restoring good Government in Egypt
and in the Sudan, it was absolutely necessary that she should
educate the people. He said that he knew from his friend the
Lord Provost of Glasgow, xvho was sitting at the end of one of
the tables, that taere had already been written two letters,
addressed to Lord Kitchener, which would be appearing in the papers
of the following day. He finally assured Kitchener that the
country would rise to the occasion and would with readiness
provide the funds to found the Gordon College in Khartoum.
The response was immediate so that by the second week in
January or in less than two months, the sura of one hundred
thousand pounds which had been asked for was subscribed. This
sum with the addition of various legacies and accumulations of
interests, eventually reached the amount of over £135»000.^
Queen Victoria expressed her interest and approval and consented
1. R. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College and its Work."
Reprinted from The Story of the Cape to Cairo Railway and River
Route 1687-1925, Vol. lv, P.9.
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to become the Patron of the College, a position which her
successors continued to hold. Lord Salisbury, on behalf of the
Government, expressed approval of the scheme and recommended the
policy of which it formed a part. A General Council was formed
and at its first meeting at the Bank of England, on January 18,
1899, an "Executive Committee" was elected with full power to
give effect to Kitchener's proposals with such modifications as
might be deemed necessary.
The plans of a suitable building were at once drawn up and
after considerable discussion it was finally agreed that an
expenditure of £23,000 on the building and £7»000 for laying out
the grounds, providing school furniture, fittings, and educational
equipment, should be incurred, the remainder to be formed into an
"Endowment Fund". Soon after his return to Khartoum early in
1899, Kitchener was anxious to make the start. The interest on
the endowment fund was utilized to support four different schools
which had already been organized and were destined to form the
nucleus of the coming college at Khartoum when the building was
sufficiently advanced to admit of it.
But the outbreak of the Boer War, coinciding as it did
with the final defeat and death of the Khalifa on November 21+,
1899, caused the transference of Kitchener to South Africa as
Chief of Staff there. On December 22, 1899, Kitchener left for
South Africa leaving Sir Reginald Wingate in his place at Khartoum.
Mr. (later Sir Edgar) Bonham Carter, the Legal Secretary of the
Sudan assumed the responsibility of starting the educational system
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in the Sudan early in 1900, and later in the same year
Mr. (later Sir James) Currie was transferred to the Sudan through
the recommendation of Lord Cramer and Dr. Douglas Dunlop, the
Advisor of Education to the Egyptian Government. Currie was
appointed as Director of Education and Principal of the Gordon
College. Both jobs he continued to hold for the following
fourteen years.
Currie, like Dunlop, was a Scotsman, with a background
of a Scottish education and training.1 His father was the
principal of the Church of Scotland Training College in Edinburgh,
and he sent his boy, who was born on May 31, 1868, to Pettes
College, where he was an open scholar and where he played in the
first Rugby XV and the first Cricket XI, Gaining an exhibition
to Edinburgh University, he was elected a scholar of Lincoln
College, Oxford, in 1888. On leaving Oxford he took the somewhat
unusual course at that time of teaching in one of the Scottish
Education Board*s schools in his native city. He gained his
experience by working in Scottish State-aided schools, and in
helping, as an officer of a local authority, to lay the foundations
of the expansion of Scottish secondary eduoation when the task
was largely undertaken by the Scottish Education Department in
1895. He continued in that field until Dunlop, who was in
search of young educationalists for his staff, selected him in
1899 to join the Egyptian service as an officer in the Egyptian
2
Ministry of Public Instruction.
1. R. Wingate, "Sir James Currie*s Life and Work", East Africa
and Rhodesia, March 25, 1937, p. 894*
2. Sir James Currie, "The Educational Experiment in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan", Joupnal of the Royal African Society, Vol. 33,
No. 133, Oct. 1934, P. 363.
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As a result of Lord Cromer's Indian experience, he was
particularly impressed with the failure of Biglish educational
effort in India, which he was fond of ascribing to the unrestricted
dominance of the Indian Civil Service over other departments. In
conversation with Currie he likened that service to the Upas tree
under which nothing could live. Both Cromer and Wingate were
of the opinion that the British masters of the educational staff
should take a share in the normal administration of the country.
Currie related that he was afforded every possible opportunity of
familiarising himself with it, including short periods as Governor
of one of the smaller Sudan Provinces. Prom the beginning an
elaborate scheme was set on foot by which it was made possible for
Or
members of the educational service to do a tour/service on the
administrative side to acquire first-hand knowledge of the
machinery of government. Also their payments and promotions for
the first years of service were identical with that of the
administrative service.
For Currie, after an interlude of eighteen months for
observation, and considerable travel all round the country, the
immediate aims of the government educational policy were
visualised. The objects of that policy were defined as:-
(1) The creation of a competent artisan class which was entirely
lacking at the time.
1. Ibid., p. 36J+.
ilk
(2) The diffusion among the masses of the people of education
sufficient to enable them to understand the machinery of
government, particularly with reference to the equitable and
impartial administration of justice.
(3) The creation of a small administrative class, capable of filling
many government posts, same of an administrative, others of a
technical nature.
While the first and the third were feasible and necessary objectives
for the new colonial government the third was financially difficult
as It would require an amount of money and a number of teachers and
schools beyond the resources of the government and so had to be
regarded as a long term objective if it was to be sought at all
within the formal framework of the educational system.
To give effect to this programme, in so far as the very
meagre funds at his disposal admitted, Currie recommended:-
(1) The institution of a small industrial school at the most
suitable point that could be founded in Khartoum or Oradurman.
(2) The establishment of "Kuttabs" or elementary vernacular schools
in the capital towns of the various provinces.
(3) The creation of two good primary schools in Omdurman and
Khartoum.
With regard to the industrial school, with the collaboration
of Commander Bond, R.H., the Director of water Transport, a small
industrial school was initiated at the Dockyard in Omdurman. Some
1. Wingate, "The Story of The Gordon College", p. 11.
175
sixty apprentices were divided into two shifts of thirty each,
who alternately received a day's schooling in reading, writing,
arithmetic, and drawing, and a day's practical work at their
separate trades. This experiment was later on transferred to the
South when an industrial school was opened in Wau under the
supervision of Catholic priests.1
Qur'an Khalwas formed an integral part of the already
existing religious education and were scattered in hundreds
throughout the country. The government was apprehensive of what
it saw as the "fanatical spirit which was such a serious menace to
2
peace and order." So elementary vernacular education was
considered by the government as the best weapon for the purpose
of exorcising the 'fanatical spirit'-1 which had led through the
influence of the Fekis^ to the rise of Mahdiism and it would also,
at the same time, assist towards local recruitment for the govern¬
ment service, while through the diffusion of technical and
agricultural knowledge, vernacular education would have an important
effect upon economic development.
With these objects in view the government educational scheme
was so drawn according to the later account by Gurrie as to give
the first place in importance to elementary vernacular schools,
1. Above Ch.II, p.35.
2. Currle, "The Educational Experiment", Journal of the Royal
African Society, Vol. 34# No. 134, 1935# p. 41.
3. S. G. Memorandum to Mud Irs, dated 1899 W. P. Box 103/7/1 DRA.
4- Feki, is the Islamic religious teacher in the Sudan;generally
one who teaches in the Khalwa.
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end the second to the technical and vocational instruction
supplied by the Upper School of the Gordon College. In addition
there were to be instituted primary schools to serve as feeders
to the Upper School of the Gordon College and to provide recruits
for junior posts in government service. The vernacular elementary
schools were so arranged as to be the means of spreading sufficient
general knowledge among an agricultural population. Any idea
that the education given in them was in any way a qualification
for government service was to be deliberately and actively dis¬
couraged. If parents desired their children to enter government
service, they had to realise that the educational avenue Into such
service was neither cheap nor easy and that special aptitude and
special funds were essential.
It was essential, therefore, to establish, without delay,
a few elementary vernacular schools in certain localities in the
provinces in charge of trained teachers, maintained at as high a
standard as possible, In order to serve as models for imitation
and to serve as the base for the new educational pyramid. The
creation, however, of these elementary vernacular schools presented
a very immediate difficulty, for teachers were non-existent. They
might, perhaps, have been obtained from Egypt but this was discarded
as both expensive and politically unwise. It was therefore decided
to create a small training college in connection with the primary
school at Omdurman.
The aims of the training college were simple instruction
in reading, writing, arithmetic, and very elementary teaching, to
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be given to a few Sudanese Sheikha, who were then to be drafted
off to the provincial vernacular schools. It was also decided
that a few of those Sheikha should be handed over to the Legal
Secretary, who would eventually find work for them in connection
with the tiewly-formed Native Courts. In imitation of King's
Scholars in England each Sheikh received an allowance of one pound
ten shillings a month, and they were all carefully selected from
X
good Arab families of the country.
With regard to the third point - the creation of one or
two good primary schools - this was perhaps the most immediately
urgent need. Government required as soon as possible educated
young Sudanese for the army, for many branches of the civil service,
post, railways, telegraphs, and provincial services. Hitherto,
these minor appointments had of necessity to be filled from
Egyptian and Syrian sources, and the latter class in their turn re¬
quired aducation&l facilities for their children. As a beginning,
a primary school, under competent Egyptian teachers, was established
at Omdurman, and later a second at Khartoum. The curriculum
followed was that of an Egyptian primary school simplified to meet
Sudanese requirements under the oversight of a capable Egyptian
inspector, Ahmed Effendi Hedayat, who had finished his professional
training as a schoolmaster with three years attendance at the
o
B/rough Road Training College at Isleworth. The pupils of these
schools were for the most fart sons of former Dervish Emirs and
1. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 13.
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important tribal Sheikha - in the proportion of about seven
Sudanese to two Egyptians.
Thus were laid the foundations of a system of education
strictly limited to only the most urgent requirements of the new
administration. Besides the financial stringency, the limitation
on the system was due to a definite line of government policy
which determined the number of places in the schools by the number
of jobs available in the government service without allowing the
former ever to exceed the latter." This principle was firmly
adhered to and for the government this necessitated extreme slow¬
ness and caution which they considered essential as they were
apprehensive that if educational progress outstripped economic
development the result upon the contentment of the country would
be disastrous. So a complete understanding prevailed between
the educational and administrative authorities as to the number
of civil servants, from engineers to judges in the Mohammedan
courts, that were likely to be required, and numbers were adjusted
p
accordingly. Such was the system that prevailed up to 1918.
The attitude of the inhabitants to these schools was such
that the government soon found it difficult to keep pace with the
number of applicants to both "Kuttab" and school. This might be
due to the assurances given by the government to the Moslems that
the religion of the children would not be interfered with and no
1. Vingate, "Sir James Currie*a Life and Work", p. 89i+.
2. J. Gurrie, "The Educational Experiment", Journal of the ftoyal
African Society, Vol. 3I4., No. 134# P« 4^.
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proselytization to Christianity would take place in government
schools. It Mas also probably due to their awareness of lucrative
future careers for their sons and to the fact that there were
fewer places provided. At the end of the year 1901 the Director
of Education reported that the educational institutions supported
by the College consisted of:-
(1) An Industrial school near Omdurman with 60 pupils.
(2) A Higher Primary School at Omdurman with 162 pupils.
(3) A Higher Primary School at Khartoum with ?2 pupils.
(!{,) A small Training College at Omdurman with 6 students.
Meanwhile, the building of the College was making progress,
but it was not yet possible to house these institutions until
sufficient accommodation was available; room, hox^ever, was found
for a general Sudan reference library, a 3mall economic museum to
assist in the commercial development of the country, and a small
laboratory.
With regard to the laboratories, their creation and
inception were to Mr. Henry S. Wellcome, head of the firm of
Burroughs Wellcome and Co., manufacturing chemists, and founder of
the Wellcome Bureau of Scientific Research, London, who was one of
the earliest visitors to Sudan after its reconquest. As a
contribution to the call for setting up the Gordon Memorial College,
Mr. Wellcome offered a fully equipped up-to-date Tropical Research
Laboratory with complete bacteriological and chemical sections.
The offer was accepted by the Governing Body of the College on
condition that the Sudan Government contributed to its upkeep, and
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a bacteriologist Dr. (later Sir) Andrew Balfour v?aa chosen as
director. Thus a beginning was made on bacteriological and
medical research in the Sudan that helped in examining the problems
of tropical vegetation, germ life and disease. In a remarkably
short time, Dr. Balfour, as Director of Laboratories and Medical
Officer of Health, eliminated the dread of malaria from Khartoum,
the capital and the seat of government and rendered it, according
to Wingat a,"*" "the healthiest city in Africa". The elimination of
malaria from the rest of the country and the rest of the
population, had to wait for a long time - indeed, it is not yet
achieved. The functions of the Wellcome Research Laboratory,
which was housed in the Gordon College, could be briefly summarised
as follows:
'(a) The study of tropical hygiene and tropical diseases both of
man and beast, especially the communicable diseases peculiar to
the Sudan, and to co-operate and to render assistance to
military and civil medical officers, officers of health, and the
clinics of the civil and military hospital.
(b) The study of plant diseases, both those due to fungi and other
vegetable parasites and those caused by insects, the study of
harmful and beneficial insects, and especially of insects in their
relation to tropical medicine.
(c) To carry out investigations in connection with cases of
poisoning, and to develop methods for the detection of toxic agents
which may be employed by the natives.
1. v/ingat e, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 17»
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(d) To oarry out chemical and bacteriological tests in connection
with water, foodstuffs, and other sanitary questions.
(e) To make analysis of soils, minerals, ores, fuel3, etc.
(f) Finally, to carry out investigations in connection with
agricultural and forest products of operations, and, generally
speaking, of any material which may be of practical interest in
the economic development of the Sudan.1"*"
Another gift to the College followed close on the heels of
that of Mr. Wellcome. That was a Department of Manual Training
and Technical Instruction, together with complete apparatus for the
establishment of practical workshops in the College. This was
offered to the College by Sir William Mather who was an eminent
engineer and exponent of technical education. He visited the
Pudan in 1902 and later on in 1909 in connection with the
cultivation of cotton in the Gezira. His conception of the
educational value of his gift was admirably summarised in the
?
letter to Lord Cromer which accompanied his present. More
important than his valuable gift were the admirable educational
ideas he expounded in his letter. They compare favourably with
what has been recently recommended in England by the Newsom Report,^
and in Scotland by the Brunton Report.*4" Unfortunately, and to the
1. "Ibid."
2. "Ibid"., p. 19, Letter dated October 21st, 1902.
3. Ministry of Education, Half Our Future: A Report of the Central
Advisory Council for Education (England) H.M.3.0. 1967. PP. 12*5-151.
h. Scottish Education Department, From School to Further Education,
Edinburgh, H.M.S.O., 1967, pp. 3^-39.
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detriment of technical education in the -Sudan, the Gordon College
later on lost sight of the advanced educational principles which
had been recommended by Sir William Mather at the turn of the
century.
Sir William said that he desired to avail himself of the
opportunity presented by the formal opening of the Gordon College
at Khartoum by Lord Kitchener, which, he was informed, would take
place on the 8th November, to ask for the acceptance on behalf of
the trustees, of the equipment for a department of manual training
and technical instruction, together with complete apparatus for
the establishment of practical workshops in the College. All of
this had already been despatched and was en route for Khartoum.
A catalogue, detailing what the equipment consisted of, including
steam boiler, steam engines, electric dynamos and motors, pumps
and accessories for raising water from the Nile for the use of
the Gollege, machines and hand tools for wood and metal work, and
sundry appliances for experimental illustration, together with
plans showing the disposition and arrangement of these in the
buildings and workshops, had already been furnished to Mr. Currie,
the Principal of the College.
In view of the opening ceremony, Sir William said, it
might be opportune for him to state the educational purposes which
he hoped under proper direction would be achieved through his
gift. The object and purpose of establishing the department of
manual and technical training was to assist the education of the
Sudanese boys and youths by combining work of the hand with the
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mental instruction given in the classroom. He amplified the
educational ideas underlying his gift by saying:
"It is now a generally-accepted principle of education
that young people learn more readily, and retain what they learn
more thoroughly, when constructive occupations, which employ their
hands and eyes and reflective faculties are associated with their
school life and teaching.
"In dealing with real things and actual processes, and in
using tools, machines and materials responsive to their will and
applied to purposes which they can see and appreciate, they
unconsciously acquire habits of observation, carefulness, precision
and logical thought and a sense of reality, proportion, form, and
strength. Thus, mental and physical activities are combined in
education, the result of which is the development of creative
faculties. An appeal is made to the senses, and through the senses
the brain is reached more easily and best furnished and made active.
This is practical education.
"Nature and nature-study ought to form the most impressive
means of education with a people so keenly sensitive to external
phenomena as the Egyptians and the Sudanese. The laws of nature,
embodied in and illustrated by concrete things produced, under
suitable instruction, by the boys themselves in the workshops of
the College, will become familiar to them. Work done by and
through the natural sciences, even in their elementary stages,
will prepare the young people of the Sudan to adapt and use the
laws of nature in whatever occupation they may follow in after life.
IQk
"The effect of manual training as an educational force,
bringing into co-operation the hands, the eyes, and the mental
faculties, first in drawing objects by freehand or to scale, then
in forming those objects in material - whether of wood or metal -
by the hand, using suitable tools and appliances, is to cause the
mind unconsciously to reason at every step as the hands and eyes
are working. Thus the manual operation interests the senses and
brightens the intellect at the same time, while it also trains the
hand to dexterity. The result is educational in the best sense
of the word, for the faculties of observation and reasoning are
quickened, and produce an intelligence applicable to every study
and occupation. Moreover, the dullness of school life is
avoided by this method of instruction, which is full of interest
and pleasure for young people, and its results are consequently
more thorough and enduring. By it the mind is not filled, but
fed, and therefore, grows and develops into healthy activity and
strength.
"For those boys who have benefited by the process of manual
training I have described, and who are able to prolong their
studies beyond the school age, the equipment will supply a course
of technical instruction which will educationally prepare them to
become apt skilful man suitable for various mechanical and
agricultural pursuits, and irrigation works, etc., and thus enable
them to contribute to the development of the material resources
of the country In which my visit last winter led me to take so
great an interest ..."
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The inauguration of the College actually took place on
November 8, 1902, when Lord Kitchener, back from the South African
campaign and on his way to assume his new appointment as Commander-
in-Chief in India, passed through Khartoum and presided at the
formal opening of the building. He spoke at seme length on the
subject of the need of education in the Sudan, expressed himself
fully satisfied with the foundations that had been laid, remarking
that he "could not expect quicker progress - but was content to
wait patiently for the future." Ten years later he was to become
once again closely and officially connected with the institution
when he became British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt where he
remained till the outbreak of the First World -Jar, when he was
succeeded again by Wingate who was his successor as Governor
General of the Sudan.
Sir Reginald Wingate described his policy in the
administration of the Sudan by saying that it had been his
persistent endeavour to make every official feel that his own
individual share in the work of administration was known to him
and that the credit should be due to that official. This was the
spirit, he said, which he strove to instil into the minds of those
who were collaborating with him in his government of the country.
Not only would he commend that method to his successors, but would
urge them - as the educational system developed and the natives of
the country began to fill positions of responsibility - to treat
the latter also with that confidence and goodwill which would
engender in their minds a feeling of trust and dependence on their
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British leaders. But to achieve this, he suggested, a system of
moral instruction should be developed whereby the student was to
be brought to realise that truthfulness, courage, fair play,
respect for authority, honesty, self-control, industry, good
manners, the duties and privileges of citizenship, were essential
to successful administration, and should therefore be cultivated
assiduously.
Wingate stressed that their efforts In that direction would
only succeed if they insisted on the vital importance of such
character-training, thus engendering the English Public School code
of honour amongst the youth of the country. This, he suggested,
could best be achieved by example and personal contact between
the students and the very best type of men the British race could
produce, for upon the influence exerted by those carefully selected
instructors would depend the co-operation and loyalty, or the
estrangement, of the rising generation of educated Africans, on
whom would devolve in an increasing degree the conduct of municipal
affairs, and a responsible share in the work of government. He
referred to Sir Frederick Lugard,1 in his work, "The Dual Mandate^
4n British Tropical Afrloa" who dealt at length with this vitally
important subject and commended its careful study to his
successors in the Sudan and to all those interested in the education
1. Sir Frederick Lugard retired as Governor General of Nigeria in
1919 and published his book the "Dual Mandate" in 1922, See
"Introduction to the Fifth Edition" of the "Dual Mandate by
Margery Perham, pp. XXVII-XLIX.
2. Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa,
Kith a new introduction by Margery Perham, London, 1965.
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of the African."*"
It was the pursuit of the policy of"Native Administration"
allegedly baaed on Lugard and his Dual Mandate that led to the
destruction of the more benevolent principles of character training
which wingate said he had advocated to the British teachers and
officials for the educated Sudanese. That relationship, when
Wingate wrote The Story of the Gordon College in 1923# was already
beginning to be dominated by fear and mistrust.^
Lord Cromer, just before his departure from Egypt in 1907,
when a programme of Irrigation, railway extension, and
agricultural development had definitely been decided on after a
study of the economic position, at the instigation of Sir Reginald
Wingate sanctioned a special grant of £100,000 for capital
expenditure on education, payable out of an impending loan. This
was to enable the Sudan government to staff itself in many of Its
lower and intermediate grades with indigenous civil service. This
meant less cost to the government and, since the importation of
the Indian element to East Africa had proved a disturbing factor,
it was to be avoided in the Sudan,^ especially as an Egyptian
eivil service in the Sudan would be the equivalent of the Indian
counterpart In East Africa. Some of the Egyptians were already
beginning to be articulate sad critical about the British policy
1. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 22.
2. Edward Atiyah, An Arab Tells His Story, London, 19i*6, PP.137-
11+0.
3. Currie, "The Ed. Expt", Journal of the Royal African Society,
Vol. 33, No. 133, Oct, 1931}-, PP. 366.
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both in figypt and in the Sudan.
From 1906 until the outbreak of the First World War the
economic development projects such as the extension of the rail¬
way to El Obeid, the beginning of the Gezira Scheme, and the
necessary huge preliminary surveys, all emphasised the need for
the creation of a Sudanese professional class without whose aid
the cost of these schemes would have been prohibitive. So a
system of technical training had by then been started by means
of the Mather workshop, and a small engineering school was being
created in which overseers of works and land surveyors could be
2
trained.
Lord Kitchener returned to Egypt in 1911 as Agent and
Consul-General in succession to Sir Eldon Gorst, who had
succeeded Lord Cromer after his resignation in 1907 and had
followed the same policy of his predecessor towards education in
the Sudan. In reviewing the educational position thirteen years
after the reconquest, Kitchener found that the government elementary
schools were gradually superseding the indigenous schools or
Khalwas. In most of the towns and the large villages first-class
"kuttabs" or elementary schools had been established, and in other
parts second-class Kuttabs staffed by teachers from the training
n
college of the Gordon College.
1. Above, Chapter III on "Missionary Education in The North", pp.121-125.
2. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", pp.22-23.
3. "Ibid", pp.23-211..
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As a rule those elementary schools were supported by the
funds raised by the local education rate, which was levied at
varying amounts throughout the country on land, crops, or date
trees as was arranged between the governors of the provinces and
the central government. Admission was for four years from the
age of seven to twelve years and incidentally this system has
continued to the present day without alteration. Though the
government insisted that elementary schools were not intended to
be avenues of entrance to the government services, but rather a
means of spreading enlightenment amongst the agricultural and
trading classes, parents were under no illusion that they wanted
their children to go to them as avenues to government service
however narrow the chances were. At this period there were
twenty-eight first-class and twenty-one second class elemen ary
schools which had about four thousand boys.
1
Primary schools which were intended mainly for the
education of the sons of government employees and of the better-off
classes of the country, were by this time established at Khartoum,
Omdurman, Atbara, El Obeid, Suakin, Wadi Haifa and Wad Sedani.
A boarding-house had been initiated at the College, in which a
number of pupils were housed at a fee of fifteen pounds per annum,
day boys paying six pounds per annum. The subjects of instruction
were Arabic, English, geography, geometry, drawing, elementary land
measuring, Islamic religion, drill and gymnastics, and, in addition,
1. nlbid.", p. 25, Primary schools later on came to be more known
as Intermediate schools for four years duration after the
fourth year of the elementary school.
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manual instruction was taught in the College and Wad Medani
primary schools.
The Upper School of the College was recruited mainly
from boys who had satisfactorily completed their four years
primary course. The training in the college had been sub¬
divided into two sections:-
(1) A four years' course for engineers, overseers and surveyors
with a view to their employment in the departments of Public Works,
Irrigation, Surveys, and Railways. These students were taught
civil engineering and surveying, elementary mechanical engineering,
English, penmanship, Arabic, translation, and mathematics.
(2) A four years' course for those destined to be teachers in
primary schools, translators, etc.
This was essentially the literary section, and the subjects taught
were Arabic, English, translation, elementary science, and general
knowledge, arithmetic, geometry, algebra, trigonometry, geography,
history, penmanship, drawing, manual instruction, and the theory
and practice of teaching. Since this early time the form-master
and monitor systems had been introduced in the College.
A military school, affiliated to the Gordon College, for
the training of Sudanese cadets - prospective officers in the
black battalions - had been established. The boys received their
education in the primary school of the College and their military
education in the military school.
In the college the training section for Sheikhs was still
in existence. Candidates for this were expected to be of out-
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standing families and those selected were required to pass through
a primary school in order to qualify for posts in the Department
of Justice (Islamic Shari'a Courts). A preparatory junior
Sheikhs* section had been founded, the age of admission to which
was about twelve years. In the senior section bursaries were
granted and in the junior section fees were not required. Thus
the College was taking over the responsibility for Islamic education.
At this time the nucleus for an Islamic school parallel to
the Gordon College had started in 1901 in the houses of the 'Ulaaa*,
Moslem learned men, who took permission from the Government to teach
Arabic and Islamic studies in their houses and in the mosques of
Omdurman, Khartoum, and Khartoum North. By 1912 these were joined
together and formed the Ma'had 'Ilml of Omdurman which adopted the
system and the syllabus of al-Azhar since that time. Unlike the
Graduates of the Gordon College very few of the graduates of this
school found chances of Government service, except in the Shari'a
Courts and these were mostly obtained by getting into the Shari'a
qadis section of the Gordon College.^
In the Gordon College, a training section had been
established for the training of teachers for the elementary vernacular
schools, but subsequently it was decided this section should
disappear as a separate body, and should be confined to the olasaes
2
of the qadis or religious Judges. In the instructional workshops
•
1. Kamil el-Baghir, "Religion Education Present and Future",
Proceedings of the 11th Annual Conference of Ph. Soc. of Sudan,
1% 3, Khartoum, 1963# pp.76-59 - Majallat Ma'had Omdurman,
January, 1963.
2. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 26.
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upwards of a hundred and fifty boys were undergoing a five years*
course on the lines indicated in Sir William Mather's letter
already referred to. They were admitted at the age of fourteen,
after having previously attended a Government "Kuttab". Pood
and lodgings were provided free for those boys who had no
relatives in Khartoum with whom they could stay. In addition to
the workshops in the College, arrangements were made for some
apprentices to undergo instruction at Omdurman in stone-cutting,
building, and masonry work, and instruction in pottery under a
skilled Egyptian artisan from Kenna. Also several cotton gins
had been erected in the workshops and instruction was given in
this branch which was closely related to the cotton growing schemes
that were planned for the Gezira and the Gash and Baraka deltas.
For training in agriculture a central agricultural
experimental station had been established for some years at
Khartoum North, and this was later transferred to the Education
Department. It consisted of a farm of some one hundred and
eighty acres in extent, with a pumping station, and irrigation by
a system of raised canals. Here essential instruction was given
to students in agricultural methods, field experiments, drainage,
etc., and water was offered to neighbouring landowners at little
more than cost price, subject to the condition that all their
farming operations were conducted in accordance with the
instructions of the director. It is interesting to note that the
1. "Kuttab", elementary school.
193
present Agricultural Institute of Shambat which is run by the
Ministry of Agriculture, and the faculties of Agriculture and
Veterinary medicine of the University of Khartoum are on the
same site.
The factors under immediate consideration included times
of planting, quantities of seed and distance of planting,
quantities of water and intervals of irrigation, the effect of
organic manures and artificial fertilizers, methods of preliminary
and inter-row cultivation, market gardening enquiries, horticultural
and experimental forestry, live stock experiments, including a
small ostrich farm, and most important of all - experiments in
cotton-growing with every variety of 3eed. A field laboratory
under the direction of a British botanist had also been established,
which admitted of the chemical examination of soils from various
parts of the Sudan to provide guidance in the work of soil
improvement and maintenance of fertility, whilst the laboratory
determination of the character of the cotton derived in local
conditions from different varieties and methods of cultivation,
was expected to be of the greatest value in connection with the
great cotton-planting scheme in the Gezira which was slowly taking
shape, ^
It may not be inappropriate, at this stage, to refer very
briefly to the all-important question of cotton planting in the
Sudan as it had great influence on the scope of education especially
1. Vingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 27.
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at this ©arly period. The vast possibilities of the country as
a cotton-growing area had commanded continuous attention amongst
users of raw cotton for many years, and all steps taken to
develop this industry by improvement of railway communications
and irrigation methods had invariably received the enthusiastic
support of the trade in Britain and especially of the British
Cotton-Growing Association. This body had frequently urged that
the preliminary steps taken by the Sudan Government in the great
Gezira plain should be pressed on and encouraged.
After prolonged examination of the results obtained in
the experimental plantations in the Gezira, it was found out that
technical irrigation problems were of a comparatively simple kind
and that it was an ideal region in which to begin development.
The 3lze of the Gezira were it all put under cultivation ,was
estimated at about three million aore3 most of which was suitable
for cotton cultivation. To achieve this object, the construction
of a dam on the Blue Nile and a canalization system were necessary.
Prior to his departure from the Sudan in 1913 Currie took no small
share in the plans and negotiations towards securing a loan from
2
the British Treasury to the Sudan for the purpose of the Sennar
Bam and the Gezira Scheme.-^ As Currie was at the same time the
Principal of the College and the Director of Education he was
1. Ibid., p. 98.
2. Wingate, "The Life and Work of Sir James Currie", East Africa
and Rhodesia, March 25* 1937*
3- Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira, London, 1959, pp. 33*54*
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undoubtedly aware of the relationship between eoonoaiio and
educational development, a relationship in which he was an
ardent believer for he thought that technical education should
be run on production basis and that the number of students in
institutes of education should not exceed the number of the careers
open before them.
When Ourrie left the Sudan in 1913 with these economic
possibilities envisaged and with the Sudan Government still
interested in training a sufficient number of local and less
costly employees for the lower and intermediary echelons of the
hierarchy there were some plans for development in the Gordon
College. Schools of law, agriculture, medicine and veterinary
medicine were all planned."1 But with the outbreak of the First
World War all development plans, educational and economic, had to
stop in the Sudan as in many other parts of the world.
Tho outbreak of the War brought about the termination of
Kitohener*s appointment in Egypt as he was called to London to be
Secretary of State for War till his death on June 5* 1916. As he
was both president and founder of the College an appeal for funds
was issued for the erection of a medical school building to be
attached to the College. The War had forced this question before
the Sudan Government in an unexpected way by shutting off
absolutely the supply of doctors from the Syrian schools of medicine
and compelling the authorities to take steps to replace them from
1. Currie, "Education in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", Journal of
the Royal African Society, Vol. 3^, 1935, p. 56. "
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local sources. Lord Cramer, who had laid the foundation atone
of the College In 1899, and succeeded Kitchener aa President
died within a few months of his predecessor.Wingate had already
been transferred from the Sudan to Egypt to succeed Kitchener in
Egypt. In 1919, Sir Reginald Wingate ceased to be High
Commissioner in Egypt, and this brought to an end the line of
British High Commissioners in Cairo with actual Sudan experience.
In Sudan Sir Lee Stack was appointed Governor General in succession
to Wingate, an office which Stack held from 191i/till his
assassination in Cairo in 1924*
After 1918 a new era opened in the Sudan, and in common
with the rest of the world a legacy of trouble had to be faced.
It soon became apparent that the old arithmetic of the Gezira
Development Scheme had been fatally upset both by world inflation
and considerable local mismanagement, and that more money would be
needed to complete the large irrigation scheme to which the country
had committed itself in 1913. After a considerable period of
L&U iWukui' Yfcri &Hwc«f
confusion and doubt, Lord Balfour, the P-rime-Mxirtater--^
Brit-a-in, received a representative deputation of British cotton
trade interests on July 5th 1922. Lord Balfour assured the
deputation that the temporary difficulties of the Sudan Government
which had necessitated a momentary cessation of work on the Blue
Nile Dam at Sennar had been surmounted, and that work would be
1. Wingate, "The Story of the Gordon College", p. 37.
2. Currie, "Education in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", Journal of the
Royal African Society, Vol. 34, 1935, P* 43*
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resumed as soon as the fall in the flood made active operations
possible.
All this meant the provision of considerable further
funds, which took the shape of additional British Guaranteed
Loans, raised at a stiff rate of interest."*" The British Treasury's
interest in the country, therefore, became considerable. The
amount of Sudan 5} P©r cent, Guaranteed Bonds issued at that time
was £6,380,000, of which £3,500,000 was issued at 95} and the
balance of £2,880,000 at 92. The total interest payable by the
Sudan in 1933 amounted to £976,160 on £14,821,000 actually raised
(6*6 per cent). And this did not include a considerable, if
dormant, Egyptian claim for money lent, on which no interest had
ever been paid, to say nothing of the large contribution which
Egypt had made and was still making to Sudan current expenditure.
The comparison between the financial relationship of the two
condominia to the Sudan raised considerable criticism of the
2
British policy in the Sudan later on. Pears were expressed of
the Sudanese recalling their Islamic teachings against usury and
quoting the Qur'an against the financial arrangement made in the
British loans.
In the field of education the only development in the post¬
war period was the opening of the Kitchener School of Medicine.
1. House of Commons, Soudan Government Guaranteed Loan, Copy of
Treasury Minute dated 18th Dec. 1913# guaranteeing the payment
of interest on the first instalment of the Loan, presented
pursuant to Aot 3 4 G©° V.C.10. Ordered by the House of
Commons to be printed, 10 Feb. 1914* No.58 H.M. S.0. London, 1914*
2. Gurrie,op.cit., pp. 43~44»
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The particular functions of the school were (i) to train students,
carefully selected from the Gordon College, in medicine, midwifery,
and hygiene, (ii) as the need arose, to provide post-graduate
classes for doctors who had received their training at the school,
and (iii) by working in close co-operation with the Medical Research
Laboratories, to inculcate the spirit of clinical research, and to
afford facilities for such research.
The scheme for the school as approved by the Governor
General in Council provided that the Trustees of the Gordon
College be appointed Trustees of the school and that tae Executive
Committee of the College should co-operate with the Trustees
and with a General Board of the School in an advisory capacity in
connection with the general interests of the school. The General
Board comprised certain ex officio members, i.e. the Principal
of the College, the Financial Secretary, the Director of the
Medical Department and the Director of Intelligence as Honorary
Secretary."*"
The success that attended the Kitchener School of Medicine
was striking. It came to be regarded as the most ambitious and
the most successful educational venture in Africa. A random
extract from the Inspectors* Report for 1931 could be taken as
typical:-
"It is unnecessary in this report to refer again in detail
to the satisfactory nature of the course of study. We are glad to
1. Letter signed Horton fto3 & Co. to Henry A. Van de Linde, Esq.,
Hon. Sec. Gordon Memorial College, dated 22nd March 1926, DRA.
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note that it la founded on a really well balanced biological
basis. We are satisfied, too, that throughout the course every
effort is being made to deal, with the problem that besets all
medical teaching in the East - the problem of encouraging students
to understand instead of indulging a mindless facility for learning
by heart and to acquire facts themselves by actual physical
i
examination, instead of as mere listeners and spectators."
Similar progress failed to be recorded in all other
directions, from the small vernacular schools in remote districts
to the School of Engineering at the Gordon College. In 1918 the
Director of Education, while trying to meet the rising needs of
the Sudan Government for Gordon College graduates, was of the
opinion that provision for the civil service should be made without
materially increasing the number of primary schools. He saw no
reason for expanding these schools beyond the demand for their
•exotic* products. They were 'schools ... decidedly for- the few,
not for the multitude' and a marked improvement in their
standard would make it possible for the same or even smaller
number of entrants to yield a larger supply for the Upper School
and for Government service.^
This policy of a smaller number of entrants to primary
schools which was shortly extended to the elementary schools
and the Gordon College was not only a temporary measure dictated
by the conditions of the war but was also, and more important, an
1. Currie: op.oit., p. I4.5.
2. G.M.C. Report and Accounts to 31.12.1918, p. 8, University of
Khartoum Archives.
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indication of a growing suspicion amongst the British
Administration in the Sudan towards the educated Sudanese.
By this time, almost twenty years since the Gordon
College had been founded, the number of Its students and graduates
formed a new elite in the Sudanese society. They became
acquainted with what was going on in the Western World through
their ability to read in English and with what was going on in the
Arab World and the East chiefly through the Egyptian press and
publications. This elite came to be known as the "Afandiyyafc",
a word of Turkish origin and Egyptian usage, which roughly meant
in the Sudanese context those who went to schools, learned
English, obtained white collar jobs and put on European dress
which they generally put off after office hours revealing the
deeper ties that bound them to their own people and culture, and
the dichotomy that existed in their lives.
The financial contribution the "Affandlyyat" made to
their families out of their salaries enhanced their position in
a predominantly poor country and the comparatively more
sophisticated and luxurious standard of living coupled with their
official status in the government machinery added further prestige
and social elevation. Their feeling of responsibility towards
their own families contributed to their gradual awareness of
their responsibility towards the welfare of their countrymen in
general.
The Government was keeping an open eye on the development
ok this elite and their response to what was taking place in Egypt
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especially in the turbulent years of the war and its aftermath.
Tie British rulers classified them as a special category of the
population which could be traced back to the younger generation
who had been children in 1898, and were throughout this period
absorbing political ideas, but who were sufficiently under the
restraint of their hard-bitten elders to retain a touch of
diffidence.1 To most of this elite B^rpt was an Islamic Eldorado
of wealth and civilisation and the British started to suspect
them during the war of nursing vague hopes of plenty and promotion
in government employment through the Egyptian connection. They
also suspected them during the War of an instinctive sentimental
sympathy with the enemy powers, a sympathy which wa3 reported as
p
•tempered by an appreciation of present benefits*.
By the end of the war the Egyptian nationalists were
vocal in claiming the Sudan to be an integral part of Egypt.
At this time the Sudan made its debut on the stage of inter¬
national politics. Locally an awakening was beginning to take
place. Though little was changed in the provinces, a generation
was growing up in the towns to whom events in Egypt and elsewhere
were an enthralling subject for speculation. Early in 1919 a
campaign of political uprisings had broken out in Egypt which
came to be known in modern Egyptian history as the 1919 Revolution.
This tvas led by the newly formed Wafd Party rallying around Sa'd
Zaghlul Pasha and supported by a vehement press. Public opinion
1. Harold MacMichael, A memorandum on The Attitude of The Sudanese
Towards Egypt, 1905-1932, DRA.
2. Ibid., p.5.
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in Egypt was mobilised against the British and the Egyptian press
was read in the Sudan. The educated Sudanese had a chance of
discussing it amongst themselves and with some of their Egyptian
friends and colleagues.
Towards the close of the same year 1919 the Milner
Commission was formed in London and sent out to enquire into the
causes of the late disturbances in Egypt and to make recommendations
for the future. Two of its members visited the Sudan early in
1920. The Commission left on record their view that "No change
in the political status of Egypt should be allowed to disturb
the further development of the Sudan on a system which has been
productive of such good results."1 They outlined the general
line of policy which commended itself to them for application in
the Sudan, and the gist of it was expressed in the following.
"Though it is absolutely necessary for the present to
maintain a single supreme authority over the whole of the Sudan,
it is not desirable that the government of that country should be
highly centralised. Having regard to its vast extent and the
varied character of its inhabitants, the administration of its
different parts should be left, as far as possible, in the hands
of the native authorites, wherever they exist, under British
supervision." This was the thin end of the wedge and It meant
that the British and the educated Sudanese were drifting apart.
As the latter were not to be trusted the former had to look for
1. Ibid., p. 8.
2. Ibid.
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native authorities as their allies and aides in the govexmraent
of the country.
By 1921 the 'Arifs (Teachers section in the Gordon College)
was reduced by one class as there was no intention of immediate
expansion in the sphere of elementary vernacular education.^" By
1922 another class of the same section had been reduced bringing
down the number of teacher trainees in one year from >8 to 36.
This was done in spite of the fact that the statistics of
attendance in the elementary vernacular schools showed that there
2
had been no falling off in the demand for instruction. To meet
this demand and at the same time to avoid opening avenues for
further higher education the Sudan Government resorted to a system
"3
of giving small subventions to controlled village Khalwas.' The
reorganised Khalwas was a system adopted a few years before in
Rufa'at District, Blue Nile Province and It had been extended since
to Dongola, Haifa and later on to the other provinces with most
satisfactory results to the British administration.^ The Khalwa
which was feared at the beginning to be a cradle for fanaticism
began to be looked for as a refuge from political upheaval amongst
the educated Sudanese. To the government a prerequisite for
"Native Administration" was controlled native education that would
1. G.Q. Report, 1922. p. i+i+.
2- Ibid. 1921 1922
Attendance 8,728 8,81$
3. The term Controlled native Koran schools or Khalwas was used in
G.G. Report 192 3. p. 1+0.
i+. G.G. Report, 1922, p. 1(1+.
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give no chanoes of office jobs or interest in political or
international affairs.
The beginning of the curtailment of educational
opportunities could be also noticed in the primary schools. The
primary division of the Gordon College had been divided into two
parts, the boarders remaining in the College and the day-boys
being transferred to a building in the centre of the town,
probably to isolate the boarders, who would normally come from out¬
side Khartoum, from the influence of the political ideas in the
town. This arrangement which had set free several rooms in the
college had not resulted in any increase in the total number of
boys receiving primary education.1 In the Upper School of the
Gordon College it was decided by 1922 to effect some reduction in
the number of classes. The qadiaf section was to consist in future
of two classes only and fees were to be imposed in both the Upper
School and the primary schools. The reason given by the govern¬
ment for the imposition of fees was that a larger proportion of the
boys had parents or relatives who because of their own education,
were "both able and willing" to pay for the schooling of the new
generation. Such measures would not be expected to please the
students or their educated parents or relatives who had to pay the
fees.
In February 1922 the British Government issued a declaration
1. G.G. Report, 1922, p. i^. By this time there were six government
primary schools m the country with a total attendance in 1922 of
1,196 pupils.
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terminating the protectorate in Egypt and reserving the question
of the Sudan. Phis year and the next were marked, in Egypt, by
a series of political uprisings and assassination, which had its
echoes in the Sudan. By May 1922 a young Sudanese officer
achieved promirmnce by his conviction for publishing a document
entitled "The Claims of the Sudanese Nation". The young officer
was All Abdel Latif, who had been trained in the Military School
at Khartoum, and the fact that he was of Dinka origin, a Nilotic
Tribe from the South, indicated the embryo of a wide nationalist
movement. On his release in 1923 he found himself a hero among
the educated class."''
By the end of the same year the government went further 3n
its policy of limiting the number of teachers and pupils. The
teaohers section in the College was reduced from the already low
figure of 36 to 15, a cut of more than half in one year. This
and the former reduction were reflected in a drop of more than four
hundred in the number of pupils attending elementary vernacular
schools from 8,815 in 1922 to 8,410 in 1923. The reduction in the
total of primary pupils was explained by greater strictness in
2
regard to free places. The arrangements which were made to open
primary classes in Haifa and Rufa 'a probably to meet long standing
local pressures, were made at the expense of reducing the school
1. MacMichaal, The Attitude of the Sudanese Towards Egypt, pp.8-9.
2. G.G. Report, 1923, p. 40. Primary pupils 1922 1923
1,196 1,162
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at Suakin and the boarding house at Atbara. The government report
was gleeful that by so doing it extended the area of recruitment
without additional liabilities."*" Even in girls education the
number of pupils was kept stationery in this new field which the
government entered only in 1921 by opening the long awaited
2
elementary girls training college.
The slight increase in the Upper School of the Gordon
College was due to the fact that a third class was added in the
first year to meet the high demand for subordinate officials
from the second year of the Upper School. Prom this time the
first and second years of the College came to supply a greater
percentage of recruits than the third and fourth years,^ an
indication that the period of stay in the College was being
progressively cut shorter. On the technical aide the slight
increase^ was due to the fact that this was a period of construct¬
ional schemes on the Sennar Dam and railway extention where local
and less expensive labour was needed. In this year it was also
decided that the turners, fitters and blacksmiths should be
1. G.G. Report, 1923, p. 40.
2. The Girls Training College opened in 1921, 1922 1923
20 19
Girls Elementary Schools 192? 1923
359 360
3. Ibid., Gordon College Upper School 1922 1923
191 283
4. Ibid., Instructional Workshops 1922 1923
255 263
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transferred from the Gordon College workshops at Khartoum to
Atbara where these trades were to be tau$it in close connection
with the railway workshops. The carpentry section had already
been moved from the College to Oradurman, thus making them more
vocational and at the same time removing them from the more
suspected intellectual atmosphere of the College students.
In 192]+ abortive negotiations took place in London with
(K
Sa'd 3ghlul Pasha who was asking for complete independence for
Egypt with the Sudan, and the evacuation of British troops. The
period of political turmoil was intensified in Egypt, and in the
Sudan the White Flag League was formed to work for the Unity of
the N le Valley. Its president was Ali Abdel Latif and the
members were chiefly ex-cadets of the Military School and ex-students
of the Gordon College. In June Ali Abdel Latif led a demonstration
and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The cadets at the
military sohool demonstrated in protest and there were similar
2
demonstrations in other towns of the Sudan. On the same day
(9 August) the Egyptian Railway Battalion, which was composed of
Sudanese and Egyptian officers and soldiers, mutinied ab Atbara.
The mutiny was suppressed and the battalion was sent back to Egypt.
The cadets and the ringleaders of the White Flag League were
imprisoned.
1. E. HacMichael, The Attitude of the Sudanese Towards Egypt, p.9.
2. K.D.D. Henderson, Sudan Republic, London, 1965* p. 63»
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All this provoked protests and counter-protests between
London and Cairo. In November Sir Lee Stack, the Governor
General of the Sudan, was assassinated in the streets of Cairo.
Immediately the British delivered an ultimatum to Egypt which
included a demand for the withdrawal from the Sudan of ail Egyptian
officers and Units. The enforcement of this measure was resisted
on 2?th November when two platoons of the 11th Sudanese Battalion
led by Sudanese officers mutinied and marched on the Palace in
Khartoum, where they intended to join up with the unit on guard
duty and, in conjunction with Egyptian artillerymen in Khartoum
North, bring off a coup d'etat. The palace guard were marched
off in another direction and the Egyptian artillery remained quiet,
thus sowing deep and bitter feelings towards Egypt on the part of
some of the educated Sudanese and affecting their late political
development. However the Sudanese moved off towards the Blue Nile
Bridge, next to the Gordon College, and were fired on by the
British troops. They thai broke into the military hospital along¬
side the road and went to ground there resisting to the last man.1
This incident marked the climax of the political events of the
year which came to be known, in the history of the Sudan as the
Hevolt of 192J+.
The reply to the Stack murder and the events in the Sudan
of 192^ was not only the summary eviction of the Egyptian Army, and
the expulsion of all Egyptian officers in Civil employment, but a
1. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 64., P.M. Holt, A Modern History
of The Sudan, London, 19&1, pp. 125-138•
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similar policy was applied to the Sudan Education Department,
which thus lost its best trained teachers.* The Khartoum Military
School in which prospective Sudanese officers had received their
military education, receiving their instruction in civil subjects
at the Gordon College, was abolished. The Defence Pore© was
modelled on the West African Field Force, with all new appointments
of officers to be made from the ranks. The Gordon College had a
portion of its building used for military occupation till the
beginning of 1926 when the higher school had been able to cane back
2
into possession of its share of the building.
The economic development of the country consequent on
Gezira irrigation was met by the importation of a large number of
additional British officials of all grades, thus curtailing
further opportunities for the educated Sudanese. Elementary
vernacular schools continued to decrease in number and in
•j
attendance, giving way to controlled Khalwas while attendance
decreased in primary schools from l,lij.6 in 1921+ to 1,101 in 1925•
This was in accordance with a three year programme formulated in
1925 which provided for the reduction in the number of the
elementary vernacular schools by closing some of them and extending
the number of subsidised or controlled Khalwas which would tea da
secular subjects and would be under regular inspection. Such an
attempt would be viewed by the educated Sudanese as undermining
1. Gurrie, "Education in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" Journal of the
Royal African Society, Vol. 3I4., 1935» P» ^6.
2. G.G. Report, 1926, p. 71.
3. G.G. Report, 1925, p. k5i G.G. Report, 1926,p.71.
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the existing system of education from the base. By 1926 the
number of elementary vernacular schools dropped from 94 in 1925
with an attendance of 7*852 to 88 schools. On the other hand
the number of subsidised controlled fthalwas rose from 161 in
1925 with an attendance of 5»hkb 293 Khalwas with a total
attendance of 8,422."*" The increase in controlled Khalwaa and
the decrease in elementary vernacular schools charted the road
towards the full launching of the policy of "Native Administration".
Economically, this period, which was witnessing the closing
down of elementary schools and decreasing the number in the
primary schools, was a period of relative material and financial
prosperity due to high cotton prices and good yields. Hence it
was a case of political decisions hampering educational develop¬
ment in spite of favourable economic conditions.
Sir James Gurrie, who, on the invitation of the Sudan
Government, was present at the formal opening of the Blue Nile
Dam in 1926, had a chance of taking stock of the situation. In
spite of considerable material prosperity, he noted a change of
attitude towards education among many of the higher grade English
officials. Enthusiasm for education had largely evaporated, and
"Indirect Rule" was the prevalent administrative slogan. This
slogan of "Indirect Rule" or "Native Administration", which had
1. G«G. Report, 1926, pp. 71-72.
2. Currie, "Education in Anglo-Egyptian. Sudan", Journal of the
Royal African Society, Vol. 34, 1935» PP« 47-l±8.
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exercised considerable influence in the Sudan'* and in many other
parts of Africa, was associated with the name of Lord Lugard.
It began early in the century, 1903* when Nigeria was in
process of coming within the British sphere of influence. Lord
Lugard (then Sir Frederick) found himself in charge of a very
large tract of country, and he decided on grounds both of economy
and high policy to use the native chiefs, who were in control, in
the administration of the country. Paradoxically enough it was
Lugard who wrote at that early time to Currie enquiring as to
Sudan procedure in education and arranged for the seconding from
the Sudan of several trained vernacular schoolmasters to "help to
2
lay educational foundations in Northern Nigeria. Currie noted
that "After the troubles that culminated in Stack*s murder, the
British local administration took fright, and in spite of the
loyalty of the educated Sudanese to the Government that had given
them opportunity, the spectacle could be beheld of young
administrators diligently searching for lost tribes and vanished
chiefs,- and trying to resurrect a social system that had passed
away for ever.
Tribalism had been blotted out in the Sudan for a long
time. The §ufi orders and Turkish rule vrere unifying forces and
Mahdiism which succeeded them was a further unifying influence of
1. Reginald Davies, The Camel*s Back, London 1957* PP* lSG-193*
2. G.G. Report, 1927, p. 79.
3. Reginald Davies, The Camel's Back, London, 1957* pp.180-193*
1+. G.G. Report, 1927* p. i+9.
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a most potent character, and in addition to all that there was
the first twenty-five years of condominium rule. But the Sudan
Government went ahead with its policy, by a series of laws. By
1927 the "Powers of Sheikh^Ordinance was issued empowering the
Sheikhs of big courts for the first time to imprison up to two
years and to fine up to a hundred pounds. In 1928 further amend-
2
rnents were made to this law with a view to strengthening it.
While increasing the powers of the tribal chiefs the Government
was continuously undermining the position of the educated Sudanese.
In 1927, too, the training couraes for junior administrative
officers were closed down. Since 1918, these courses had been
planned to take annually educated Sudanese, selected from men who
were regarded competent during several years of experience in any
part of the Government service and who were to be given, on the
civil administrative side, openings as junior magistrates, junior
administrators, and police officers in the provinces, comparable
to those for commissioned Sudanese officers on the army side.-
These opportunities which were formerly designed for the older
generation of the educated Sudanese as distinct from the younger one,
were now closed for all.^ Elementary schools continued to be
reduced in number as more controlled Khalwas came to be in vogue.
1. G.G. Report, 1927, p. 2.
2. al-Sunni Bannaga, Adwa 'alanni^am al-qabali wa-l-idira fl-s-
Sudin, Khartoum, I960, p. 35. '
3. Ourrie, "Education in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", Journal of the
Royal African Society, Vol. 3^, 1935» P* 53»
I4.. MacMichael. Memorandum p. i*..
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Primary schools were reduced from 11 to 10 by 1929 and the
Gordon College, despite the increase in the number of attendance
due to the greater need of government department for junior local
employees, Gould only provide about half of the numbers required
in those economically prosperous years.1"
The College itself became rigid in outlook with more
emphasis on discipline in its annual reports and though it had
had a Commission of Inspection from outside the Sudan for the f^rst
time since its inception at the beginning of the century, there
was no indication that the recommendations of the Commission were
effected. The Commission provided several recommendations
regarding the chief defects connected with the teaching of English
2
and History and the desirability for regular future inspection.
They stated that they "believed it right to apply to the College
the somewhat stringent standards of attainment which are set by
the Technical and Secondary Schools and Teacher's Training Colleges
in England at the present day."
In spite of the high standard set, Lord Lloyd, the
British High Commissioner In Egypt, was able to x*eport in his
1. Gordon Memorial College, Annual Reports and Accounts, DRA,
The position of supply anaf demand was as follows:-







G. Report of The Commission of Inspection on G.M. C.,
1929, p. 3.
2H
covering letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
that "The Commission's report was generally favourable, and the
College emerged from the test with credit especially as it lost,
as recently as 192^, the services of the Senior Egyptian teaching
staff who had of necessity to be replaced by teachers of far less
experience."^* Lord Lloyd's view of the first aim of the College,
p
with which the Secretary of State agreed, was that "The first aim
of Gordon College should be to train loyal servants of the Sudan
Government (The staff of the College from the Warden downwards
have this object always before them.)" Where that policy had led
the College could be described by Dr. W.H. McLean, the founder of
the Sohool of Engineering in a letter he wrote to Sir James Curr e
in the early thirties.-^ "They seem to have gone completely 'off
the rails'; the training, both in quality and in quantity, appears
to have dwindled so that today there is no higher technical
education worthy of the name; the School of Engineering has been
described officially as only a secondary school with an engineering
bias in the third and fourth years, and the opportunities of
employment in the Departments have been curtailed. Had they
continued on the practical and economic method instituted in 1906,
there ought by now to have been in the country a sufficient number
of Sudanese engineers, quite as useful as the expensively trained
1. Ibid., p . l±.
2. Ibid., p. 5*
3. Currle, "Education in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", Journal of the
Royal African Society, Vol. 1935* p. 56.
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Egyptian engineers, and capable of doing most of the ordinary
engineering routine work now being done by European engineers.
This would have resulted today in a great and muoh needed economy.
The Government has laid itself open to the charge of retarding
higher technical education."
The terrific economic crisis of 1930# the World Depression,
aggravated the situation and rendered considerable quantitative
reduction a necessity for reasons of economy. For the Sudan it
was a double disaster. At the very time when the bottom fell
out of the American economy and prices slumped all over the world
the twin diseases of blackarm and leaf-curl struck at the Gezira
Crop. In 1931 the yield fell to l-ij. kantars to the acre (against
I4/8 in 1926) and the price from eighteenpence to sevenpence half¬
penny."*" The suspicion which had been building up between the
Sudan Government and the educated class for more than a decade
was revealed in 1931 in an episode that came to be regarded
later on as a landmark.
Among its economies to meet the economic crisis the
government had reduced the starting salaries of Sudanese officials
newly appointed from Gordon College by a cut of over 30 per cent
(from £8*000 m/m to 5*500 m/va). Although some reductions were
made on the salaries of the British Staff they were not so heavy
2
nor had they been imposed on their starting rates. Since the
1. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 67. HacMichael, The Attitude of
the Sudanese Towards Egypt, pp.12-13.
2. Gurrie, "The Educational Experiment", Journal of the Royal
African Society, Vol. 314., p. 53.
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College students were there to be government employees they felt
that their future was being threatened. They all went on a strike
and to strengthen their unanimity they resorted to a deeply rooted
Moslem tradition in the Sudan for collective action, of ablution
followed by a collective oath on the Qur'Sn that they would abide
by their decision to stay away from classes until the Government
repealed the cut in the starting rates. The strike continued
regardless of the attempts of parents and religious notables to
intervene. The graduates (former pupils of the College) selected
a committee to mediate with the Government which refused at first
to change its decision. later on the students decided to go back
to work and twelve days after their return the Governor General
told a delegation of notables and officials that he decided to
raise the starting pay for Gordon College Graduates from £5*500 m/m
to £6*500 m/m)1
The strike led to some internal reforms in the
administration of the College such as providing the Sudanese and
other teachers with comparable authority to that of their British
colleagues and to the reduction of the cowers which the prefects
had been given over their fellow pupils. New insight had forced
the Government to think that changes were necessary in the
structure of the curricul^ so that it should not, as it could not,
be the sole employee of the College graduates. The graduates
themselves having withdrawn considerably from collective activities
1. E. Atiyah, An Arab Tells Hi3 Story, pp.166-169; El-Patih Mahgoub,
Secondary Education In the Sudan 1905-1955* M.A. Thesis in
Education, London University, 1966, pp,108-123» P. Holt, A Mod.
Hist. p. 137.
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since the abortive attempts of 1924 and their harsh suppression,
started now to revive their intellectual activities in a cautious
movement of emerging literary societies, an embryo of a social
and political movement which began to take shape later in the
decade.1 However in this period, the severity of the Depression,
far outweighing that of the policy of "Indirect Rule'5, became a
major factor in further depleting the flow of government sponsored
education.
Thus in 1932 in the Gordon College four classes instead
of five were accepted in the first year which resulted in a decrease
2
of sixty-four on the total attendance in 1931. Financial
stringency necessitated the closing of the Dueim Primary School
and the withdrawal of boarding house facilities at the Rufa'a
School. The numbers of free and reduced-fee places were further
restricted and this coupled with the fact that It was becoming
increasingly difficult for the majority of primary school boys to
find remunerative employment, and for parents to pay school fees,
resulted in reduced attendance in the Primary Schools. In short
education at all levels suffered from the axe of reductions
including the government favoured schools in this period, the
subsidised Khalwas.
In 1933 in the Gordon College a further decrease of 34
students took place in the intake and a large proportion of the
1. Hasan Najlla, Dhikrayati fi-l-Badiya, Beirut, undated, p. 53*
2. P.O. Report, 1932, p. 77-
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boys who completed the secondary course had no hope of Government
service and posts in commercial firms were limited. ^ This
decrease in the number of students attending the Gordon College
continued to be registered until 1936 when it reached its lowest
ebb of 291 which meant that the College was reduced to about half
■a
its siae (of 555) in the beginning of the decade. The only
blessing for education which took place during these bleak years
was the foundation at Bakht er Ruda of the boys Elementary Teachers
Training College in 193U-. This was the result of one of the
recommendations of the Winter Committee which was set up by the
Governor General soon after the strike at the College to report
not so much on the causes of the strike as on the rapid change
from under-production to over-production of educated whose only
prospects lay in Government employment.
At this point the chief inspector of education, G.C.
Scott, with passionate insistence succeeded in widening the Committee's
terms of reference to include a survey of lower education. A well-
written^ memorandum gained the approval of the Committee and the
Government who decided that the teachers section in the Gordon
College should be transferred to a rural site outside Khartoum
1. G.G, Report, 1933» p. 69.
2. G.G. Report, 193E, p. 69; G.G. Report, 1935« p. 76;
G.G. Report, 1936, p. 87*
3* G.G. Report, 1930. P* 92.
1+. "Note on Education in The Northern Sudan" by G.C. Scott,
published in M.O. Beshir, Educational Development, Appendix IV,
PP. 351-382.
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where an elementary teachers training College was to be started.
V.L. Griffiths who was inspector of education and
secretary of the Winter Committee was appointed head of the
Training College and he chose the site at Bakht er Ruda in a
rural area near Dueim on the White Nile. The College came to bear
the name of the place and the mark of the founder who continued
to be its principal for almost two decades when he retired in 1950.
then Griffiths was entrusted with the task he said"5" "I found my¬
self very much in agreement with the climate of British opinion in
wanting education - particularly the village elementary education -
to be directed more towards rural activities. I had had three
and a half years of teaching academic subjects to anxious village
students in an Indian College, and it had been a very disquieting
experience. But visits to Tagore's Shantiniketan and to an
American School, Ushagrara, built on the lines of a Bengal village,
had been inspiring, and I hoped to profit now by what I had seen.
I was also, of course, very much in agreement with the view that
rote-learning without understanding was a bad thing and mast be got
p
rid of. Griffiths had progressive and liberal educational ideas
some of which were ahead of the common practice in the United Kingdom
2
today. He was aware of the significance, the advance and the
difficulties in the face of what he was going to try out at Bakht er
1. V.L. Griffiths, An Experiment In Education, London, 1953# pp.11-12.
2. For a violent attack on similar attitudes of innovation in
educational matters in Britain today see, C.B. Cox and A.E. Dyson,
eds. Fight for Education: A Black Paper, London, 1969. Also see
heated discussion raised over the pamphlet in the British Press
and mass media when the Pamphlet was denounced on April 8th by
Mr. Short, Secretary of State for Education and Science. The
Times, The Guardian, The Scotsman, all of April 9th, 1969.
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ftuda as he said in his account, " ... I was also full of other
ideas, some of which would not have gone down very well had they
been broadcast. I disliked corporal punishment - almost the
only punishment in Sudan Schools of those days. I wanted to
abolish exams., but keep reports, lessen competition, give up
prizes, introduce projects (where the pupils choose their own
subjects of study) and develop camps and school journeys. In fact,
I was infected, or perhaps inspired - it depends how you look at
it - by the wave of distrust of old methods and the desire for new
ways which was a feature of the period immediately after the
19114.-1918 war. The credit for whatever proved good in these ideas
is due to the Boy Scouts and to the London Day Training College
in the stimulating days of Munn and Fairgrieve.
"Were these ideas suited to Sudanese traditions -
©specially the political traditions which it was now the policy to
foster? This was doubtful: it depended on how fast the Sudan
was likely to change. I had come from the exciting political
atmosphere of India in the days of the Simon Commission to a Sudan
which was patriarchal and Public School. It felt like stepping
back twenty or fifty years in history. But I could not help
believing that, whatever the appearances of the moment, the educated
Sudanese would eventually came to dominate affairs and to want our
sort of education. In the event thi3 happened more quickly than
w© expected."
While Griffiths was trying to reform elementary education
in Bakht er Ruda away from the attention of the Government
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administrators and public opinion, the educated Sudanese were
coming forth to play a greater role and to demand advances in
education both in quantity and quality. The literary societies
that flourished in the early thirties and the press which started
at the same period began to discuss not only literary subjects^
2
but also social and political questions. The period of the
financial depression came to be a period of intellectual revival
amongst the educated Sudanese. An editorial published, on the
16th of June 1935 in the fortnightly Al-Fajr was an indication of
the concern of the educated Sudanese far education.
The editorial with the title "Give Us Education"^
considered the year 1932 as marking the start of an epoch of
decadence in education. It lamented that the number of students
in the Gordon Memorial College had been decreasing and decreasing
since then and that the practice of sending selected Sudanese
teachers to the American Jniversity of Beirut had been discontinued,
thus bringing the source that gave higher education to some
Sudanese to an end. Al-Fajr also stated that the Coraboni1 and
q
the Coptic"^ Secondary Schools, the only two besides the Gordon
1. Abdalla al-Tayeb, al-lttijahat al-hadltha fl n nathr al-'Arabl
fl s-Sudan, Cairo, 1959, pp. 32-79."
Al-Fajr, No. 19, Vol. I, 1st May 1935, pp. 878-879.
3* Al-Fajr, No. 22, Vol. I, 16th June, 1935, PP* IO66-IQ65.
ii,. Comboni College: a Secondary School opened in 1929 by the
Italian Catholic Mission in Khartoum.
5. The Coptic College: A Secondary School opened by the Coptic
Community in Khartoum in 1929 and fallowed the curricular of
the Egyptian Schools.
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College, were governed by laws which debarred the Sudanese from
being students in either of them. It noted that although the
staff of the two schools were not of better standard than those
of the Gordon College their Curricula were far better, and,
although they were merely secondary schools, th^y equipped their
students for IJhlversity study either in Cairo or abroad. It
demanded that both schools should be opened fcr the Sudanese as
well as the other communities.
For the Gordon College Al-Fa.1r called for the curriculum
to be developed considerably to prepare the students for University
education, and at the same t Lrae to be sufficient in itself as a
last resort. It criticised the educational policy which was
limited to "the view of training some men to become officers and
civil servants in the Government offices." It asked "Should not
the policy of education take another direction? Should not the
curriculum be developed to produce men for the world and not with
local limitations? And should in any case the number of students
be reduced, because the Government demand for such men has been
diminishing?"
The editorial continued "Education ... should be given
to us at this stage. Thanks to God, the difficulties with which
educationalists are confronted in other African countries do not
exist in our country. The Arabic language is spoken all over
the country and Islam is the prevailing religion. The minds of
the people are fit for understanding and receiving any kind of
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education whether literary or scientific, technical or manual.
The time has gone for those who were saying that lack of
educational tradition in the country does not allow of introducing
higher technical and University education. The younger generation
is the offspring of educated men and thus the educational back¬
ground, the enlightened environment has become possible."
The editorial went on to say "Our aim in life is to be
given higher education. A school of Law, an Agricultural
School and a Higher School of Engineering, both Civil and
Mechanical have become essential for the future of this country.
It is time that the Sudanese should have better chances in the
Government of his country, and the only way for the realisation
of those chances is higher education." It continued, "We were
given, some sort of education, which some of us have been
developing and seme were contented with their lot. We have
realised the value of education and have come to believe that it
is the key to our progress. The Government has embarked on
giving us education, but does not seem to aim at any further steps.
The danger in this lies in the fact that once education is started
in a country it must be continued and developed; failing this the
people will cry and ask for more education, because it becomes to
them as essential as food, water and light."
It conoluded by saying "Mr. J.H. Oldham, as quoted by
Professor Julian Huxley in his book "Africa View", says that
"The fundamental business of Government in Africa is education" ...
"The New Scales, Transport Regulations and Leave Regulations are
2?k
only complications, but lack of education is the mortal disease.
"Give us education and leave us alone* is our slogan." This
concern amongst the educated Sudanese for the improvement of
education both in quantity and quality continued to rise until it
found expression in the formation of the Graduates Congress in
1937 which played a major role in the political and educational
life of the country.
The educated Sudanese concern was no doubt enhanced by
the negotiations which were taking place between tne British and the
Egyptian Governments with the future of the Sudan as a main issue,
L i
and sometimes the stumbling bloc, although the Sudanese were not
at toe negotiation table. Opinions varied as to what extent
Egypt would help in their salvation but they were all agreed that
without education nothing could be achieved. The invasion of
Ethiopia by Mussolini in 1935 and the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian
Treaty of 1935 which recognised Egypt aa a fully sovereign state
without prejudice to the question of sovereignty over the Sudan
2
introduced a new factor to the situation. The two contracting
parties to the Treaty of 1936 agreed that their aim was the welfare
of the Sudanese. By this time individual Sudanese students began
to find their way to Egypt in search for higgler education, some of
whom finished their university education in Egypt and a few others
1. Harold MaaMichael: Memorandum: The Attitude of the Sudanese
Towards E&ypt, 1905-1932* PP« 13-13* ERA.
2, Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp..78-79.
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were sent on Egyptian scholarships to study in British or French
Universities .
by the end of 1936 the Government reported that the
establishment in the near future of three schools for professional
training in Engineering, agriculture and veterinary science had
been approved in principle while training in Government departments
2
continued. The press was demanding that training should not be
confined to Government departments and that, for instance, the
training undertaken by the Legal Department for Sudanese legal
assistants from amongst its officials should be extended to setting
up a school of Law in the College where advocates as well could be
trained. Al-Pajr asked for the appointment of Dirdlrl Ahmad
Israa'il, who had obtained a master's degree in laws from Leeds
University through an Egyptian Scholarship, as a teacher in the
law school it proposed. This, Al-Fajr said, would prove the good
intentions of the Government towards those who took the initiative
and risked going abroad to get an education that was not available
"5
at home.
This inter-departmental training, limited as it was, and
falling short of the ambitions of the educated Sudanese, was probably
brought about by the artiole in the 1936 treaty which stated that
when "making new appointments for which qualified Sudanese are not
Al-Pajr, No. 23, Vol. I, 16th July, 1935, PP- 1072-3.
2. G.G, Report, 1936, p. 66.
3. Al-Pa.1r, No. 23, Vol. I, 16th July, 1935, PP. 1072-3.
226
e/ailable, the Governor General will select suitable candidates
of British and Egyptian nat iorxality. But as the Sudan govern¬
ment was not prepared to restore to the Egyptians the position
they held in 19214., Sudanisation was the alternative and this
necessitated improvement in the available facilities for education
and increased the urge of the educated Sudanese for higher
education.
p
The De la Wane Commission was in East Africa in 1937
to report on higher education there. 'This Commission was invited
by the Governor General to pay, on its homeward journey, a visit
to the Sudan to enquire into and report on the curriculum, staff
and organisation of the Gordon Memorial College, and to review the
method and organisation of the elementary teachers' training school
at Bakht er Huda and one or two selected schools. The Commission
accordingly visited the Sudan in February.^ Two months later All
Bey El Garem, joint senior inspector of Arabic in Egypt, arrived
in Khartoum by invitation from the Sudan Government through the
Egyptian Ministry of Education, to inspect and report on the Arabic
teaching in the Gordon Memorial College, and to advise on the best
method of training future Arabic teachers.^
The Government view on these reports w^as that "taken
together these two reports touch on almost every aspect of education
1. "Article 11(2) of 1936 Treaty".
2. Eric Ashby, Universities: British, Indian, African, London, 1966,
pp. 197-200.
3* G.G, Report, 1937» p. 79.
k. Ibid.
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ia the Sudan, and it must be some time before final decisions to
implement them are taken. ha the meantime, these valuable reports
have been published for the general information of the public on a
subject which vitally concerns the future progress and welfare of
the country.""*" The publication of the reports was a token
recognition of the ccncem of the educated Sudanese which was
beginning to assert itself. It was also an indication of a change
in the attitude which was prevalent only three or four years before
when Bakht er Ruda was being established. Griffiths wrote
"Hadn't we consulted the educated Sudanese? Not very much. In
those days they were mostly in subordinate positions; few as yet
had any width of experience on which to form helpful opinions.
Most members of the administration thought they were out of touch
with the main body of tribesmen, and had different interests. We
did not cultivate their appreciation, we used reason and firmness.
2
This was usually the method even with the very unsophisticated."
The De la Warr Commission reported that they were able
to visit and inspect the Gordon Memorial College, the Elementary*
Teachers Training College at Bakht er Ruda, the Kitchener School
of Medicine, and a number of the intermediate, elementary and
Qur'an schools, including some schools for girls.^ From the
evidence received the commission gained the impi*ession that there
2kid., pp. 79-80.
2. V.L. Griffith, An Experiment in Education, p. lip.
3» De la Warr Commission Report, Khartoum, 1937* P« 5«
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was a danger of the bifurcation of the Sudan, at that early stage
in its growth, into native administrations in the countryside and
the relatively small but influential groups of Afandiyya in the
towns and the Government Departments. This appeared to the
Commission to be the .greatest danger in the developments of the
previous ten years. The government recognised this, and the
Commission hoped that there would be an immediate and rapid
movement towards the adoption of the principle that only those who
received at least an elementary schooling would be appointed
chiefs, sub-chiefs and even village heads. The Commission thought
it was worth considering whether chiefs might not be encouraged to
send their sons forward beyond the elementary stage. They also
noted that the expansion of education on the scale they
envisaged would Involve a substantial increase in the vote of the
Education Department, and they urged that in view of the importance
of the subject the needs of education should receive the most
sympathetic consideration in the preparation of the Budget
estimates.
The Commission reported that the results achieved by the
G.M.C., by the Kitchener School of Medicine, and fey the recently
established Teachers* Training Centre at Bakht er Ruda made it
unnecessary to justify the education of the Sudanese upon
principles inspired by those adopted in Europe. But it also
noted that the impact of western ideas upon the 'Mohammedan*
life of the Sudan naturally created problems, and a wise system
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of education was necessary to direct into beneficial channels the
movement set up by that impact. Unassimilated, these modes of
thought imported from a different environment must jar, and it
was the function of education to harmonise what was best in
European civilisation with the Sudanese environment. "Schools
and Colleges", the De la Warr Commission recommended, "must there¬
fore be in close contact with the needs of a community which is
predominantly rural. Not least among these needs is the training
of leaders, who must be both superior to the mass of their country-
1
men and in sympathy with them."
The great fault pervading Sudanese Schools was the tendency
to memorise without understanding. The result, the Committee noted,
a failure not only to produce qualities of initiative, foresight,
judgement and adaptation to circumstances, but even to reach an
adequate standard in the knowledge of the subjects themselves.
The aim was too often a mere teaching of facts without regard to
the environment of the pupils, whose mental background was the
Qur'anic tradition, and to whom Kestern civilisation and education
2
necessarily appeared as foreign products. They noted, however,
that admirable work was done at Bakht er Ruda to devise methods
fitted to the students* environment and capable of correcting the
faults of the existing schools.
The De la Warr Commission thought it was regrettable that
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
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Bakht er Ruda was the only modern institution in the Sudan concerned
with boys* primary education. They thought the time for experiment
was over, and the moment had arrived for advance upon the knowledge
gained. The aim, they recommended, should be the creation of a
Bakht er Ruda in every province and they recommended the immediate
establishment of at least .one other 3ueh institution. Only by
such measures, they thought, could teachers be trained to staff the
1
new schools which were urgently needed. However Bakht er Ruda was
to remain the only teachers training college of its kind for eleven
more years until the Elementary Teachers Training School at Billing
2
was opened in 1924-8.
The D© la Warr Commission considered all stages of
education as inter-dependent and consequently that efforts towards
improvement should be spread over every grade of school. They
recommended that efforts should be made, in co-operation with the
religious authorities, to improve the Khalwasj and that, since
more and better elementary vernacular schools were needed, the
schools at Bakht er Ruda should be extended and similar schools
should be founded elsewhere. Similarly an extension and improvement
of the Intermediate School was necessary. The headmaster of each
Intermediate school should be advised by a British supervisor.
There were only eleven Government intermediate schools at the time
but nevertheless this recommendation was never implemented possibly
for financial, administrative and political reasons.
1. Ibid., p. 10.
2. G.G. Report, 19U-8, p. 139.
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Another recommendation which, if properly implemented, could have
served a similar purpose to the intermediate schools, was that
1
every province should have a full time education officer. They
also recommended that girls* education should be greatly expanded.
The Commission thought that the time was ripe for making
those beginnings out of which a university would eventually
develop. An intermediate step in the development of the university
should be the establishment of a university college, and the
elements of the future university college should be centres in the
Gordon College building. An important stage towards this goal
was that the Government secondary school, which the Gordon College
was, should be graded up to a standard equivalent to that of the
British School Leaving Eh.aminations even if this necessitated the
extention of the course from four to five years for a temporary
period. This would require the number of British masters at the
secondary school to be increased from five to eight and also that
the Sudanese who were to teach English or in English, should take
2
courses in England. The secondary school itself should be
located on another site to give room for the developing college.
The Gordon College, so proposed, was to comprise the
Kitchener School of Medicine, besides the other schools and
departments which were to be developed. An arts department was
to be developed w!th the teachers' training course as its nucleus.
This was a course designed for intermediate school teachers at the
1. De la Warr Commission Report, 1937# P* i+8.
2* Ibid., p. 14.9.
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time. The teaching of pr©-professional science to students who
had previously completed a secondary course in natural science
should also be carried out in the new Gordon College. The
agriculture course should be located at Khartoum North and should
not be confined to candidates for Government employment"^ and a
satisfactory system of pupilage should be evolved for engineering
students. The Commission was of the opinion that the advanced
courses in professional subjects should, from the first, aim at a
standard not lower than that required for a British professional
qualification.
The Commission recommended that the recognition of Sudan,
diplomas by examining authorities in England and elsewhere should
be sought and, wien an at equate standard was reached, selected
students should be entered for external degrees; while refresher
courses and post-diploma work should be encouraged in the Gordon
College, outstanding students should be sent to study abroad.
Lord De la Warr was more vehement in his criticism in a letter he
2
sent later on in the same year to the Governor General Sir Stewart
J^rmes where he said, "A general and impartial view of education In
the Sudan leads to the conclusion that the schools are inadequate
in number and unsatiafactory In quality. This is clearest in the
case of the elementary and intermediate schools but it applies
also to the Gordon Memorial College which appears to have been
pursuing for many years a comfortable rut at an easy amble ... The
Ibid., p. 50.
2. S.G. Archives 17 B.l. Vol. 1, 16.10.37.
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Gordon College which should have achieved a continuously rising
standard throughout the thirty years of its existence, has
failed not only to attain the complete University standard which
its founders envisaged, but even to reach the stage of University
entrance."
Lord De la Warr, drawing on his knowledge of education
in East Africa, told the Governor General in the same letter that
expenditure on education in proportion to total expenditure was
considerably less in the Sudan than in most of those territories.
Complaints had of late been frequent that Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda
and Tanganyika spent too little on education, yet the proportion
of their expenditure devoted to this service was "from one-and-a-
half to twice the proportion of compressible expenditure devoted
to education in the Sudan." Lord De la Warr was no doubt
referring to the Sudan Government1s ten year educational plan
which was approved in 1936^" when he said, "Under the present
approved rate of expansion of education in the Sudan, expenditure
is likely to Increase by about £50,000 per annum. While we
welcome this increase, we cannot feel that It can meet the real
needs of the situation. The Sudan with its 6,000,000 people and
a budget of four and a half million pounds, spends £1^9,051 (net)
on education from central and local funds. Uganda, with little
more than half the population and less than half the revenue,
spends £119,872". Lord De la Warr expressed his anxiety that
1. G.G. Report 1536, pp. 86-7.
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"the Sudan should now make up the accumulated arrears of many
years of stagnation.
The criticism made by Lord De la Warr was, in its general
tone, similar in many ways to that made by Sir James Currie in the
2
early thirties and to the criticism which increasingly had been
made by the educated Sudanese for a long time. However, the
reaction of the Government, this time, was a revision of the 1936
ten year educational plan. The new programme^ which was to spread
over the next eight years envisaged capital expenditure of
approximately half a million pounds by 191+6 and raised the total
recurrent expenditure on education which was approximately
££150,000 in 1956 to approximately £E300,000 in eight years time.
However modest these changes were, their arithmetic was rendered
obsolete by the outbreak of the Second World War. The principal
achievement of the De la Varr Report was that a year later the
Gordou College could claim for the first time that some of its
best pupils attained the standard of an English secondary school.
In 1938 the best fourth-year class of twenty-two boys sat for the
Cambridge School Certificate Examination; twenty secured
certificates and sixteen exemptions from the Cambridge Previous
Examination.^ The total number of students at the College in
1. Letter 16.10.37*
2. Currie, "The Education Experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan"
Journal of the Royal Afrioan Society, 1933» 1934*» Sric Ashby,
Universities, British, Indian, African, pp. I+76-J4.8.
3' O.G. Report, 1938, p. 83«
G.G. Report, 1938, p. 83#
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this year was 357•
Secondary qualification or no secondary qualification
the urge and need for higher education were long overdue and
the beginnings had to be made. So in the same year 1938 the School
of Veterinary Studies commenced the first year of a three-year
course in January and in September the School of Agriculture
opened in buildings at Sharabat, a rural suburb of Khartoum.
At the same time final plans were made for the establishment of the
new School of Science, which was intended to provide the pre-
professional training required by students going on to the School
of Medicine, A griculture, Engineering and Veterinary Studies, and
in a simplified form, by those under training to be science
teachers in the intermediate schools. The School of Engineering,
too, vacated the Gordon College building in November and was
housed in premises of its own."" So the professional training
p
that was carried out in Government departments" came to be pursued
in the Gordon College which was still officially maintaining the
close links with the departments concerned. For the Gordon
College to develop a step further towards University status it
had to wait until 19lt-6~ after the Asquith Commission's report had
been published when, with the rest of similar colonial institutes,
arrangements were being amde for some of the students to qualify
for external degrees of London University.^
G.G. Report, 1938, pp. 85-6.
2. G.G. Report, 1935, p. 77•
3* G.G. Heportj 19U-6.
iq. Eric Ashby, Universities: British, Indian, African, pp.211-215.
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OHAPTEH V
GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION IN THE NORTH:
PROM THE GRADUATES CONGRESS TO 1965
The literary societies that began to flourish in the
early thirties and the concern about social and political problems
that ensued out of that and increased after the Anglo Egyptian
Treaty of 1936 crystallized in the formation of the General Graduates
Congress. The Congress came as an expression of a growing desire
among the educated Sudanese to work together. This feeling was
enhanced by the realisation that the Sudan was not represented by
Sudanese at the Treaty which was dealing with their future and
that of the country. Though the spectre of the Congress Party in
India could not fail to be discernible to the authorities in the
name, the Graduates Congress - yet the latter did not start with
an articulated political pro gramme or an express political aim.
It sufficed itself in the beginning with the general purpose, "to
promote the general welfare of the country and its graduates,"1 a
statement reminiscent of the phrase used to define the aim of the
two contracting powers in their administration of the Sudan as laid
down in the Treaty of 1936. Most of the members were employees of
the Government with memories of 1921^. and its aftermath still alive,
moderation and caution were recognisable counsel. The Government
recognised the Congress only in so far as it was representing its
1. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 60.
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own views and those of its members. The new organisation, being
itself formed of educated members, paid great attention to the
question of education and played a significant role in this field.
Interest displayed in these early years formed the basis of future
policy when this generation came to power.
Congress First Memorandum
Two months after the inauguration of the Congress, with
branches in different parts of the country and a central Committee
of sixty and a Oc msel of fifteen in Omdurman, a special committee
was formed, in April 1938, to study the problems of eduoation in
the country so that the Congress might submit its views on this
subject to the authorities. This was at the time when the De la
VarrCommission*s reports on Sudan and East Africa had just been
published. In July 1939 Congress presented its views in a
comprehensive memorandum to the Government.^
The note traced the work of education in the Sudan to
the arrival of the Arabs in the country. It described the main aim
of that eduoation as religious, "hence the great number of Khalwas
throughout the country which played a very good part in the way of
education and general enlightenment. These Khalwas were run by
the people themselves until recently when some of them were sub¬
sidised by the Government." It seemed that this tradition of the
people running their *khalwas! was underlying the Congress-led
1. M.O. Beshir, Thesis , Appendix V, pp. 387-412.
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movement of *National or Ahlia Schools'. The Congress was critical
of the position of education in the country as it believed that the
number of the literate was not more than 1% of the total population.
It estimated that there were about 300,000 boys of six to twelve
years of age in the country of whom 19,000 only received elementary
or intermediate education in Government or other schools or about 6$
while in Uganda it said, over 33$ of boys of the same age actually
received similar education. Girls' education was described as so
backward that it could not be compared with that of any other
country. The number of girls receiving education was not more
than 6,000 in both Government and other schools, while girls in
the country, the note stated, were "more numerous than boys."1
The memorandum went on to say that even if the existing
number of elementary and intermediate schools was doubled in a few
years time, which was what the revised ten years plan was hoping to
do, "it will still fall short of our aspirations, and far from
being comparable to other Arab countries it will not reach the
stage achieved by the neighbouring countries." On educational out¬
look the Congress said that in numerous aspects of their life the
Sudanese had much in common with the Arab countries of Islamic
Orient and they therefore considered that education in the country
should take "an Islamic Oriental character and not a pagan African
one, or that in other words the Arabic language and Religious




Critical of education in the Sudan as being mainly
designed to supply the various Government offices with suitable
staff, Congress thought that it was high time tnat a new and more
general policy had been laid. The alms of the new policy should be:
* (a) Total removal of illiteracy and
(b) expansion and improvement in all stages of education
with a view to maintaining a high cultural standard to ensure:
•(i) Creating spiritual happiness for the individual
in community life.
*(il/ Inculcating public and co-operative spirit in the
individual so that he may take an active interest in the welfare of
his community, and
*(iii) Equipping the individual with the qualities
which make for sucoess in his struggle for existence.*^
They expressed the view that modem educational theories
did not atop at teaching reading, writing and arithmetic and that
they did not think that education would serve its purpose if it
failed to prepare the educated for a life more productive than that
of the uneducated and to induce them to impart the advantages so
gained to their community. As with the aims, they found the
structure of the educational system, too, unsatisfactory and in need
of reform. They criticised it as being designed to prepare the
pupil for the next higher stage, while neglecting the needs of the
majority who would not go any higher. To achieve both purposes
they suggested that a speoial system be introduced, in both
1. Ibid
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elementary and intermediate schools, whereby the pupils would
receive a caramon syllabus after which those who desired to continue
their education would proceed, while the rest who wished to qualify
for their life work would be given two years of further training.
What types of training they did not explain. For the fulfilment
of this suggestion they advocated a certain degree of decentral¬
ization owing to the vastness of the country and the geographical
differences. But they emphasised that those differences should
not affect the consaon spirit that should in the first place pre¬
dominate education in all its stages. And though they attached
great hopes to the efforts made at Bakht er Ruda on elementary
education they felt it was likewise of vital important that similar
work should be done for the intermediate schools.
On school age, they noted that children began their
elementary schooling at the age of ei^it and finished secondary
education at the age of twenty, which they regarded as a
comparatively high average age for entering higher schools that
required from four to six years of study. They suggested that boys
should start elementary education at the age of six and that girls
should start at the age of five so that women teachers could have
more working years before they got married. On Khalwas, they felt
that Government subsidies to them were not serving the purpose for
which they were intended because the Fikis"*" absented themselves from
their Khalwas for a good part of the year in pursuit of their living.
This they attributed to two reasons: (1) The reward given to them
1. Fikis, Khalwa teachers.
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was scanty and did not cover their necessities, (2) The parents of
the pupils ceased to offer the small contributions or fees they
used to give in the past to the Ftkis on the understanding that
they were now in receipt of regular pay from the Government.
The Education Department, they thought, had apparently
discovered these defects and had therefore (1) re-introduced the
preparatory class in the elementary schools which boys could join
from their homes without any direct instruction at Khalwas and
(2) devised a new system of half elementary schools (sub-grade) in
places where elementary schools did not exist. Congress, while
accepting sub-grade schools, thought that Khalwas were still
necessary for religious purposes and as an additional means of
combating illiteracy. To remove the defects described they
suggested that no direct payments be made to the Fikis but that a
lump sum grant be placed at the disposal of the Qmdurman Ma'had
Board or a special committee appointed by the Ma*had who would be
authorised to distribute the money at their discretion in consul¬
tation with the local authorities. From this proposal Congress
appeared to be looking for the support of the Fikis and Ma'had, i.e.
the religious educated and the public.
They fully supported the Lord De la WarrReport and
urged expansion and the representation of Graduates on the proposed
Council for the College and not that of notables as was the case with
other Councils. On education in the Southern Sudan, they said it
was left entirely in the hands of missionaries who were subsidised
by the Government. This in their opinion was responsible for the
2k2
backwardness of education in that ^alfceh^ They did not wish to under¬
estimate the contribution which the Missions had made and were
making to education in the South, but as the main object of the
Missions was religious, the educational value of Missionary schools
was consequently low and therefore so far had very little effect on
the life of the Southerners. They regretted that in the South
tribes still lived in such a primitive and inhuman condition that
did not bei t the twentieth century.
They suggested that improvement of education in the South
could not be attained by expanding and improving the existing
missionary schools at Government expense but by opening entirely new
schools on the lines of those in the Northern Sudan. The Arabic
language, they submitted, would provide a suitable lingua franca as
it was already spoken by most of the tribesmen and would thus solve
the difficulties expressed by the Director of Education in his
report for 1936. Quicker results could be achieved, they added,
if restrictions were removed and the South was opened unconditionally
to the Northerners. Apart from the educational value of the
continuous contact between the peoples of the North and South, the
economic conditions would be improved by promoting trade and
agricultural activities.
On Ahlia Schools or National Education, Congress said
that in spite of their limited resources, the people of the country,
prompted by their desire to provide additional facilities for
educating as many of their children as possible at a reasonable cost
and to enable the poorer classes to receive free education, had, by
2k3
combined efforts, established a few elementary and intermediate
schools which they continued to maintain at their own expense.
Some of the schools received some help from the Education Department
in the form of a free issue of scholastic materials. Though these
grants were much appreciated, it was felt that these schools
deserved more substantial subsidies from the Government. Their
greatest difficulty was in the lack of qualified teachers. This
was partly <ue to the absence of capable teachers locally and partly
to the inability of the schools to offer suitable terms of service
for such teachers from within or without the country. They suggested
that it would greatly alleviate these difficulties and help towards
raising the standards in the National schools, if the Government would
extend its subsidies to all the National Schools to cover the pay of
the headmaster or one teacher at least in each as was done to the
Missionary Schools. Congress maintained that this would not only
help to preserve the existing schools but would also enable some
of the funds collected to be utilised in expanding the schools to
take a greater number of boys which would in turn relieve the
pressure on Government schools.
The memorandum was acknowledged by the Government in a
letter sent to the Secretary of the Congress by the Civil Secretary
and described as a constructive contribution to a problem vitally
affecting the welfare of the Sudanese,^" with a promise that he would
bring it to the- notice of the Governor General on his return from
1. Letter dated 16th July 1939, 9/8/65 MEA, p. 9.
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leave. The wide discussion the memorandum received before its
submission and the recognition it got from the Government prepared
the way for Congress to be the champion of 'National Education*, a
terra used for citizens* sponsored schools. Though the Government
did not do anything more about the memorandum, the already existing
aohools of that type did. At the time the schools in existence
were the Ahlia Intermediate School"*" at Oradurraan which had been set
up in 192? by the citizens and the educated in response to the
Government policy towards education at the time, and as a protest
against attempts at proselytizing of Moslem boys in the American
2
Mission School at Gmdurman. The other school was the Ahfad school,
elementary and intermediate, established by Sheikh Babiker Badri,
with the active support of acme of the authors of the Congress
memorandum in 1933.^ A third one was an elementary school
established in 1937 at Wad Medani^ where the Graduates* movement
was the leading in the country and where the idea of the Congress
is believed to have originated.
Ahlia Schools Movement
Within two weeks of the Government reply to the Congress
memorandum the Director of Education was reading all the relevant
1. Note by Chief Inspector, 1.5.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Badri, Vol. 3, pp. 77-92.
3. The boys elementary section was established in Rufa'a in 1930
then moved later to Omdurman. The Intermediate section was
established in 1933*
ii.. p. 16, 9/8/65, MEA.
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papers as regards petitions from the Ahfad and the Omdurman Ahlia
schools for increased Government subsidies and, more important
still, for the opening of a secondary school along the lines of the
Gordon Memorial College in the Ahfad. But the Director thought
the whole question of Government subsidies to non-Government schools
required investigation and a defined policy. As it was connected
to some extent with major issues such as the opening of an Egyptian
Secondary School in Khartoum which was then in the air, he wished
to delay a final reply until he had discussed the matter in England
with Mr. Newbold, the designated Civil Secretary, and with
Mr. Roseveare his successor as director of education, who were
both on leave at the time.
In the meantime the press was bringing the issue of
secondary education into the open. In an editorial *E1 Nile*
wrote:^ "Our need of secondary schools needs no proof. A great
number of those who complete the intermediate schools are turned
down by the G.M.C. yearly. Some of them are disappointed and
others seek education in the foreign and missionary schools. Although
it has come to light that an Egyptian secondary school will be
established yet the deficit in secondary education will not
thoroughly be made up. The two hundred students who can find no
chance in G,M.C. exceed the number required by the Egyptian
Secondary School." Within a week after this editorial the Director
1. Dated 1.8.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Badrl, Vol. 3, pp. 128-151.
3. El Nile 22.7.39.
21+6
of Education, Mr. Cox, was having dinner with Sayed Abdel Rahman
El Mahdi who, bringing the conversation to its goal of the
secondary sohools said "if the Government could not itself provide
sufficient accommodation, let it be Sheikh Babikr Badri and not the
Egyptians."^ The playing off of the Egyptians send the British
was now taking shape.
The Sudan Government found that it had to define its
policy towards this impending movement towards secondary schools
and towards the renewed demands for substantial subsidies to the
intermediate schools. A note prepared by Mr. Jamieson at the
2
Department of Education outlined this policy. On Secondary
education the Government was to confirm that it was their intention
to provide secondary education for three classes of boys (a) those
who were exceptionally clever and were likely to prove of value to
the Government, (b) those who through inherited position were
likely to play a leading part in Local Government,-^(c) the sons of
those who were prepared to pay for their education. The Government,
it was also suggested, should reaffirm that it was their intention
to limit secondary and post-secondary to those who could usefully
profit by it, i.e. to the absorptive capacity of the country.
The Government, it was also maintained, should state
that education in the Sudan had been or was being adapted to suit
1. Note of conversation with Sir Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi Pasha;
29.7.39 (Sgd.) O.W.M. Cox 7.10.39. 9/8/65 MEA.
2. Note by Mr. Jamieson for Reading by Director of Education before
Discussion on National Schools, 1.8.3 9. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 72.
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the needs of the country and only those boys who had had a course
in intermediate schools following the Sudan Government syllabus
should be accepted into the secondary schools and only those who
had had a course in secondary schools following the Sudan
Government syllabus should be accepted into higher schools. In
employing Sudanese in Government service preference should be given
to those who had received their training in the Sudan schools.
But before he Government gave its approval to the opening of non-
Governraent Secondary Schools wholly or largely for Sudanese it
should be convinced that there was a need not supplied by the
Government, that the education was on the lines laid down by the
Government for secondary schools and that the schools were
supplementary to Government education and not competitive with it.
This meant that fees would be charged at the same rate as for
Government schools.
It was anticipated that the two cases where secondary
education would be asked for during the coming few years were at
the Egyptian Secondary School and at the National Schools. The
Egyptian Secondary School was to be told that it should be designed
from the start to cater for Egyptians only and that permission to
accept Sudanese would be limited to a very low figure, comprising
those who had no intention of seeking Government employment, who
desired a further education in Egypt and who were prepared to pay
for it. In the meantime stricter control was to be exercised on
the Coptic College, Comboni College and similar community schools
and intake of Sudanese was to be limited. The National Schools were
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to be told that only if they could employ staff fully equipped to
teach the Sudan secondary syllabus would permission be given and
then only if there was a need for another secondary school. At
that stage the application for a secondary section at Babikir Badri
was to be turned down.
The two schools, the Ahfad and the Ahlia, were to be
toned up by rigid inspection at their intermediate schools and an
increase of books and materials of up to £19 per class. The
Government was to open the Qmdurman Junior Secondary School, a two
year secondary school for commercial subjects, in the following year.
This it was hoped would stem the tide but if for political reasons
the Government found that the demand for secondary education became
too strong to resist and it was not prepared to meet it by opening
another class at its existing secondary schools, then permission to
run a secondary section would be given to the better of the two
schools on the lines of a paying concern but it was hoped that
this would not take place for many years. The Sudan Government saw
to it^" that persistent applications were rejected or deferred and
consequently the Ahfad secondary section was not given permission
to open until 1943,2 the Ahlia until 1944 and the Egyptian (Farouk)
Secondary School was not formally opened till 194&^ the same year
as the Omdurman Secondary School, which had been moved during the
1. 7.10.39. 9/8/65 MEA.
2. Badri. Vol. 3, pp. 133-155.
3* O.G. Heport. 194&» P* 125- Eadri, op.cit., p. 164.
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war period from the Gordon College buildings, was divided into two
schools, one of them occupying the Wadi Seidna buildings in January
while the other opened in Hantoub in September.^"
Egyptian Education
The Egyptian Secondary School and Egyptian education
were a growing concern of the Sudan Government and this was clearly
indicated by the outgoing Director of Education, Mr. Cox, in a
p
letter to his successor, Mr. Roseveare, just after the outbreak of
the war. Cox, who gave his full support to the memorandum prepared
for him before his departure, gave further amplification of that
memorandum and suggested to his successor ways and means of putting
it into effect. He stated that he was afraid that the likely
developments of Egyptian education were: that the Parouk Secondaxy
School could be tempted to sidetrack the second Government Secondary
School by insisting on the Government increasing the Wadi Seidna
school to 500 and letting the surplus go to the Egyptian School.
Even if this did not occur a growing number of Sudanese would go
to the Egyptian school and the Government, Cox thought, would be
faced with a surplus of ex-secondary school boys with no jobs.
Furthermore Cox feared that the situation at Gordon College would
be complicated by a growing number of applicants whose secondary
education had been on the Egyptian syllabus. He also feared that
if the Sudanese who passed through the Egyptian secondary schools
1. Ibid., p. 121+.
2. 7.10.39. 9/8/65, MEA.
250
either in Khartoum or in Egypt went on to Egyptian Universities,
there would be a danger, owing to the superior prestige of a
"proper" Degree, either of the sidetracking of the Gordon College
or of a surplus of University graduates with no jobs.
To minimise these dangers the former Director of
Education suggested a firm implementation of the suggestion of
giving preference for Government posts not only to those who had
been train in Sudan Government schools but also in Sudan
Government higher education as well, and also by fixing economic
fees which would restrain parents from paying for an expensive
education for their sons if they were likely to waste their money
by having them unemployed in the end.
The other side of the Egyptian problem was, to the
Director of Education, whether similar control could be exercised
over the annual exodus of Sudanese boys to secondary schools in
Egypt as over an annual entry to an Egyptian School in Khartoum.
Besides the publ city in advance of the deterrents he proposed
earlier, of no guarantee of jobs and preference for those following
the Sudan Government syllabus, Cox suggested that this should be
explained to the Egyptian representatives and an effort made to
persuade them to keep their "political philanthropy" down to a
minimum. He knew this would not be easy for them, exposing them
to Sudanese criticism, unless they could quote an understanding
with the Sudan Government. The number of thirty that year seemed
moderate at the time, but in fact it applied, not as he thought to
Sudanese boys already domiciled in Egypt, but to a fresh influx from
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the Sudan. The trickle to Egypt of earlier years, Cox warned,
had only in the last three or four years become a stream and until
the products began to flow back as they soon would, the complications
involved could not be fully realised. He thought it most important
to watch that stream and check its numbers and subsequent fortunes.
Though this was the Civil Secretary's business, he personally would
like to see the Sudan Agent in Cairo given a standing instruction
to watch aid report on this. Inside the country he recommended
that headmasters should be circulated to annually and instructed
to send in returns to the Education Department of boys leaving
their schools to seek Instruction outside the Sudan.
As regards those Sudanese proceeding from Sudanese,
British or Egyptian secondary schools to universities in Britain,
Egypt or elsewhere outside the Sudan, the declaration of the
principle laid down should do a good deal to act as a deterrent.
Mr. Cox thought that so far there had hardly been any test cases.
One Sudanese doc or with a British (Edinburgh) Degree, had recently
applied for admission to the Medical Service; he was admitted
provided he finished his training with the Kitchener School of
Medicine students, but Cox thought he was ri^it in saying that
Pridie, the Director of Health, was reluctant to admit him, or at
least would have preferred him to have been trained in the Kitchener
School of Medicine, and would dislike a stream of Sudanese applicants
from Great Britain, though that applicant was a good man. A
Sudanese with an Egyptian Agricultural Degree applied to become a
lecturer at the School of Agriculture and they had to turn him down.
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In spita of the reasons given that not everyone with a degree was
qualified to become a don or that if he had applied to the
Agricultural Department's general cadre they would no doubt have
taken him, such similar instances later on led holders of Egyptian
degrees to believe that there was deliberate discrimination against
them.
Cox was of the opinion that when trying to regulate
and check a stream which had been already flowing for some years,
if men who left the Sudan before the date when the Sudan Government
formulated its policy presently returned with British or Egyptian
or Beirut Degrees, it would be most unfair not to take them if they
were in general suitable. But once the policy was formulated and
made known, those who then chose to start university courses out¬
side the country would know that preference would normally, not
invariably, be given to those with the local Diplomas. He assured
his successor that in such a policy he would certainly have the
convinced support of all the employing Departments.
Much trickier, the former Director thought, was the
attitude of the Sudanese thanaelves, to whom the glamour of a
recognised Degree "even an Egyptian Degree" was a lure and they
could easily - unless great care were taken - become suspicious
(and even hostile) towards the Khartoum Diploma a3 a low standard
makeshift depriving then of opportunity. This was a serious
danger and it would not, the former Director thought, be averted
unless the raising of the Khartoum academic standards to the
equivalent of a recognised British counterpart was kept always in
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mind as the constant aim of the Director of Education, as Chairman,
the Committees and the Principals of the various schools.
This, Cox told his successor, had bean done, in the
face of much criticism, by successive directors of the Medical
Service, with the result that as regards the Kitchener School of
Medicine the danger had been averted. The Kitchener School of
Medicine was to be the model for the other schools but the Director
of Education was advised to throw his weight more heavily in the
scales as regards the other schools, including the Teachers* School,
than he would otherwise have wished to do, if he were to counter¬
balance the strong braking action of educational idealists on the
one hand and Departments sceptical of Sudanese capacities on the
other. The two key-points, for some time to come were, as Cox
thought, qualifications of staff, and external examiners; the
Sudanese were suspicious about the former and the Departments
were not keen on the latter.
Lastly, Cox thought that in practice, when all was
said and done about preference, it would be unlikely that Sudanese
with British Degrees — too few to constitute a problem — or with
Egyptian Degrees (except for certain Departments like Education and
Medicine) would be refused posts as being not good enough compared
with holders of Khartoum Diplomas. It was consequently possible
that, especially if the Khartoum Diploma standards were to rise too
slowly and the College became unpopular with the Sudanese, the
Egyptian Government would be tempted for political reasons to give
many facilities leading Sudanese directly or ultimately to Egyptian
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universities. If that did occur, the former director thought,
it would either, if in practice the government gave preference to
Khartoum Diplomates, flood the Government with Sudanese graduates
from Egypt without jobs, or sidetrack and stultify the University
College plan, for the sake of which all that money in moving out
the Secondary School had been sunk. Such a situation would be
the concern of the Civil Secretary and if ever there were danger
of it arising he imagined action would be taken through the British
Bnbassy in Cairo.
Under these circumstances of concern for education
from all sides the Graduates Congress concentrated its efforts in
this field. It began the collection of deviations from different
parts of the country and for this purpose it organised what Congress
called "Yawn al-Ta'lIm" or "Education Day". This was a special
day on which, in each town, a festival was held during which
articles donated for the purpose of financing "National Education"
would be sold and contributions collected to be sent to the
Graduates Congress Central Committee in Omdurman. How the money
was to be spent by Congress on education was a topic of deliberations
1
between representatives of the Congress and the Sudan Government.
Government and Congress on Ahlia Schools
When the Director of Education met the representatives
of Congress, Ismail El Azhari, later first Prime Minister after
Independence, Mohamed Saleh El Shingeti, later Speaker of Parliament,
1. Note on Meeting with Representatives of Graduate*s General
Congress 10.11.41. 9/6/65* MEA.
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and Ahmed Mutwali El Atabani, later Attorney General, the Congress
representatives, who were minor Government officials at the time,
stated that they were not themselves proposing to open schools,
but were going to use the money which they had then, about £6,000,
to help existing schools, and to encourage and help the opening of
new schools in the villages and towns by local Committees. Though
the Government realised that Congress were eager to encourage local
initiative its representatives had stated that they were anxious to
act fully in agreement and harmony with Government development by
helping local schools to start at places where the Government
agreed that a proper demand existed.
Given the conditions of the war, the infancy of Congress
and the fact that most of its members were employed by the Government,
in addition to the fact that Government approval was essential, the
attitude of the Congress representatives was that of compromise
and understanding. They appreciated the Government view on
avoiding the danger of giving a capital grant for schools which
might subsequently prove unable to run efficiently without financial
help from outside. The Government may have been apprehensive of
being asked for tnat or of Egyptian help coming in for these schools.
Congress representatives proposed to keep a fund in "hand to help
such schools with running expenses where necessary.
The Director of Education, expressing the general policy,
said he was only too anxious to co-operate in a plan which aimed
at spreading literacy and also at improving facilities which already
existed. The important thing, he thought, was to avoid spending
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money on schools which might subsequently become inefficient, or
on schools for which there was not really an honest demand and for
which parents were not prepared to pay fees. Congress representa¬
tives said that their main difficulty was in the provision of
teachers and they asked to what extent the Government could help in
their training. Gould boys be taken into Bakht er Ruda or the
Higher Schools? From these arguments it seems that while Congress
was aiming at starting some schools at elementary, intermediate
and secondary levels, the Government was planning to canalize the
efforts of Congress and limit its activities to sub-grade schools
KM'jfW '
as more secondary and intermediate schools may bring the potential
political danger of unemployed educated Sudanese.
The Director also told the representatives that, at
the time, the numbers being taken into both Bakht er Ruda and the
Higher Schools were a maximum, having regard to accommodation and
to practice classes available, and the output was still not enough
to fill the Government cadres which were consequent on the 1938
submissions. He also raised the point that, at the moment, in
contrast to England, all trained boys would prefer posts at
Government schools, and that it was unreasonable to tell any of
them, unless they were turned down as failures, that they could
not be given such posts but should go to non-government schools
instead. But he stated that more boys could be given sorae training
for sub-grade school teaching, as soon as the Department were
informed of any new schools of this type whose opening was being
made possible by Congress help. Ptill training as elementary school¬
masters could not be offered, the Director said, for about tnree
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years by which time the Bakht er Ruda intake could be increased.''"
The Congress representatives replied that for local
village schools they had in mind the employment of reliable Ma'had
graduates, perhaps with a former intermediate schoolboy assistant.
The Director of Education, though he expressed no view for or
against this, questioned whether the teaching capacities of the
Ma'had graduates would be as good for the purpose as those of
reliable former intermediate schoolboys. The Ha'had, which had
been established by local initiative as a school of Islamic studies
since 1912, continued to provide chanoes for some of its graduates
2
to proceed to al-Azhar or teach religion in the country, but with
very limited chances of entering into the Government service. The
Congress proposal to employ Ma'had graduates indicated its intention
to widen its support in the country by rallying this group who
received their education in the Ma*had and not in the Gordon
College and its related schools.
At the end of that meeting, both sides agreed that
such meetings should be periodic, at least annual. However, after
this meeting Congress seems to have decided to concentrate its
efforts on intermediate schools rather than elementary schools or
sub-grade schools as the Government had proposed. The political
advantages of intermediate schools were neater and more obvious.
Boys who finished intermediate schools were more assured of
1. Ibid., p. 2.
2. Kamil el-Baghir, "Religious Education: Present and Future
Development", in Philosophical Society of the Sudan, 11th
Annual Conference"**1963 on Education in the Sudan, pp. 76-89.
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Government office jobs so the lure for parents to contribute and
appreciate were greater than in the case of elementary schools
for which the Government was not prepared to provide teachers and
the sub-grade schools whose value was questioned. The difficulties
facing the starting of non-government secondary schools were no
doubt apparent to Congress. Since the membership of Congress was
predominantly from former secondary and intermediate school boys
more intermediate schools would provide Congress in a few years
time with increasing membership of its own efforts.
The question of non-Government Sudanese intermediate
schools was discussed in a meeting attended by the Assistant Civil
Secretary and the senior members of the Department of Education
early in the year."*" The Province Education Officer felt there
was a danger of increasing the existing difficulty of finding
employment for ex-intermediate schoolboys, and of producing a dis¬
satisfied class of boys if such schools were permitted. The
meeting recognised this danger and felt that expansion should be
watched carefully with this in mind, but that the danger was not
urgent. It was agreed that it was difficult to refuse such a
request if the people were prepared to put up the necessary money.
Until this time the only intermediate school that was set up,
besides the Ahfad and the Ahlia Omdurman, was the Ahlla Intermediate
2
School at wad Medani, the nucleus of which was the elementary
school started there in 1937«
1. Record of meeting held in the Assistant Director's Office on
31st March, 191A- 9/8/65 MEA.
2. Letter dated 22nd December 191A. 9/8/65» MEA.
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In April 1942, the President of the Graduates Congress
intimated to the Director of Education that his Committee had
included in their budget for that year funds for starting three
intermediate schools by the beginning of 19i+3-One of the schools
was to be at Dongola District, in the Northern Province. This was
later located at El Golld, another at El Obeid, in the Western part
of the Sudan and the third one at Oradurman. The President stated
that the Graduates Congress was starting those schools in places
where demand was "high and in collaboration with local committees
and that it would continue to give the necessary financial support
till such time when the local committees could finally take over
the full responsibility. After submissions of detailed plans by
2
Congress and the local committees to the Director of .education and
consultations between the latter, the Civil Secretary^ and the
governors of the provinces concerned,^4" approval was given by the
Government for the proposed Ahlia Intermediate Schools to be
started. To solve the staffing problems, some of the members of
Congress volunteered and resigned their government jobs to teach
in the Ahlia schools.
1. Letter dated 11th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Letter dated 13th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Letter dated 13th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
4. Letter dated 20th April, 1942. 9/8/65, MEA.
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Congress Petition of l%-2 Rejected by Government
In April l%-2, Congress, influenced by the promise of
the ri^ht of self-determination stipulated in the Atlantic Charter,"*"
2
presented the Sudan Government with a petition asking for
(1) 'The issue, on the first possible opportunity, by the British
and Egyptian Governments, of a joint declaration granting the Sudan,
in its geographical boundaries, the right of self-determination,
directly after this war, this right to be safeguarded by guarantees
assuring full liberty of expression in connection therewith; as
well as guarantees assuring the Sudanese the right of determining
their natural rights with Egypt in a special agreement between the
Egyptian and Sudanese nations.
(2) The formation of a representative body of Sudanese to approve
the Budget and the Ordinances.
(3) The formation of a Higher Educational Council, composed of a
Sudanese majority, and the devoting of a minimum of 12$ of the
Budget to education.
(Ip) The separation of the Judiciary from the Executive.
(5) The abolition of ordinances on 'closed areas* and the lifting of
restrictions placed on trade and on the movements >f the Sudanese
within the Sudan.
(6) The promulgation of legislation defining Sudanese nationality.
(75 The stopping of immigration, except within limits agreed upon
in the Anglo-Egyptian treaty.
1. Badri, Vol. 3, pp. 60-61.
2. Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 82-83.
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(8) The termination of the Sudan Plantations syndicate contract
at its expiration.
(9) The carrying out of the principle of welfare of the Sudanese
and their priority to government posts as follows:
(a) By giving the Sudanese an opportunity to share
effectively in ruling the country; this is to be attained
by the appointment of Sudanese in posts of political
responsibility in all the main branches of government.
(b) By limiting the appointments to government posts to
Sudanese.
(10) The Sudanese to be enabled to exploit the commercial,
agricultural and industrial resources of the country.
(11) The promulgation of an ordinance imposing on companies and
commercial firms the obligation of reserving a reasonable
proportion of their posts for the Sudanese.
(12) The cancellation of subventions to missionary schools and
the unification of the syllabuses in the northern and southern Sudan.
The forthright rejection of the petition by the
Govemor-General, who did not admit that Congress was entitled to
speak for the nation, and the contrasting private assurances given
by the Civil Secretary Douglas Newbold to Ibrahim Ahmed, the 1942
President, and some members of the Congress, led to the polarisation
of rivalries inside Congress along political lines and the
emergence of right wing or moderates on the one hand with Mahdist
support and British patronage which continued when they became
later on the Umraa Party and on the other hand a left, led by
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Azhari with the tacit support of the Khatmlyya following and
later on with Egyptian patronage. But the two groups remained
within Congress competing for its leadership.1 The demands
included in the petition, though rejected by the Government,
enhanced the demand for education as they pointed the way for the
future value of education. This contributed to the popular
support for the Ahlla Schools movement led by Congress .
In October 19^2, six months after the petition of
Congress, the Government, in reviewing the educational situation
at the halfway stage of the educational programme of 193$, which
provided for three more intermediate schools by 19i|6, affirmed
that it was still government policy to provide intermediate
education for the clever boys, the sons of chiefs and those who
2
were able to pay for it. But realising that the number of boys
in the last category was too large to be met by Government
provision and recognising the enthusiasm apparent in the country
for education at all levels, the Government adopted the policy of
giving some encouragement to the opening of non-Government schools
of the type of the Ahlias at Omdurman and Wad Medani, and the
Ahfad at Omdurman, subject to certain conditions, chief amongst
which were evidence of financial stability, administration of the
school's affairs by an efficient representative committee and the
existence of a strong local demand. The Government recognised
Badri. Vol. 3, pp. 65-66.
2. Note on non-Government intermediate schools to form the basis of
discussion with representatives of the various schools and
committees concerned, 6.10.19i|-2. 9/8/65* J4EA.
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that three schools of this type, the attendance of which would
shortly equal in number the normal attendance at eight full
Government schools, had already been founded, and the opening of
a fourth at Port Sudan had been approved, while permission had
also been granted to the Graduates* Congress to prepare plans in
concert with the local people for the opening of several more.
The Ahlia schools were asking for the same assistance
from the Government as was granted to the missionary schools or
the cancellation of grants to the latter as stated in the petition
of Congress. The Government considered that though it preferred
the Ahlia schools to eharge economic fees yet in cases of need it
thought of giving some assistance either in paying a proportion of
each teacher's salary in accordance with the teacher's qualifications
or in the shape of a small grant per head of the number of boys in
the school."'" Regarding the training of teachers for the Ahlias,
the Government, though aware of their problem, found that it would
be difficult to do very much in the next few years as the teacher
trainees who were already in the Higher Schools or who were to be
admitted in the course of the next two or three years, would be
required for staffing the Government intermediate schools. To
solve this problem the alternative proposals were; increasing
the numbers in training classes in the Higher Schools of the
Gordon College} the attachment of ex-secondary school boys to
Government intermediate schools as apprentices, with a course at
Bakht er Ruda to follow later; or as an additional possibility,
1. lbid., p.2.
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the secondment to private schools of specialised Government teachers,
e.g. of science and Arabic, in exchange for teachers of general
subjects.
Another proposal to solve the teacher-training problem
was the continuation of the practice which began that year of
granting a limited number of scholarships at the Higher Schools in
order to provide free tuition for the training of students
intending to seek posts as teachers in non-Government school.
As a corollary of this it was suggested that bursaries to cover
their maintenance during the training period should be granted to
those same students either by the school committees themselves or
by the Committee of the Graduates' Congress or by other philanthrop-
ically disposed individuals or bodies.1 At the time three extra
students had been taken into the School of Arts in 191+2. The
Government were providing their tuition free while the Graduates'
Congress was paying for their maintenance.4" The Government warned
a meeting with representatives of the Ahlia Schools and Congress,
at which the latter was represented by Azharl, that in the next few
years Government requirements would be high and that it would be
impossible to give up many places for future non-Government school
"5
teachers.
The meeting of the Government with the representatives
of Congress and the Ahlia schools did not arrive at specific
1. Xbid«, p. 3.
2. Record of Discussion on non-Government Intermediate Education,
p. 3. dated 18.11.1+2. 9/8/63, MEA.
3. Ibid.
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recommendations as to the form of the assistance the Government
was to give to the Ahlia schools. The matter was raised again
at a similar meeting two years later, in 19U4* Aa the schools
were growing and their liabilities were increasing it was agreed
that representation should be made to the Government with regard
to the payment of grants. The Government agreed to the appoint¬
ment of a Sub-Committee "to prepare a case for presentation to the
Director of Education for the giving of grants, both capital and
recurrent, in order to assist Ahlia Intermediate and Secondary
2schools." The latter were just starting.
The Committee reported^ that the capital cost of a
school building and initial equipment ranged between £E2000 and
£E30Q0 on the basis of existing costs of material and this was
raised by the school board looally. Any difference was covered
by a grant from the "Education Fund" at the disposal of the
Congress. Temporary buildings were in certain cases hired to
house the school until the necessary funds were collected for the
erection of permanent buildings. Teachers employed, the Committee
reported, were partly unqualified for the job in view of the
shortage of qualified teachers in the country. Great efforts were
however being made to facilitate training of such teachers by
providing refresher courses at Bakht er Ruda at their schools*
expense.
1. Record of a Discussion on non-Government Intermediate Education,
held in the Education Department on 12th May, 19M|. 9/6/65, MBA.
2. Ibid., p. 3•
3. Report by the Special Committee appointed by the Ahlia Schools
Conference held in May, 19i4t- Dated 15th Nov., 19if4* 9/8/65, MEA.
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The recurrent expenditure, particularly an salaries,
was considered by the Committee to be comparatively high and the
deficit during the first four years amounted to about £E800 or
about 35# of the teaching staff salaries, which deficit increased
every year as the salaries were raised. The deficit was covered
by local donations or grants from the Congress Education Fund.
The maximum fees collected at the time were £E10 per boy per annum.
Some schools had to raise their fees to £E12, whioh resulted in
hardship causing many absenoes and uncollected arrears. Other
schools reduced the free tuition percentage from 20 to 10# in an
effort to reduce the deficit, thus depriving the poor of the
chances of receiving education. So the Committee concluded that
Government subsidies for Ahlla schools were needed and recommended
rates of between one third to one half of the salaries of the
1
teachers provided certain conditions were met by the schools.
In 191*2 the Government told the Ahlia Schools that it
would not be able to help them substantially in the training of
2
teachers until 19i+5» In 191+5 the Director of Education wrote
that it would not be until about 191+8 that any real effort could
be made to supply non-Government schools with fully qualified
teachers. Meanwhile, he told the Civil Secretary, if the Govern¬
ment insisted on a new school opening with qualified and experienced
teachers, the result could only be that these would be attracted
1. Ibid., p.2.
2. Record of Discussion on non-Government Intermediate Eduoation,
22nd Oct., 191+2* p.i+. 9/8/65, MEA.
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away from existing Government or non-Government schools, with
consequent loss of efficiency to them, as teachers could not be
replaced, and raw recruits had to be engaged without any training.*
To obviate this difficulty he laid it down that when new schools
were permitted to open, they should be able to find in their firat
year adequate staff, perhaps from retired officials, without
drawing from existing schools? and that thereafter they should
appoint staff in advanoe far a year's training as supernumeraries,
attached to government schools. The Government insisted on the
Ahlia schools charging economic fees with no Government subsidies
in the first four years of the school and having sound financial




191*6 was a year of political activities concerning
the Sudan both inside the country and abroad and these had their
impact on education as well. The Labour Government in Britain
was at the time involved in a series of negotiations with the
Egyptian Government over Anglo-Egyptian relations, chief amongst
them the question of the Sudan. By this time Sudanese political
parties had been formed and a combined delegation-^ representing
all shades of opinion was sent to Cairo headed by Azhari, who was
1. Policy to be adopted in regard to the opening of non-Government
intermediate schools, dated 11th February, 191*5* 9/8/65, MEA.
2. 27th February, 191*6, 3rd March, 191*6. 9/8/65, MEA.
3. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 91*.
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by this time head of the Ashlqqa Party and the Graduates* General
Congress. The two main points of view were that of the Umma
Party, standing for complete independence and favouring co-operation
with the British in a gradual development towards self-government,
and that of the more militant Ashiqqa and other smaller groups who
believed in some form of association with Egypt, ranging from
complete unity to loose federation, with greater antipathy and
distrust of the British. Soon after arriving in Cairo the
delegation split again with the result that the Umma delegates were
recalled back to Sudan and Azhari and the pro-Egypt members remained
there.
Post-War 3tudent Militancy
As militancy grew in the Graduates Congress after the
petition of 191*2 so it was the case with the students body after
191*6. From the Gordon College and its higher schools to the
i
secondary schools militancy became widespread and the occasion
of the departure of the delegation witnessed huge popular as well
2
as student demonstrations in the Sudan. Since thai the involve¬
ment of Sudanese students in politics has not ceased and not a
single year had passed without a strike or a demonstration taking
place in one secondary school or post-secondary institution in the
country. If in the late 1960s European and American students
began to be widely involved in political and social questions because,
Badrl, Vol. 3, pp. l?5-6.
2* G.G. Report, 19h6, p. 129.
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partly, there were so many of them; in the Sudan students became
involved, partly, because there were so few of them in comparison
to the total number of the population. By I9I4.6, with only one
post-secondary College, the Gordon College, which had not yet
started awarding University degrees and with only two Government
secondary schools that could lead to that College, the students
Identified themselves as an intelligentsia which had a sooial arid
political responsibility. The example of the role played by the
Egyptian students in politics at the time was not too far to
emulate.
With more and more students leaving the Sudan to study
in Egyptian Universities either because they were dissatisfied with
the standard of the Gordon College, as was anticipated by the former
Director of Education in 1939, or because they could not secure
places for themselves in the Sudan and were offered chances of
education in Egypt, some of these students coming back home
during their holidays participated in disseminating the ideologies
of the Communist and Moslem Brotherhood organisations, which were
rife amongst the Egyptian students in the late forties and early
fifties, and this dissemination which began at the Gordon College
in Khartoum found its way to the secondary schools. The fact that
Sudanese secondary school pupils were, and still are, between
sixteen to twenty years old, an age oomparable to that of British
undergraduates, made them more susceptible to political involvement.
Ever since that time life in the secondary schools and institutions
of higher education has come to be polarised between normal class
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and school work and ideological involvement and political
participation or affiliation of one sort or another. Phis early
involvement led to the Students* Union of the Gordon College and
later on of the University of Khartoum coming to be a national
political forum for the varying political parties with a general
tendency of opposition to the Government of the day.
Gordon College and Asqulth Report
Thus 19ii-6 witnessed the Inauguration of the post-war
political strife in the Sudan, and on the educational plane it saw
the involvement of the post-war generation of students in politics
and the first steps towards the affiliation of the Higher Schools
of the Gordon College to London University. It was not until the
end of I9l±k that the Gordon Memorial College ceased to be a Government
secondary school and became the home of the post-secondary higher
schools, under the direct and independent control of a council with
a statutory constitution."^ The decision to enter into association
with the University of London for the purpose of entering the best
students of the College for the London external general B.A. and
B.Sc. degrees was taken in December 19ii3» The Sudan Government and
the College authorities were greatly helped at this critical time by
arrangements made for similar African Colleges as a result of the
Asquith Report that year. The year 191+6 was one of planning and
preparation for the implementation of this plan in 19^7.
1. G.G. Report, 19k5» p. 122.
2. fcric Ashby, Universities: British, Indian, African,pp.211-223.
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At the beginning of the yean 19k> there were 207
students in the College distributed among the various schools,
with 106 in the School of Arts, 65 in the School of Science, 17 in
the School of Engineering, 11 in the School of Administration, 5 in
the School of Agriculture and 3 in Khartoum Veterinary School.
During the course of that year, however, the College authorities
reported that there was a drift of students away to Fu * ad I
University, Cairo, owing to the attractions of the very favourable
financial terms offered to Sudanese students there and of the chance
of gaining a degree.
Post-War Educational Programme
19U& seems to have been a year of first occasions in
the post-war period in more than one way: Hantoub and Wadi Seidna
Secondary Schools moved to their new premises; the King Farauk
Secondary School was opened in its own buildings in Khartoum by
the Egyptian Minister of Education, indicating the rivalry at
school level between the British and the Egyptians in the Sudan;
secondary education for girls became a definite part of the Sudan
Government system of education with the acceptance of twelve fourth
year intermediate girls in the recently formed secondary class at
p
the Omdurman Girls Intermediate School. And the first post-war
educational programme was approved to cover the period 19!+5-56.
1. G.G. Report 19ii6, pp. 128-9.
2. Ibid., p. 130. See L.M. Sanderson, A History of Girls Education
in "the Sudan, M.A. Thesis, London, 1963.
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The programme was estimated to Involve a capital expenditure of
more than £E2,500,000 spread over the next ten years, vhlch would
raise the total recurrent expenditure on education from £E450,000
in 19ij.6 to ££1,000,000 in 1956. This programme was revised later
on subsequent to political developments. An outstanding reform
in the programme, which was later on discarded,1 was the Brown
plan, named after its author who was the headmaster of Hantoub
Secondary School till 1955* It aimed at the creaming off of the
intermediate school at the end of the second year to give those
who were intended for academic education six years of secondary
p
education ending in a class comparable to the English Sixth form.
-- This reform was not, however, carried out and the three stages of
four years each continued to characterise the school system in the
Sudan as since its inception early in the century.
The Ahlia schools were more fortunate under the new
programme which was prepared while the leaders of Congress, the
Champions of Ahlia schools, were in Cairo intensifying the
agitation against the Sudan Government and increasing the latter*s
speculations about Egyptian money being poured into the country for
political reasons.^ A report sent from the British District
Commissioner of Wadi Haifa, the closest udanese town to hgypt,
aroused considerable concern in Khartoum over possible Egyptian
subventions to Ahlia schools in the Sudan. The District Commissioner
1- G.G. Report, 191^7, PP- 135-6.
2. G.G. Report, 191^.6, p. 12L\..
3* Badrl, Vol. 3, pp. 71-72.
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reported"*" that he had been shown a letter from the Union of the
Northern Sudan (Education Section). It stated they wished to
open an Ahlia Intermediate School in Haifa for boys. They quoted
the Sudan press as saying that there were 168 applications for
forty places in the Haifa Intermediate School in 1946, which was
true, and stated that Ismail El Azhari, leader of the Sudan
delegation in Cairo whom th^p consulted, advised them that much
money would be required and that they should have the Sudan
Government's permission. They claimed that provision of the
necessary money was easy and relied on people on the spot to obtain
the Sudan Government's pemniasion for the school.
The letter also mentioned that Suleiman Gasim, a
member of the Union which comprised Sudanese of Haifa district
working in Egypt, made himself entirely responsible for school
building. Here was the rub of the matter. Suleiman Gasim was
personal attendant to King Farouk at Abdin Palace in Cairo. The
Commissioner had no doubt that Gasim would adopt the same tactics
in this matter as he had adopted over the Abri Mosque in 1943* by
obtaining an initial subscription and patronage from the King aid
thai collecting the rest of the money from the Pashas. The
Commissioner was asking to be informed h w he should reply to the
application as he had already mentioned, when approached, the
difficulties about staff for the school, though he had no doubt that
reasonably adequate staff could be recruited from retired masters
in the district. The Haifa Education Committee, a local one, were
1. Letter dated May 30th, 194-6. 9/8/65, MEA.
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themselves on the point of starting a drive for an Ahlia Inter¬
mediate School but also required a new building for their sub-
grade school.
The Governor of the Northern Province immediately
sent the report to the Civil Secretary who consulted the intelligence
Department, the Department of Education and then sent his reply.1
He thought that the best way of minimising the undesirable effects
to the Sudan Government of having Egyptian, and particularly palace,
backing behind the proposed Ahlia School at Vadi Haifa would be for
the district commissioner to stimulate as soon as possible the
Haifa Education Committee into definite action, and to allow them
to start the work for an Intermediate School. Should the Union
of the Northern Sudan subsequently apply for permission to open a
school, they could be told that a proposal to start an Ahlia
School had already been given provisional approval, and it could
be suggested that they place whatever funds they might have at the
disposal of the Committee already set up.
The Director of Education was in agreement with the
action and was prepared to approve the establishment of an Ahlia
school at Wadl Haifa. The Sudan Government most definitely did
not want a "King Farouk School" at Wadi Haifa and were determined
to do what they could to prevent one being established there. At
the same time they could not afford politically to refuse Egyptian
money, so the best line of defence was a local committee which,
1. 18th June, 191+6. 9/6/65, MSA.
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they realised, would require prodding and support if it was to
withstand the lure and pressure of Egyptian rivalry.3" Other Ahlia
schools also needed support, which meant substantial subsidies to
existing ones and closer scrutiny of applications for new Ahlia
O
schools if a similar danger was to be averted. The number of
Ahlia Intermediate Sohools by 191+6 was 11+ schools with an enrolment
of 3,767 boya^ as compared to 13 Government Intermediate Schools
with 2,027.^ Congress was priding Itself that it had helped to
found more intermediate schools in a few years than the Sudan
Government had been able to do in almost half a century.
With the increase in number of Ahlia schools, the need
arose for a Union of the Ahlia Schools, or an educational board to
arrange the relationship between the teachers, the schools and the
c
Government. This proposal appeared first in the vernacular press^
and was endorsed by the Education Department, which asked the Ahlia
schools to discuss It. The Government was beginning to think
that "these schools w>uld have started up even had the Education
Day Fund not been in existence."^ Up till 191+5 the Omdurman Ahlia
School, the Ahfad Sohool and the Wad Medani Ahlia Schools, the three
1. Letter dated 22nd June, 191+6. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. Record of Meeting, 12th November, 191+6, p.l. 9/8/65, MEA.
3« G.S. Report, 191+6, p. 125.
1+. Ibid., p. 121+.
3* Al-Rs'i al- 'Am Newspaper 17.12.1+6.
6. 5th Jan. 191+7.
7. Note on the Foundation Financing and Staffing of non-Government
Sohools. 19th March, 191+7. 9/8/65, MEA.
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oldest, received small subventions towards books and materials.
By 191+6 the wad Medani Ahlia was granted £E2,500 by the Governor-
General as a mark of recognition of the committee's good work.
The Government also became committed to assist all
Ahlia schools to the extent of up to 33$ of their staff salary
bills after the first four years of their establishment, with
eligibility for subsidies of up to half their budget or all of their
deficits
With more agitation by the militant nationalists for
the immediate termination of colonial rule and more promises by the
Sudan Government to the moderates of increasing Sudanisation in the
Civil Service at all levels up to 62% by 1962, rapid increase in
the number of Ahlia schools was effected so that by 191+9 their number
rose to 21 intermediate schools, with i+,332 pupils, nine elementary
schools with 1,520 pupils and three secondary schools with 315
pupils.^ Needless to say improved economic conditions in the post¬
war period enabled many parents to send their children to schools
and meet the required fees.
By 1952 the number of Ahlia schools rose to a total of
forty, thirty of which were boys' intermediate, two were girls
intermediate. The latter were the first Ahlia schools opened for
girls at the intermediate level.^ During the period of transition
1' G.G. Report, 1950-51, p. 61. 9/8/65, MEA.
2. S.G. Report of the Committee on the Sudanisation of the Civil
Service, Khartoum, 191+8, p. 19.
3* G.Q. Report, 19U.9, p. 132.
i+. G.G. Report, 1951-52, p. 131.
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to independence which began with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement in 1953» Ahlia schools continued to grow in number and
to provide ooramon ground for people belonging to different
political parties yet serving together on the voluntary work of
founding Ahlia schools in their own areas.
After Independence the Government decided that education
was a national responsibility of the Ministry of Education and the
boards of the Ahlia schools were to be thanked for their efforts and
for taking that responsibility during the period of colonial rule.
The Government decided to take over the Ahlia schools in the North
just before it announced the takeover of the missionary schools in
the South. Very few Ahlia schools resisted the government decision
and were permitted to remain as private schools, depending on their
own revenues by charging economic fees. The Ahfad was one of the
few schools which decided to opt for this. A similar agreement
was reached with the Christian Missionary Scaools in the North.
By July 1957 the decision to take over the Ahlia schools
had been implemented and the school boards handed their responsibil¬
ities to the Ministry of Education. Fifty-one intermediate sohools
and i| secondary streams were thus incorporated into the Government
system. This step was recognised by the Ministry as having made
"a big demand on the time and means of the Ministry.""*"
1. Ministry of Education Annual Report 19>6-57. Section 1A
Introduction.
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Intense Last Ten Years of Condominium
The la3t ten years of the condominium had been most
intense and active on both the political and the educational planes.
After the split in the delegation in Cairo and the recalling of the
independence group, negotiations continued between the Egyptian
and the British governments. In October, 1914-6, the Egyptian Prime
Minister, Isms '11 §idky, went to London in search of a settlement or
a compromise. Tension in the Sudan was higp. When the news came
that Britain would be brought to recognise Egyptian sovereignty over
the Sudan, the Umma Party and its patron Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi
were very disturbed by what came to be known as the §idky-Bevin
Protocol, though the British and the Egyptian sides each had their
own interpretation of the sovereignty envisaged. The Condominium
Government in Khartoum was also unhappy about the protocol which it
resisted in its own way, and the Governor General, Sir Hubert
A.
Hudjleston, had behind him in opposing it the support of every British
Civil Servant in the Sudan. Thus the draft agreement came to
nothing.1
After fruitless attempts at negotiation the successor
of §idky Pasha, NaqrashI Pasha, lodged, on .13 July 191+7» an official
complaint to the Security Council, saying that the continued presence
of British troops in Egypt and British administration in the Sudan
was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations. The
complaint was duly debated by the Security Council in August.
1. Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 91+-95.
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Three delegations from the Sudan were at Lake Success to attend
the debate, representing the Government and the two rival groups.
The Security Council did not reach a solution and the three
delegations returned to the Sudan.
Political Development
The Sudan Government in 191+6 set up a special committee
to work out a new constitution and a more representative body
which might be more acceptable to the educated Sudanese, who in
general regarded the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan, formed
in 19i+3» as a continuation of the policy of Native Administration.
Congress was not represented on it and the educated Sudanese were
mainly ignored,1 except for a very few individuals. It was
composed mainly of traditional religious and tribal chiefs with
2
no real power. The South, too, was not represented as the
Government till that time had not decided that the South should
join with the North. The meetings of the Commission which was to
discuss what should replace the Advisory Council came to be known
as the Sudan Administration Conference. This resulted in the
constitution of the Legislative Assembly which met in 19i+8. The
Legislative Assembly was boycotted by the militant parties which
were pro-Egyptian, but was accepted by the Umma party.
1- Badri, Vol. 3, p. 65.




The militants, hacked by Egypt, regarded the Legislative
Assembly as a British design to prolong their stay in the Sudan,
wnile the Umma, the tribal chiefs, and the Southerners, who decided
to join after the Juba Conference in 1914-7, justified it as a step
towards self-government. The boycott was effective after violent
riots in the towns by the militant political movement, trade unions
and the students. The Assembly chose a Sudanese Speaker, and as
Leader of the House, the Secretary of the Umma Party, Abdalla Ehalll,
who then appointed a Minister of Health, a Minister of Education, and
ten Parliamentary Under-Secretaries all of whom were ex-officio
members of the Assembly. All of these were founders and ex-raerabers
of the Graduates Congress who had ceased to participate in it after
7
it had been completely taken over by their militant rivals in 1945.
The ministers, three under secretaries and the senior British
officials formed what was called the Executive Council.
Anglo-Egyptian N egot1ations
Meanwhile negotiations between Britain and Egypt had
petered out in 1948% been resumed in 1950 and continued in a
desultory fashion. In 1951 a proposal was adumbrated for a Middle
East Defence Pact between Egypt, Turkey, Prance, Britain and the
U.S.A. This could not be discussed as practical politics until
the Sudan question had been solved. On the night of 8 October 1951
Badri, Vol. 3, p. 66.
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the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa El Nahas Paaha, announced
the unilateral abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the Condominium
Agreement declaring Farouk as King of Egypt and the Sudan.*
This was interpreted by the anti-British militant movement as
destroying the juridical basis of the Condominium Government in
the Sudan. Agitation followed in the schools with further
demonstrations and strikes by students and workers.
The Umma, the British and the Militants
Inside the Assembly the Grama party started to urge
the Government to hasten steps towards self-government, to the
extent that in December 1950 they forced a motion through the
Assembly in favour of immediate independence. The motion was
opposed mainly by Southern representatives and tribal chiefs whom
2
the Umraa accused of being lobbied by Senior British officials.
The Umma were confirmed in their suspicions when later on the
Republican Socialist Party came into existence, comprising tribal
notables in the Assembly who summed up their policy as one of full
co-operation with the existing government "Until such a time as the
country is in a position to decide its own future."-5 They were
regarded by the Umma as an attempt by the British to undermine
their rural following. It looked as though the British were
trying to make use of their connections during the period of
1. Henderson , Sudan Republic, p. 100.
2. Duncan, Sudan*3 Path to Independence, p. 137»
3. Henderson, Sudan Republic, p. 100.
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•indirect Rule*,1 and of the Southern Policy, to provide a
balancing force to the Umma and to those of the Khatmiyya who
might be persuaded to join the next parliament, which was supposed
to succeed the Legislative Assembly after its expiry in 1952 as
2
another stage in Self-Government. The militant movement, though
weakened by schisms within itself during this period, was bent on
boycotting the constitution for the proposed parliament as it had
done with the Legislative Assembly.
1952 Coup d'etat in Egypt
The political unrest which was rife in Egypt culminated
on the 23rd July 1952 in a coup d'etat. General Najlb, who emerged
as the head of the new regime, was born in the Sudan and went to
school there with leading politicians. The new regime in Egypt
took a more realistic approach to the question of the Sudan and
formally abandoned Egypt's claim to sovereignty in an attempt to
reach an agreement with the Sudanese political parties over the
evacuation of the British from the Sudan within three years, to be
followed by self-determination either for complete independence or
some form of union with Egypt. The Ashiqqi and the smaller unionist
parties merged and formed the National Unionist Party headed by
Azhari. They then signed the Agreement with the Umraa Party. The
Socialist Republicans signed too. With all the Northern parties
signing the agreement the British Government "had no real choice
1. Holt, A Mod. Hist, p. 161.
2. Duncan, Sudan's Path to Independence, p. 1^0.
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about doing the same.^" It fought hard for the inclusion of safe¬
guards for the South, and incurred northern hostility by so doing,
but had to give way and sign an agreement in its turn in February
1953." Only the communists opposed the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian
Agreement and tried to stage strikes and demonstrations in the
trade unions and the schools but later on they retracted their
opposition.
Agreement and Independence
The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement provided for a Special
Commission (instituted ^pril 1953) to review arrangements for
elections and ensure that they were conducted in a free and neutral
atmosphere. It consisted of two Sudanese, one Egyptian and one
British member under a Chairman from Pakistan. The elections
themselves were supervised by a separate international commission
with an Indian expert, Dr. Sukumar Sen, in the chair. The various
parties settled down to an election campaign and in January 1954 a
new Government took over,with Isma {Il El Azhari as Prime Minister.
In February a Sudanisation Committee started to get rid of the
British officials and in April 1955 its work was completed. By
November the British and Egyptian troops had gone. In December
Parliament resolved unanimously for independence. On the first
of January, 1956, the flags of England and Egypt were lauled down
and the new tricolour hoisted in their place.
1. Henderson, Sudan Republio, p. 103.
2824.
Impact of Tense Ten Years before Independence
These political developments had their impact on
the ten-year educational plan which had been prepared to cover the
Northern Sudan set up a special committee to study the plan. The
committee's report, which was published in April 1924-7, recommended
the postponement of the scheme for the re-organisation of secondary
education, the Brown plan, and also called for a more rapid rate
of expansion at all levels than had previously been envisaged.
Discussions on these points were held between the Department and
the Committee in November that year, and a modified plan was
formulated which was described by the Government as "modified to
2
meet the Committee's wishes so far as was possible."
1. Outline of Original Education Plan 1914-6-1956,
Type of Schools Position in Target in 1956
period 19145-1956. During 1924.6 the Advisory Council for the
19246 Number of schools
BOX'S SCHOOLS
Sub-grade schools 192























2. G.G. Report, 192,-7> PP- 135-6.
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Bakht er Kuda and Intermediate Education
When the Conatituent Assembly came into being the
first Sudanese Minister of Education was Abdel Rahman Ali Taha, who
had been for the previous twelve years Vice-principal of Bakht er
Rude."1" Bakht er Ruda came to play another role in the plan by
opening, in August 19U-9, the two-year Intermediate Teachers Training
Course for former secondary school boys, to meet the needs of
intermediate schools for trained teachers. Formerly intermediate
schools used to recruit Gordon College diplomates, who by this time
with opportunities of Sudanisation in administrative jobs had become
more attracted by other departments. The course was designed to
turn out I4.5 teachers yearly to meet the requirements. At the same
time it was feared that the absorption of this number of young and
inexperienced teachers into the cadre would naturally raise problems
in the schools, and arrangements were made at the end of 1914-9 for
2
more regular inspection of intermediate schools. This put Bakht
er Ruda in full charge of intermediate education, inspection, books
and training, besides its long established respons ibility for
elementary education and with the South coming into the picture
•3
further revisions in the plan were made by the linister-^ so that
the responsibilities of Bakht er Ruda came to be countrywide for
the eventual unification of the two systems which had nitherto
existed in the North and the South.
1. Griffiths, p. v.
2. G.G. Report, 19ij-9, p. 131.
3- G.G. Report, 1950-51. p. 78.
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Technical Mucatlon
A major contribution of the 1%.6 plan and Its
subsequent revisions was in the field of technical education, the
development of which was overdue and was made all the more necessary
by post-war economic development. When the Brown Plan was
discarded in 19i|.8 the technical educational requirements were
assessed and plans were framed for the development of this branch
of education. It was proposed to set up pre-apprent iceship
schools at El Obeid, Wad Medani, Omdurraan and Port Sudan. The
object of these sohools was to recruit boys direct from the
elementary schools and to provide facilities for their further
education in general and technical subjects. The course was
originally planned to be of three years* duration to give a background
to those who were required as artisans in industrial occupations.
Concurrently with the setting up of these schools, a
Technical Institute was decided on, to be established in the
Khartoum area. This was the origin of what came to be known as
the Khartoum Technical Institute (K.T.I. ). A senior technical
school was designed, to be accommodated within the Institute, with
the object of continuing the education of selected boys from the
pre-apprentIceship schools for a further three years course. The
curriculum for this section was meant to give to the boys the
knowledge demanded of those who aimed to qualify for higher technical
posts in Industry. It was decided that facilities should be
provided in the Technical Institute to enable workers to attend
1. G.G. Report, 191+8, p. lij.9.
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continuation classes, and also accommodation for departments of
commerce, industrial art, and adult education.
Technical education remained a second best to academic
education. It was also influenced by the latter and soon the
three year courses became four year courses, like the intermediate
and the general secondary in duration. With shortage of artisans
and technically qualified people, boys began to find their way from
general intermediate or secondary schools to the upper stages of
the Khartoum Technical Institute. The Institute itself began to
increase the number of years of its course in its post secondary
section from two to three and then to four years. l\foen it reached
the latter stage its graduates began to ask for equal status witn
that of university graduates. This led to friction over salai*y
scales and status between two types of engineers in the country,
those with university degrees local or foreign, and those with
K.T.I, diplomas.
By the end of 1963 the K.T.I, stood at the apex of the
pyramid of technical education with two branches of a secondary
school, twenty-five intermediate technical schools, ten trade
schools for the training of skilled foremen and one senior trade
school in Khartoum to produce skilled supervisors of works.'*'
The K.T.I, was one of the beneficiaries of the technical
aid particularly American given to the country after Independence,
and many of its graduates found their way to American Universities
1. Seminar on Higher Education In a Rural Society, Khartoum,
1963, p. 6.
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and Colleges and returned to teach in the Institute. By 196k
the Institute graduates were recognised by the Government, which
was engaged on big constructional programmes, as equal as regards
pay to those who completed four years of University studies, to
the great resentment of the University engineering students and
graduates, who interpreted this as an attempt by the military
government, then in power, to win over the Institute against the
opposition to military rule which was rife among the students and
was centred around and led by the students of the University of
Khartoum. Later that year, with the overthrow of the military
government after popular uprisings in the country, the Prime
Minister of the civil caretaker government was the Principal
of the K.T.I, and deputy under-secretary of the Ministry of
Education. In 1965 the Institute staff and students campaigned
vigorously and after a series of strikes and resignations managed
to gain recognition as an autonomous body independent of the
Ministry of Education and governed by a council similar to that
of the University of Khartoum.
The Ten Year Plan1 for economic and social development
covering the years 1961/62 - 1970/71 put more emphasis on technical
education than had been the case before. The plan stipulated
that industrial output should be increased by no less than 500%,
from £36 million to £S36 million. It was realised in the plan
that this development would result in increases in the demand for
1. S.G. The Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 1961/62 -
1970/71i Khartoum, 1962.
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technical skills of all types and at all levels.1 Over the total
period of the plan it was estimated that the expected output for
technical Jobs was only 3*350 persona against the stated require¬
ments of the plan of 9*000. One of the implications of this was
that the national educational institutions, especially the
technical ones, needed to be expanded and supplemented as fast
as possible in order that they might eventually be able to meet
2
the requirements of economic development. A Unesco mission that
was called upon to investigate the situation in January and February
1963^ found that for the purposes of the plan the number of
intermediate technical schools was very small by comparison with
academic schools and the number of the students in the former was
less than one twentieth of those in the latter. The disparity
was less, though still great, at the secondary stage where the
encolmenfe in secondary technical schools was only 11$ of that
in secondary academic schools
The Unesoo mission noted that the school system in the
Sudan appeared to be based on the principle that all pupils of the
age of 11-15 years were capable of pursuing academic education.
This meant to the mission that there was "an actual insistent
demand for a particular type of education rather than one based
1. Ibid., p. 55.
2. Unesco Educational Investment Programming Mission, Khartoum,




on educational theories or principles or indeed, on the real needs
of the economy."1 There was consequently a neglect of preparation
for future trade practice, specially in the field of skilled and
semi-skilled artisans and craftsmen." It seemed that the mission
did not realise that it was partly the needs for white collar
officials in the lower echelons of the civil service, and later on
at the higher ones, that popularised the system they were
criticizing. The mission however realised that the problem was
partly due to the fact that only one third of the boys leaving the
elementary schools found places in the intermediate schools,
government or private, and the other two thirds had to find
employment as unskilled workers. Those leaving intermediate
schools (of whom 96% would have been in academic schools) could
also be classified as completely unskilled despite a higher level
of general education. These were to a great extent the causes
of the great shortage of skilled and competent workers in the Sudan,
and the contribution of the intermediate schools to solving the
problems in the plan of lack of manpower was very small. If it
was to be increased more emphasis would need to be placed upon
technical education. The total amount for technical education
in the ten year development plan was £34*130,000 out of the total




2. Ibid. , p.153
291
The Crosby report dated April 1960^ on manpower
indicated that 9of the skilled tradesmen in the Sudan at the
outset of the plan were expatriates and when new projects
required more expert workmen, they were usually recruited from
abroad. The Sudanese Government, hoping to replace this large
number of expatriates, embarked on an intensive programme of
technical and vocational training and apprenticeship. By I96I4./65
the Khartoum technical institute was providing training in
engineering, art, commercial subjects, and building construction.
Some other post-secondary courses were also offered but not at a
level that would enable students to qualify for the higher
certificate. Ehtry requirements specified a secondary academic
or technical school certificate. Though the K.T.I, operated its
own secondary school from which it drew students, generally only
30% of K.T.I, entrants had had technical training prior to
enrolment.
There were about 500 students enrolled for 1961+-65 at
the Instituted higher level. The Institute expected to graduate
120 engineering students in 196i4./65«^ This was more than the
total number of 83 engineers who graduated from the University of
Khartoum in the period 1956/1962^" and while the Institute was
scheduled to maintain that number of graduates annually till the
1. Education and World Affairs, p. 3 •
2. Education and World Affairs, pp.15-16.
3. Ibid., p. 16.
L).. An-Hadhlr Dafa ' Allah, at-Ta *llm aj-Jami'I fi-s-Sudan, p. 9.
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end of the period of the plan there were 207 students in all
the four years of the Faculty of Engineering and Architecture in
the year 196l4./65.^
From University College to University of Khartoum
However, the arrangements with London University which
were made in 191*6 for the Gordon College were further developed in
1951 when the Kitchener School of Medicine Joined with the Gordon
College in one body to form the University College of Khartoum
which continued to grant its local diplomas as well as to prepare
2
the better students for the external degrees of London University.
As the College since its foundation was closely related to the
needs of the Government service, the Sudanisatlon of posts, which
took place in a hurricane manner in the transitional period after
the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, had greatly enhanced the
position of the College and its graduates. ¥hen independence was
declared on the first of January 1956 the Civil Service was a fully
Sudanese service - senior and junior posts in every branch of the
service came to be held by Sudanese. According to the recommen¬
dations of the 191*8 Sudanisation Committee 62*2$ of Division I
and II posts were to be Sudanlsed by 1962.-^ Things did move fast,
much faster than could be contemplated before.
1. University of Khartouqj, "Number of Students 1955-1966".
2* Daffa.' Allah,p.4,op.oit.
3. Mohammad Abd el Halim Mahgoub, "The Sudan Civil Service" given
in a seminar arranged by the University of Khartoum and the
Conference for Cultural Freedom, Khartoum, 1962, p. 6.
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Since development became the main aim of the governments
after independence the Civil Service became the main instrument
for development and the College was its main source of professional
supply; other sources came to be scholarships abroad,"'' sponsored
by Government or semi-governmental departments or by other
governments or international organisations. The total of
P
scholarships abroad was estimated as 14-59 in the year 1962/63 • Still
the local supply was the main source. The University College of
Khartoum became the University of Khartoum in July 1956 and thus
became the first of the African Colleges affiliated to London
University, after the Asquith report, to reach the status of an
independent university,-^ granting its own degrees. But the
University of Khartoum remained in close contact with the British
Universities in the fields of external examiners, recruitment of
staff, and scholarships for its future staff.^ Besides trying to
supply for the needs of the country from its eight faculties,^
the University of Khartoum*s other concerns were the maintenance
of a high academic standard and the training of its future Sudanese
scholars^ abroad, mainly in Britain and in the United States.
1. A1 a-th-Thilith 11 Wad* at-ta'llm fi-s-Sudan, 19614-65*
2. Ibid.
3. Dafa.9 Allah,-p. 5 •
I4. Eric Ashby, Universities: British, Indian, African, p. 214.9.
5* The Faculty of Pharmacy, the ninth faculty was opened in I96I4.
6. Dafa ' Allah, p. 9.
291+
Higher Education
The growth of the Egyptian type of education in the post¬
war period culminated in the establishment of the Khartoum Branch
of the Cairo University in October 1955* This provided a further
opportunity for higher education in the country and, as its
classes were conducted in the evenings, it also provided chances
for government employees who possessed the necessary qualifications
to get further qualifications in its faculties of Arts, Law and
Commerce. The opportunities provided created further problems in
higher education a few years later when the graduates of the
humanities, particularly in law, from both universities began to
compete for certain government jobs such as the Judiciary. With
the graduates of the Egyptian universities accusing the Government
of preferring Khartoum University graduates, an old complaint
since the colonial days, some departments, the Judiciary, the
Attorney General and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced
their own selection examinations instead of the usual practice
of interviewing the applicants. This problem was to be further
complicated with the return of the great but unrecorded numbers
of secondary school leavers who found their own way for various
courses of higher and university education abroad, particularly
In East European countries.
The development and expansion of higher education is a
remarkable feature of the post-independence period. The Ma'had
al-'Ilmi which started as a parallel Islamic School to the
295
Gordon College, developed alao into the Islamic University of
Omdurman in 1965 thus bringing a third University to the country,
besides the Higher Teachers Training Institute, which was
established in 1961^ for the training of future secondary school
teachers in a four year course which would lead to a diploma.
The latter was resented by the students as their entrance
qualifications were similar to those of the University of Khartoum
and consequently they wanted a recognised university degree and
not a diploma. Both students and staff c&me to be desirous of
an affiliation with the University of Khartoum and of autonomy
from the Ministry of Education. Other Ministries created their
own post-secondary training courses, such as the two year
Agricultural Institute at Shambat in Khartoum North, which was
started by the Ministry of Agriculture and began to face similar
problems of discontent with existing status and demands for a
more recognised qualification. The creation of a National Council
for Higher Education or even a Ministry of Higher Education could
be the most satisfactory way of meeting the problems of assessment
of standards, distribution of students and the co-ordination with
the needs and requirements of the Gountry in a more planned way.
Since about one half of secondary school leavers get post-secondary
2
training in one form or another, with expansion in secondary
education the need for co-ordination becomes imperative instead
of the present unco-ordinated set up.
1. Al-'Ard a-th-Thalith, p. 23.
2. Ibid., p. I4J4..
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The proposition for co-ordination does not mean that
the needs of the country were exceeded or even met by the
development of these institutions. The Ten Year Plan for
development, which was described by its critics as conservative
and unambitious and by its protagonists as realistic, calculated
that the total output of the University of Khartoum over the
ten year period ending in 1970-71 would be i+,1+00, and if it was
assumed that approximately 150 students would return annually from
overseas study, high-level personnel among these would total 1,500
by 1970-71• Consequently, the total number of Sudanese
University graduates over the plan period would be about 5*900 -
only about 1+5 per cent of the additional needs. If the
approximately 1,000 persons to be upgraded over the plan period
through training at the University of Cairo's Khartoum branch,
and the 2,51+5 graduates anticipated by the plan itself from the
Khartoum Technical Institute and similar Institutions are included
in the output estimate, the need for additional trained manpower
will be reduced to 3,300 and almost 71+ per cent of the additional
personnel required will have been supplied."*"
These figures, however great the efforts made in their
projection, should be taken as guidelines and not as very
2
reliable as the plan itself indicated. Co-ordination might lead
to better results and at less cost. Though the supply of high-
1. Education and World Affairs, p. 31.
2. The Ten-Year Plan, p. 25.
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level man-power was expected to be better (714$) than that of
middle-level man-power, only 12$) the coat of training per head
would also be much higher at the higher level. The student in
the University of Khartoum was estimated in 1962/63 to cost
£S727 per annum, both in direct and indirect expenses, while the
expenses for a secondary school pupil would be half that amount.
International Qommlaalon on Secondary Education 1955»
Unlike higher education, secondary schools and the lower
stages of education had been under the supervision of the Ministry
of Education. Concern over secondary education and its problems
grew with its deteriorating results in the years just before
independence for which various explanations were offered but the
most common in the headmasters reports was the frequent
interruptions to school work through student strikes over political
issues in the country.1 However, in November 195*4-# about a year
before independence, the Governor General of the Sudan invited an
international commission of British, Egyptian and Indian
educationalists with a Sudanese as a Secretary, to investigate
and advise the Sudan Government on the improvement and development
2
of secondary education. The Commission met from January the 15th
to 28th February 1955. When the report was published in 1957
the Sudan had already become independent.
!• G.G. Report 1914-6, pp. 11*1, 11*2} G.G. Report 191*9, pp. 131,14-00}
G.G. Report 1951-52, pp. 93# 98.
2. S.G., Report of the Internetional Commission on Secondary
Education, Khartoum, 1957. P« 1«
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The terms of reference of the Commission -were:
"To enquire into and make recommendations to improve secondary
education in the Sudan with particular reference to;
(a) The low standard of secondary schools and the
problem of producing adequate numbers of young men with the pre¬
requisite qualifications to alter the University College of
Khartoum.
(b) Inter-relationship of different types of secondary
schools.
(c) The content and method of selection at the lower
stages and how they affected this standard.1
In interpreting these terms the Commission had taken
into consideration the fact that no stage of education could be
treated In Isolation and that all stages were Inter-related and
inter-dependent. They regarded, rightly, that the standard of
secondary education, for instance, was bound to be affected not
only by the standard of elementary and intermediate schools from
which their pupils were drawn, but also by the standard of the
college from which their teachers were recruited. The function
of secondary education in the Sudan, in relation to the future
development and needs of the country, was seen by the Commission
as much wider and more far reaching than "producing adequate
numbers of young men with pre-requiaite qualifications to enter
the University College". They recognised, however, that this
1. Ibid., p. 1
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was an Important function of secondary schools, and that, In
the special circumstances obtaining in the country at the time,
due partly to the policy of "Sudanisation" of services, this
function had acquired special urgency. But basically* the
Commission thought, secondary education, like education at other
stages, should be an end in itself. It should provide an
intellectual and social training for the child of secondary school
age suitable to his abilities and interests at that age, and it
should aim at making this of the highest possible quality.
The Commission did not forget that many secondary pupils
would have particular aims in mind, such as the University, or
Training College. But the secondary schools should not be led by
this consideration to concentrate too much on the mere aim of
preparing for University or College. In principle, if they saw
to it that they gave their pupils a true and well balanced
education the rest would follow automatically.*
It seemed to the Commission that the secondary schools
were not able to live up to this high ideal. In actual practice,
almost every student went to the secondary school with the fixed
aim of passing the final examination in order to be able to Join
the College, and the whole work of the schools was dominated by
the pressure and the demands of the examinations. As some of the
witnesses who were working in secondary schools had put it, the




At the time, in 1955» ovei* the whole Sudan there were nine
government secondary schools including one in the South, one girls*
secondary and one secondary technical, with a total enrolment of
2,311. There were also 9 non-government secondary schools, Ahlia,
Egyptian and Missionary with a total enrolment of 2,279 pupils.
It is interesting to note that by 1964/65 the number of the
Government boys* secondary schools streams had risen to 277 arid
the enrolment to a total of 10,490 and the Government girls*
secondary schools rose to 62 streams with a total enrolment of
2,360 girls. All of these,apart from one technical, were
academic secondary schools, an indication of the prevalence of
academic education despite the recommendations of the 1955
Commission for diversification of the curricula to include a
variety of technical subjects, resulting in a form of a
comprehensive school.
In their assessment of the secondary schools the Commission
found that the causes of the drop in examination successes were
"insufficient talent caning up through the Ahlia schools where
the drop was most marked; political unrest; insufficient
2
stability of staff. Sudanisation of jobs had been depriving
secondary schools and the Ministry of Education of many of the
best teachers who had either been promoted or taken up administra¬
tive jobs in the Ministry or left their teaching jobs for better
1. A1 'Ard a-th-Thalith, p. 2oo.
■ ... ■■ .i JL■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 11 1 — 1 ■ ■
2. Report of International Commission on Secondary Education, 1955.
pp. 8-11.
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opportunities in other government departments or left the country
as many expatriates had been doing during that period.
A major cause of the drop, the Commission found, was
the English language, important both as a medium of instruction
in the secondary schools, and as a compulsory subject, failure
in which would, up to that time, entail failure to obtain a school
certificate.1 A steady increase was noted in the percentage of
failures in English from 38$ in 194& to 50$ in 1953* It was also
found that "it cannot be denied that a considerable number of
candidates who failed this year (1953) might have passed, but for
their failure in English." The country was in the mood far this.
With the British departure, English was going down in both
standard and standing and a change was effected in the following
year. Although English language would remain a compulsory
subject, failure in it would not automatically entail failure to
secure a certificate. A pass in Arabic would compensate for that.
Closely linked with this recommendation of the Commission
was another major one concerning the use of Arabic to replace
Ekiglish as a medium of instruction for all subjects in the
secondary schools. The Commission argued strongly in favour of
this, stating that it was the normal practice all over the world
that people should be taught in their own language and whenever
there was a deviation from that general norm, there should be
some very strong justification for it and care should be taken
1. Ibid., pp.1+,5.
to see that the deviation did not continue for more than the
minimum necessary period of time."1* The Commission summarised
the main reasons why English had been used as the medium of
instruction in secondary schools as:-
(a) English was the official language of the Sudan Government
after the Anglo-Egyptian Conquest.
(b) Most secondary school teachers, especially during reeent
decades, had been English,
(c) Education generally and secondary education in particular was
conceived at the outset as a means of preparing minor employees
in Government offices, and, later, as a gateway to the University
College.
Subsequently, the Commission found that close relations
had been established between secondary and higher education and
institutions like the Cambridge Overseas Syndicate and London
University, with the result that the Sudan education system came
to be tied up to the English system. The effect of this was that
secondary school curricula and standards also became linked up
with the Cambridge Overseas Certificate requirements. This resulted
in the first place in an increasing dependence on English teachers
and the consequent postponement of the task of preparing Sudanese
secondary school teachers, and in the second place, in the need
for developing a national system of education not being recognised
till recently and no effort was made to prepare Arabic text books.
1. Ibid. , p. 1*8.
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Again, the Southern Sudan had been treated as a separate
territory, where education was left entirely to foreign missionary
societies, in whose missionary schools the medium of instruction
had been invariably English.
All these factors, in the opinion of the Commission,
created a tendency to consider English as the natural medium of
instruction and it almost came to be assumed that Arabic was not
a suitable medium of instruction at the secondary level, since it
lacked the necessary technical terms in scienoe and suitable text
books could not be produced in Arabio for secondary schools. It
had also been claimed that Arabic books for reference and general
reading were too few to form an adequate library for general
reading in secondary schools.
The answers of the Commission were: that it was clear
the argument based upon English being the offioial language was
becoming hardly applicable, for the official language in future
would in all probability be Arabic. The experience of other
countries, whose official language was Arabic, showed that there
was no justification for the assumption that the Arabic language
lacked technical terms or text books. Teaching was done in
Arabic in most of the Arab countries, at all levels below the
University, and even at University level in many faculties. It
was true that books of reference and general reading were fewer in
Arabio than in English or many other European languages, but it
could be said that even a limited library in the national language
was far more useful than a much developed library in a foreign tongue.
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The circulating library at Bakht er Ruda Institute had shown that
the greatest demand on the part even of elementary and intermediate
teachers was for Arabic books.
The Commission thought that the strongest argument for
teaching in English in secondary schools seemed to be that
University education was given in English. But this same argument
was used in other countries about half a century before and had
since proved untenable. Even if they accepted the assumption
that secondary education was merely a preparation for University
education, they still thought teaching in a foreign language would
always defeat its own purpose. One of their witnesses, reporting
on technical education,1 expressed the view that the pupils were
often learning only English language when they were being taught
science and technology in English/ A secondary school master made
a plea for teaching in Arabic because the minds of the pupils did
not benefit by their studies through English. The same view had
been expressed by many other witnesses who gave their evidence
before the Commission, and by many others who expressed their views
in newspapers. The Teachers' Association was also of the opinion
that teaching in a foreign language in secondary schools presented
a serious obstacle in the way of effectiveeducation and instruction.
As examination papers were set and answers were required
in Eiiglish, this doubled the difficulty and tended to make
instruction largely a matter of word learning. There was not
enough concentration by the pupils upon the subject matter, and
1. Ibid., p. 49.
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their main concern was to learn their notes, so as to be able to
pass in the examination. It could be said that even some of the
brilliant boys were hampered by the language difficulty both at
secondary and university levels. There was also a great deal of
exaggeration in the argument that it was necessary to teach in
English in secondary schools as University studies were carried
on in English. Secondary school leavers, the Commission thought,
should be able to follow lectures in English at the University,
and read English reference books after they had been taught English
with reasonable efficiency as a foreign language for eight years.
They would also attain a higher standard of knowledge in the
various subjects because the language difficulty would have been
removed. With a better grasp of the subject matter, they would
be more capable of understanding advanced matter. A high
standard in the English language could never compensate for short¬
comings in knowledge and it would not help a student who had a
poor grasp of the subject matter.
The Commission also noted that it had also been asserted
that teaching in English in secondary schools would greatly
facilitate learning at the University, because the students would
be familiar with English "technical terms" in the various subjects.
This argument, they submitted, forgot that studies in secondary
schools covered only a small proportion of the terms necessary for
university studies. It seemed to them that the limited number of
technical terms could easily be picked up in the course of university
studies, when the students had a clearer understanding of the facts
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themselves. English terms could, if necessary, be put beside
the Arabic terms In Arabic text books, so that the students could
be familiar with both. Mien the medium of instruction became
Arabic, the Commission expected that the four years of secondary
education would allow secondary school pupils to attain a much
higher standard of knowledge in the various subjects. In this
case, they should be able to attain a standard in science for
example, equal to that of the English Sixth Form, and thus would
give a much better account of themselves in the University.
Moreover teaching in Arabic in secondary schools would
ultimately solve the problem of the final secondary examination,
which at the time hindered even some of the brilliant pupils from
reaching the standard of University admission, because they could
not adequately express themselves In English in the examination.
But it should be clear, the Commission added, that teaching in
Arabic In secondary schools should not lead to neglecting the
English language. Far from this, every possible effort, they
recommended, should be made to raise its standard as a foreign
language. The principal aims in teaching a foreign language, they
said, were comprehension and expression and these could be attained
without English being the medium of instruction, and without
sacrificing the principal aim of education, which was the all-round
development of the individual himself.1
The change in the medium of instruction from iihglish to
1. Ibid., p. 50.
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Arabic, the Commission noted, would depend on the availability
of staff, for which they recommended the establishment of a
School of Education in the University.^ For this reason the change
could not be introduced abruptly, and possibly not even
simultaneously. They thought it might possibly be necessary to
introduce the Arabic medium at different dates for different
subjects, depending on the strength of the qualified staff available,
( c
(both Sudanese and expatriate Arab'-speaking). The matter of text
books was secondary to that of teachers who, if well trained,
qualified and competent, would be able to teach their subject in
Arabic, and many of them might be willing to enter into a healthy
competition to produce suitable text books from which a choice could
be made by the Ministry. The Commission hoped that the Ministry
of Education would prepare a suitable scheme for facilitating and
expediting the preparation of qualified secondary school teachers
and suitable text books, and thus would be able to bring about the
change of the medium of instruction as quickly as it was
administratively possible. They stressed that "there should be no
2
avoidable delay in this matter.""
As a response to the International Commission's recomm¬
endations, the Minister of Education appointed in 1957 two
1. Ibid., p. IJ4.6. The Council of the University of Khartoum decided
in 1956 to set up an Institute of Education, in 1961 the Ministry
of Education started its own Higher Teachers Training Institute,
in 1963 The University of Khartoum started the Department of
Education. Discussions have been recently conducted to
affiliate the Institute to the University.
2. The Report of International Commission on Secondary Education,
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committees to study and advise on:
a) The creation of a Secondary Teachers Training College,
b) The use of Arabic as a medium of instruction in secondary schools.
Both these Committees finished their work and submitted their re¬
commendations early in 1958.1 Pressure was building up in the press,
with more discussion on the purpose Arabiciaation would serve In
the integration of the Ma *had 'ilmia, Islamic schools, into the
general system, thus ending the dualities in the system not only of
2
Northern and Southern but also of an Islamic and a general system.
The military coup which brought an end to democratic
government in slightly less than two years after Independence, on
the 17th of November, 1958, did not change the position as far as
educational policy was concerned. The Minister of Education
Ziada Arbab kept his portfolio in the new government and continued
to be Minister of Education till November, 1962. There were more
frequent changes in the senior Civil Service jobs in the Ministry
during this period. However, 'Secondary education was not the
only concern of the ministry which felt that other stages of
education needed some reorganisation'.-^
0
The Ominous Prophesy After Independence
By this time the Ministry must have known the ominous
prophecies of Mr. Krotki the man who conducted the First Population
Census in the Sudan on the eve of Independence 1955/56. Krotki
wrote in 1958 " ... to ensure that all children of school going
ages have a place in school, the school capacity should be
1. Abdel Hamid Kadhim, Kadhlm Report, Khartoum, I960, p. 3.
2. 'arcal wa- 'amal, Khartoum, undated but probably 1962, pp.103-113.
3. S.G. Ministry of Education, A New Plan for Education in The
Sudan, Khartoum, 1962, p. 2.
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increased 15 times. The net 1955/56 budget expenditure of the
Ministry of Education added up to £S3*5 million. To cater for
a complete school system it would have to be increased by some¬
thing like £Si|.9 million. And this expenditure would have to be
repeated annually. Thus the budget of the Ministry of Education
alone would have to be equal to 1# times the present budget of
the whole Government of the Republic of the Sudan. To undertake
a programme of education for all would require the building of
schools. If the present value of school installation is taken as
£322 million (Education, 1956), to provide space for 15 times more
pupils, presumably buildings and installations to the extent of
over £3300 million would have to be built. This is equal to 2l±
times the assumed annual net capital investment in the Sudan, on
which - as we shall see later - the continued progress of this
country depends. It is not possible, yet, to say with any
accuracy what the annual output of the building industry is, but
if it is taken, only as an indication of the ordrr of magnitude,
somewhat around £S3 million it would take the whole building
industry of the whole country 100 years to build these schools.
The raw materials required for those schools would seriously tax
the source of supply, J4.0 years of the output of the Atbara Cement
Factory (Commerce, 1958) would be required to provide the 2*5
million tons of cement for all these schools, or alternatively
Port Sudan would have to import for seven years (Farquharson,
1957) nothing else but cement in order to build the schools
required. All this assumes £31,000 worth building needs 7*5 tons
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of cement. This admittedly very rough exercise assumed a static
population. If it grows the task will be correspondingly
greater."■*" In a way all efforts at expansion after Independence
particularly at the first stage of the ladder are consciously or
unconsciously made to forestall this ominous prophesy, by low
cost school buildings, or by spending more on education or by
attempts at reorganization by subsequent reports.
Akrawi and Kadhim Reports
On the twenty-second of November, 19j>0» the Minister of
Education appointed a Committee of eleven educationalists from
2
the Sudan, comprising the Viee-Chancellor of Knartoum University
who was the former Director of Education, the Director of
Education and nine other senior educational officers^ under the
chairmanship of a Unesco expert, Dr. Matta Akrawi, who had
arrived in Sudan for this purpose a week before the coup.^ Akrawi
had been told by the Minister in Paris that his mission was to
include not only the five-year plan of expansion but also the re-
c
organisation of the whole educational system.
Akrawi's first task, since he was an Iraqi, was to get
acquainted with the educational situation in the Sudan, to know
1. J.P. ivrotki, "Demographical Survey of the Sudan", Published in
The Population of Sudan, Report of the Sixth Annual Conference
of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan, held in the University
of "Khartoum, 10th and 17th January 195$.' Khartoum, 1950* P* 31*
2. Akrawi Report, Khartoum, 1959, p. 2.
3. Mat'ca Akrawi, Interim Report, 29.1.1959, p.2.
h* ' P* •
5. Ibid., p. 2.
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something about its recent development and about the problems it
was facing. Pour methods of collecting information seemed open
to him and he decided to use the four of them (1) studying the
published and unpublished documentation, including the documen¬
tation supplied to him by the Education Clearing House,
(2) collecting statistical and other data by issuing special forms
for the purpose, (3) interviewing important persons working in the
field of education or having views about Sudanese education,
(if) touring the country, visiting schools, seeing town, village
and tribal life and discussing educational problems with as many
competent people as possible.
After a meeting with M. Maes, the Unesco expert in
educational statistics in Sudan, who was there at the time to help
in training and establishing an office in the Ministry, Akrawi
realised that till that time precise statistical information about
schools for his purpose was hard to compile. The total number of
elementary, intermediate and secondary schools was known precisely,
the number of sub-grade schools (the incomplete three-year
elementary schools run by local councils) seemed to be approximate.
Figures of enrolment were for the most part approximate and there
was no distribution of enrolment by grades or ages. Maes had
issued in raid-October a simple form for gathering precise enrol¬
ment figures to be filled on the 15th of November. That form was
designed to give attendance for the past two years broken down
according to grades. Akrawi's work required, he expected, much
more complicated information than annual school attendance, which
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had been available since the early days of the Condominium.
He asked for certain information which would give a complete
picture of the school, enrolment statistics by grades since 1953*
the qualifications and experience of the teaching staff, the
existence or absence of other staff in the school, failure or
promotion in the last two years, school buildings, the library,
school hygiene, feeding and aid to students.
The Educational Planning Committee was established by a
memorandum of the Minister of Education which stated, "Since
education in every nation must be closely related to the culture
of the country and to its national, sooial, economic and health
needs, it has become necessaiy, after the rise of the national
government and the enjoyment of independent life by the Sudanese
people, to review the existing system of eduoation for the purpose
of establishing a system which will ensure national unity and the
bringing up of a generation of citizens which would know its
rights and duties and would be ready for practical life, for
production and for the development of the wealth and economic
resources of the country." The Minister continued that such
a system must necessarily be in two stages, a first stage attended
by all children of the country, most of whom would go forthwith to
life after having received a sufficient theoretical and practical
education; and a second stage attended by the selected and more
gifted of those children who would finish the first stage in order
1. Akrawl Report, p. 1.
313
to continue their education and prepare themselves for the
assumption of the great responsibilities and requirements of the
various aspects of Sudanese life.
The terms of reference of the Committee were specified in
1
the report of the Committee as: "First, to study the aims of
education in the Sudan and the direction in which it is advisable
to orient it.
"Second, to study the present educational organisation in
its three stages and the extent to which it meets or does not meet
the needs of the country, particularly whether the length of the
first stage is sufficient to educate a good citizen ready for life;
and to recommend the needed modification to the present system or
lay down a new organisation based on new foundations;
"Third, to recommend a plan for the next five years which
would ensure the orderly transition from the old to the new
organisation without disturbing the running of the schools, and
which would ensure the necessary expansion of education to all the
children of the people within a reasonable period of time and
2
within the limits of the possibilities of the country." It is
interesting to note that Akrawi, in his interim report to Unesco
after his first six weeks in Sudan, described these terms of
reference as having been agreed upon between the Minister,the





Introducing later a few minor modifications to the draft. Later,
in 1962, the Minister when giving account to the President of the
Supreme Council of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Prime Minister
of what he had asked the Akrawi Committee to do, added to
"proposing a new plan for education in the Sudan compatible with
our independence," the phrase "and the aims of the revolutionary
2 *3
government" which was neither in Akrawi's Interim report-^ or in
his Committee*s report.^ The Minister in his later acoaint also
c
left out reference to the five year plan as this came to be
modified during that period to a seven year plan and then to a ten
6
year plan of economic and social development; and instead of
stating the three terms of reference he gave a broad summary of
7
them as two.
Akrawi in his interim report to Unesco was very happy
about the formation of the committee as he thought it would ensure
that any recommendations, ideas and plans he would propose would
be thoroughly discussed by what really was a competent committee
whose members had the experience of Sudanese education and who
should know what was and what was not feasible. Instead of an
1. Akrawi*s Interim Report, p. 3.
2. A Mew Plan for Education, Introduction Pa.
3. Akrawi Interim Report, p. 3*
4* Akrawi Report, p. 1.
5. A New Plan, Pb.
6. The Ten Year Plan 1961/62 - 1970/71, pp.1-9.
7. A New Plan, Pb.
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extraneous plan thrown 3n by an outsider, this arrangement, he
thought, ensured that the plan would be really Sudanese. More¬
over, he optimistically reported that since the Committee was
made up of senior education officials the chances of the execution
of the plans were immeasurably increased.^" This later proved to
be over-optimistic. The fact that the committee was made up
almost exclusively of senior serving educational officials of the
Minister under a military government could have been regarded as
a point of weakness as well.
The first session of the Committee was inaugurated by the
Minister of Education on Wednesday, the 10th of December, 1958# at
six p.m. In his speech, which was delivered in Arabic, the
Minister, besides restating the terms of reference of the Committee
raised three issues. The first was the changing of the existing
ip-I4.-I4. plan of the educational ladder into a 6-6 plan, thus
increasing the period of the elementary school to six years,
eliminating the intermediate school and substituting for it a
secondary school of six years. He argued that the elementary
school of four years was too short and sent the children to face
life too early. The second issue was the problem of the education
of the nomadic population, a considerable proportion of the
inhabitants of the country, estimated at a million and a half in
various stages of nomadism out of a total population of about
ten and a half millions at the time. The third issue was education
in the Southern Provinces and here he emphasised the problems of
1. Akrawi, Interim Report, p. 3«
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national unity and the propagation of Arabic as the national
language. Besides these he emphasised religious and physical
education as a means to the formation of character. He made it
clear though, that these were his own opinions and were meant in
no way to tie the Committee's hands.1
These opinions were, however, comfortably accommodated in
the thirteen principles which Akrawi's Committee formulated as the
"Aims of Education in the Sudan. n<t These aims were summarised as
"(1) To transmit the national and human heritage to the new
generation in a spirit of continuous revision and in such a way
as to make it thought-provoking and produce a thinking citizen
with an open mind and a scientific outlook.
(2) To produce a patriotic Sudanese citizen conscious of the Unity
of his nation, knowing his rights and duties, democratic and co¬
operative in outlook and imbued with the spirit of international
understanding and co-operation.
(3) To help children grow, to develop their abilities, aptitudes
and interests to the full and in such a way as to produce emotionally
stable and happy individuals who can fit easily into society.
(4) To inculcate sound moral character.
(5) To imbue children with a deep religious and spiritual outlook,
to teach them the tenets of their religion, and the ideals of
religious tolerance.
1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. Akrawl Report, Gh. 1, pp. 7-28.
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(6) To help all children acquire sufficient mastery of the
national language, Arabic, and as advanced a level of expression,
understanding and appreciation in it as their level of schooling
permits.
(7) To impart the basic mental skills and the basic knowledge
necessary for living.
(8) To develop the manual skills of children, break down any
prejudices against manual work and as far as possible make of
them productive persons able to earn their living and contribute
to the economic development of the country.
(9)(a) To produce healthy and physically strong citizens.
(b) To develop the spirit of sportsmanship and a sound character
through games and sports.
(10) To develop the hobbies and interests of children so that they
can make healthy use of their leisure time and have sound ways of
recreation.
(11) To prepare the children for second family life.
(12) To encourage creative self-expression in children and
individual a.
(13) To develop in children qualities of initiative, leadership and
responsibility."
These aims and their salifications, were accepted by
2
Dr. Kadhlm who cane a year later as an assessor for Akrawi
Committee*s report, and they were also crudely incorporated in the
!• Akrawi Report, pp. 145-11^.
2. Kadhim Report, p. 32.
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four principlea of the Ministry of Education's "A new plan for
Education in the Sudan 1962". In fact most of the latter plan
could be considered as a crude restatement of the laaasA finer
report of the Akrawi Ni Committee.
The most important contribution of the Akrawi Committee's
2
report was its proposition of a new educational ladder. This was
preceded by an analysis of the existing school system where they
found out that at the time of the report only about 35 P©** cent
of the boys and 20 per cent of the girls finishing the four-year
elementary schools would have access to any higher schooling tnat
year. Also about 34. per cent of the boys and 33*5 per cent of
the girls finishing the intermediate schools would have access to
secondary schools or other equivalent education at the time.
They also found that about one fourth of the students sitting for
the School Certificate Examination succeeded in getting to the
University of Khartoum in the preceding year, a further small
number got into the Khartoum Technical Institute and most of the
remainder went to work. So they concluded that of every 100 boys
finishing the elementary school, 22 would get into the public
intermediate schools, 10 would reach the secondary schools and 2
would succeed in entering the University. Of every hundred
girls finishing the elementary school 12 would enter the public
intermediate schools, 4 would enter the secondary or similar schools
1. A New Plan for Education in The Sudan, 1962, pp. J4-6.
2. Akrawi Keport, Ch.II, pp. 3O-6I.
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and less than one per oent would get into the University.1" Need¬
less to say this was a static picture of the position at the time
of the report which was submitted in June 1959.
Three criteria were used in the Akrawi Gomnittee's
report to evaluate the sub-grade and elementary schools:
"(a) Can they serve as a basis for universal education?
(b) Do they provide a sufficient standard of education to produce
a literate citizen ready to face life and do his duty as a
citizen?
(c) Is age eleven at which the child leaves the elementary school
the right age to judge whether he deserves to continue his
p
education or not?"
It was found that the total number of children enrolled
in Southern village and Northern sub-grade schools of two or
three years was 10?, I4.6O (23,7Qk girls) in 1958-59. This repre¬
sented forty per cent of the enrolment in the fir3t stage of
education. A substantial proportion of these might drop out
after the first or second years thus receiving only one or two
years of education. At the time less than 20,000 children were
enrolled in the third year of sub-grade. The Committee concluded
that the sub-grade school appeared to be an inefficient school.
As it was taught largely by unqualified teachers and the period of
education in it was very short, there was a serious question of
!• Ibid., pp. Ih5-147
2. Xbid., pp. 3o-37.
320
its usefulness. Its only merit was in preparing the small
fraction of children who succeeded in transferring to an elementary
school. Kadhim in his report endorsed the Akrawi report's
criticism of the sub-grade school which was predominant in the
rural areas of the country. With local governments and rural
councils which were elected bodies in charge of the first stage of
education and more cries from rural areas to have just as good
schools as the urban areas the movement towards the upgrading of
the sub-grade schools culminated in the Sudan Government, Unicef
and Unesco agreeing on a project for in-service training courses
during the 196]+, '65 and *66 summer vacations as a first phase
of upgrading, with a second phase to be organised in 1967# *68
and '69.^ This would end in the upgrading of the teachers and
the schools to elementary school level.
By contrast, the elementary school was considered by
the Akrawi Committee to be a much more efficient school,k It
held "all" its children for the full four years course and on
the whole succeeded in attaining a good standard of education
corresponding to the age of the children. However, they regarded
its period of study as too short and the pupils were too immature
and childish to permit it to do more than lay a foundation and
provide a skeleton. It did not permit it to provide sufficient
1. AkrawiReport, pp. 37-38*
2. Kadhim Report, p. 32.
3- United ilations, Plan of Operations for a Project of Assistance to
Elementary Teacher Training in Sudan, pp. 1-9.
4* Akrawi Report, pp. 39-ij.7*
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content to produce good and productive citizens ready to face life.
Moreover they regarded the age of eleven as too early for deciding
on the basis of teats which of the children deserved to go to the
next stage of education and which did not. Such an early selection
might deprive too many meritorious children of the chance of a
further school education.^
The criticism of the length of the elementary period
2
was not written in Akrawi's Interim report to Unesoo; he was
more concerned about another striking feature which raised a big
problem and that was the very large provision of boarding
facilities in the elementary schools and some of the sub-grade
schools. He found that one quarter of the children enrolled in
elementary schools in the district of Wadi Haifa were boarders.
Their ages were usually between 7 and 11. Quite apart from the
harmful social, psychological and educational effects of such a
procedure as regards children of such a tender age, the system,
he thought, was quite expensive. The estimated cost of building
some village elementary boarding schools for 160 boys could go
up to £328,000 (eighty-four thousand dollars). This was
exclusive of the running expenses of the boarding departments
which seemed to average about £S25 (seventy dollars) a year per
child. He described this as prohibitive from the standpoint of
the Sudanese economy and if persisted in it would make the
application of free and compulsory education very remote.
1' IMS., pp. H4.8-9.
2. Akrawl, Interim Report, p. 6.
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The policy that had led to this was that no new
elementary school class was opened unless 30 children were
available. Since few villages were large enough to supply 50
boys of the same group, the remainder was brought as boarding
students from other villages in the district. So the Committee
was "actively studying" with two or three education officers a
possible redistribution of the schools and the children in their
districts according to the principal of one and two teacher
1 -
schools. Incidentally this principal which Akrawi and his
Committee were "actively studying" was the basis on which the
Khalwa had operated for centuries in the Sudan and which people were
still,using to provide education for their children, especially the
rural and nomadic sections of the population. This Akrawi and
his Coimaittee never considered for a moment in all their report
as a possible solution for the education of the nomads. An
exciting experiment in the education of the nomads* children through
a one-teacher mobile school was run in the early thirties amongst
the Kabablsh, and admirably described by that teacher himself,
Hasan Najila in his memoirs. This was also not considered
when the Akrawi Committee reported on the education of the nomadic
children.-^ Co-education in the elementary stage should also have
been considered as a possible solution as in rural life, unlike in
the towns, boys and girls are close relatives and play together.
1. Ibid., p. 7.
2. Hasan Najlla ZlkrayatI fi 1-badiya.
3* Akrawi Report, pp. 126-129.
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When discussing the problem of the nomadic children
the Akrawi Committee stated from the outset that the real and
ultimate solution of the education of the children of the nomads
was the solution of the problem of nomadic life itself, by-
solving the two problems of water and grazing in such a way as to
make them settle in permanent dwelling places.3" In the meantime
the Committee suggested three methods which could be experimented
with in the education of those children.
"1. In those tribes which spent a substantial part of the year in
one place, about seven or eight months, schools should be opened
in the localities where there was a congregation of the largest
number of the people. This they recommended should be done with
an eye on smaller congregations being within a walking distance of
two or three miles from the larger one in which the school would
be located. In case the sendentary life was seven months or
shorter the Committee recommended that it might be possible to
erect a temporary shed for the school In the summer quarters of
the tribe.
2. For the children of full nomads, the Committee thought that the
use of boarding schools seemed to be inevitable. However it was
amongst the Xabablsh whom the Committee classified as full nomads
that Hajlla had his mobile school for four years in the early thirties.-^
1. Seminar on Community Development in The Sudan, Hajal 1at Tanmiyat
al-mujtama', Vol. X, Nos. 2 and 3, Cairo, 1963# PP- 121-154-.
2. Akrawi Report, p. 126.
3. Na,ilia, pp. 2314.-235.
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3. The third recommendation was the addition of vocational
classes in cattle raising or mixed farming to some of the schools
of the nomads in order to introduce modern methods and new ways
j
of economic support.
Kadhlm was in agreement with these proposals for the education of
the nomads but he did not agree with Akrawi Committee's proposals
on the new educational ladder or with all that they said about
2
the elementary, the intermediate and the secondary schools.
The intermediate school was described by the Akrawi
Committee's report as seeming to have no purpose of its own other
•j
than being preparatory to the secondary school.It was
criticised as giving a largely academic kind of education which was
dominated by the study of languages, English and Arabic, while
giving little or no place to science, the arts or any practical
work and consequently it did not prepare the majority of its
students who would not go to the secondary schools for a career
in life. The secondary school was likewise described as largely
preparatory to higher education and was therefore academic and
because it taught in a foreign tongue its students seemed to lose
a good deal of time on trying to understand the language rather
than the content of education. The?/ regarded the standard it
attained as good but not sufficient to prepare the students for
their University work and thus forcing the University to have a
1. Akrawi Report, p. 139.
2. Kadhim, p. 32.
3. Akrawi Report, pp. 47-46# P» 149.
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special preparatory class. It reported a feeling that teaching
in Arabic would make for greater progress in their studies by the
students with the possibility of economising one year. At the
aame time it might free the teachers of English of any danger
that some of their work might be undone by other teachers teaching
the school subjects in their imperfect English. Like the
intermediate school it was described as failing to prepare for
life the majority of its students who would not proceed to any
higher education.*
Following their analysis of the elementary, the inter¬
mediate and the secondary schools the Akrswl Committee was pointing
the way towards a new educational ladder. The new suggested
ladder was to be preceded in special cases in the beginning by
a Kindergarten of two years covering age3 six and seven to be
2
opened in very limited numbers. The ladder itself was to
consist of a primary school of six years covering the period from
the end of the seventh year to the end of the thirteenth year of
age. A practical bias was recommended for education at this
school and as far as possible activity methods were to be used
in order to prepare the children for life.^ The next stage of
the ladder was to be a secondary school for six years to follow
the primary school. This was to be divided into two stages;
a general secondary school and a higher secondary school each of
1. Ibid., pp. 14.8-50, p. lij.9.
2. Ibid., p. 51.




three years. Each school was to he one of the two types, one
1
predominantly aoaderaic and the other predominantly vocational.
A year later Kadhlra, the Unesco expert of educational planning in
his report of "Acoount, Appraisal and Implementationn on the
2
Akrawi report had some valuable criticism to make. Kadhim showed
that in various countries various kinds of eduoational ladders
were to be found, and that success in life was not, so it seemed,
dependent on this or that kind of ladder. The length of schooling
below University level, the co-ordination of educational action,
the kind of teacher, text-books and ourricula, were the real
factors involved.*^ Kadhim also pointed to another factor which
probably had influenced the Akrawi Committee in recommending that
ladder and this was the fact that in a number of Arab countries,
such as the United Arabic Republic and Iraq the suggested
educational ladder was in use. Kadhim himself was from Iraq
and had been in the Ministry of Education there for some time.
Other Arab countries seemed to be moving in that same direction
as the Arab League, through its cultural Committee, was trying to
have uniformity in the duration of schooling below University
level as well as in content, in examinations and in the
educational ladder.44"
rhid., pp. 51p-60,
2. Kadhim Report, September, I960, pp. III-VXI.
3. Ibid., p. 33*
1+. Ibid., pp. 34"35*
327
Though Kadim thought that uniformity was not without
its merits yet he also forewarned that the existing ladder of
education should not be dismissed so lightly as changing from one
ladder to another would involve difficulties. While agreeing
with the Akrawi report that education in the elementary school
ceased too early and that there ware a number of weaknesses in
the existing syllabus, yet he was of the opinion that a worthwhile
educational superstructure could be built over it. He thought
there was some exaggeration and generalisation in the Akrawi report
about the elementary school child and was more inclined towards
the upgrading of the sub-grade school to elementary than of the
latter to primary."1"
On the Akrawi report view that the intermediate and the
secondary schools had no purpose of their own except preparation,
Kadhim thought that this again was a resort to exaggeration. He
said he was not unaware of the weakness in those schools.
Excluding English and mathematics, he thought there was much
repetition in the syllabuses of these schools and there was not
the desired co-ordination, especially in history and geography.
Though he agreed that there was much to be done to improve
conditions in the three stages, they were not as bad as the Akrawi
report seemed to suggest. The intermediate school prepared for
the secondary and the latter for the University. This was true
but was not that one of their functions? In fact each of them did
more than mere preparation. The first fed the Elementary Teachers
nadhlm, pp.8^,-87•
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Training Colleges while the second fed the government offices,
the array, the police and the teaching profession. The other
graduates went out "to meet life". The weakness of these schools
as Kadhita saw it, was not due to the fact they were organised cm
the i4.-ij.-lj. pattern. It was rather due to other factors, notably
the prevalence of theoretical studies and untrained teachers.
In the case of the secondary school, the fact that Instruction was
in a foreign language, Sadhiia thought, had added another source of
weakness.3.
On analysis of expenditure on education In Kadhira's
report It was found out that two thirds of the total cost of school
2
buildings went on boarding accommodation. Furthermore, that
boarding expenditure on education amounted to 19*5 par cent of
total expenditure on education. School building itself was a
major problem as about 1+0 per cent of the estimated coat of the
five year plan was on school buildings and teachers1 houses.*^ So
unless boarding accommodation for pupils was to be kept to a bare
minimum and buildings were to be constructed according to modest
patterns to bring down the cost considerably, expansion in
education would be seriously hampered. This aspect had been dealt
with by another Uhesco expert L.B.H. Creraer.^
1. _Ibld», p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 112.
3. Ibid., p. 115.
i+. L.B.H. Creraer, Report an. Low post School Building, 1558,
Sept. 1959. Khartoum, 1959.
329
The other point raised by Xadhira, while basically
related to technical curriculum questions had scene bearing on
economy in expenditure. In the Intermediate and secondary schools
the number of periods per week, as Kadhim noted, was large. In
the intermediate it ranged from 3b to I4.0, in the secondary it
was i|2. Comparing this number of weekly periods with practices
elsewhere it was found to be larger than the average. Besides,
either seven or eight periods in one morning would not be without
its negative influence on students. So Kadhim suggested that
economy could be achieved through the reduction of the number of
weekly periods and this would effect a saving on staff and
accommodation. The third point related to the use of school
buildings, as the general practice was, and still is, to have
instruction in the morning, a number of school buildings could
easily be used by two schools." These points were later on taken
up and expanded upon in the report of the Uhesco Investment
Programming Mission in 1963.
For the achievement of universal education Kadhim
presented two schemes, one over 20 years in case the authorities
decided to keep the existing system sand the other 25 years on the
assumption that it was decided to keep the system but gradually
achieve six years of universal education. The main difference
between his scheme and that of Akrawi as regards this point was
over girls1 education. While Akrawi considered that girls*
1. Kadhim, p. 113.
2. Unesco, Education Investment Programming Miss Ion,Sudan, Jan-
Feb. 1963.
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education was lagging behind and so would need 35 yeans,1 Xadhira
thought that 3° years would be enough to achieve universal
2
education for girls. With more African countries gaining their
independence these problems came to be discussed in a special
conference in Addis Ababa which recommended that education at the
first level be considered to cover broadly six years.^
Addis Ababa and African Affiliations
As the Sudan was coming to be more and more involved on
the African as well as on the Arab planes, it looked as though the
Akrawi report was going to be implemented in one form or another.
In the Paris meeting of Ministers of Education of African countries
participating in the implementation of the Addis Ababa plan, a
summary was given of projects foreseen for the 1961/62 end 1962/63
budget years. In that summary it was reported on the Sudan that
"the major part of the budget is allotted to the upgrading of
Junior and elementary schools to full primary schools offering a
six-year course of education.This was in accordance with the
Addis Ababa Unesco Conferences1 recommendations for education in
Africa.
A Mew Plan Defeated
Further amplification to the summary of the proceedings of
the African Ministers of Education in Paris was given in the Ten Year
1. Akrawi Report, p. 158*
2. Kadhira, pp. 111+-115*
3. Unesco, Addis Ababa Conference 15-25 May, 1961, Final Heport,
p. 1+9. ' " —
i+. Unesco, Final Heport 26-33 March 1962, Unesco douse, p. 128.
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Plan for the whole country which was presented a few weeks later
by the Minister of Economics and Finance. The Ten Year Plan
section on education stated that "the proposed investment of
£332,896,110 is related to the Introduction of the new educational
policy in the Sudan. This educational re-organisation will
raise our academic and technical standards to those enjoyed in
most advanced countries, without sacrificing the conventional
and traditional qualities of our country. The new educational
ladder will oonaist of three stages ..."^ These were explained
further by the Ministry of Education in "A New Plan for Education
in the Sudan" which was issued shortly after the Tec Year Plan
had been presented.
The "New Plan" borrowed freely from the Akrawi report,
which together with Kadhim's had not been published, and copies
of either were not to be found in the Ministry by 1965 even for
the use of a new Minister. The new plan stipulated that the
existing educational ladder should be abolished and replaced by
a new one consisting of three stages; a primary school of six
1. The Ten-Year Plan, pp. lij.6-147.
2. A New Plan for Education in The Sudan, 1962.
3. Letters were sent to Unesco in Paris and seen by the author
asking for the supply of copies though both reports were
typed in Khartoum. Since then an Educational Documentation
Centre has been established in the Ministry of Education.
The author is grateful to Unesco Research Centre in Paris
for supplying him with original typescripts of both reports
and for allowing him to freely consult their other documents.
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years followed first by a general secondary stage of four years
and then by a senior secondary of four years also.'1' Akrawi
2
proposed three years for each of the two secondary stages. The
senior secondary stage according to the new plan would fall into
two stages, the Secondary School Certificate Ordinary Level stage
and the Advanced Level stage, for those who successfully completed
the Ordinary Level stage. The Advanced Level stage was to conform
to the praotised (sixth form) stage of the Grammar Schools of the
United Kingdom. The projected senior secondary school was to
occupy the buildings of the existing secondary schools.
Thus the period of school education would be thirteen or
fourteen years, starting at the age of six, with technical general
secondary leading to senior technical secondary and higher
technical education, and vocational academic general secondary
leading to senior agricultural, senior commercial, senior primary
O
teachers' training send senior academic secondary. The last year
of the senior secondary school was to be given to the higher
studies leading to the Senior Secondary School Certificate,
Advanced Level. When experience revealed the possibility of re¬
shaping the syllabuses of the last phase of the general secondary
school and the first two years of the senior secondary school
in such a way that it would be feasible for the senior secondary
school pupils to take the Ordinary Level examination at the end
A New Plan, pp. 6-7.
2. Akrawi Report, p. 150.
3* A New Plan, The New Educational Ladder.
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of their second year in the senior secondary school, then the
last two years of that stage would be devoted to higher studies
leading to the Advanced Level Certificate and further to the
Intermediate, after the *sixth form' style in the Grammar Schools
of the United Kingdom. This, the new plan concluded, would result
in considerable savings in state expenditure on the preparatory
stages of University and higher education.1
However, it was at the University of Khartoum that the
new plan met its end. The plan proposed changes in the secondary
school structure that would affect the preliminary year in the
University of Khartoum where post-Ordinary Level work was done
and it also proposed further future changes up to the Intermediate
Level. The University had not been consulted about the plan when
it was being formulated and felt completely and deliberately
ignored and perhaps undermined as well. The plan came under
severe criticism from the University and in a ministerial re¬
shuffle the Minister of Education was removed to the Ministry of
Works in November 1962 after being Minister of Education since 1936
under both democratic and military governments.
In a few weeks* time his successor, Major General Tala'at
Parld, the second man in the military regime, had the chance of
attending the Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of
the Sudan in the University of Khartoum. The Conference had been
2
arranged under the broad title "Education in the Sudan" but the
1. A New Plan, p. 7»
2. Philosophical Society of the Sudan, Education in The Sudan,
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Conference IQth-llth
January 1963» Khartoum, 1963.
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paper on the "New Plan"'*' stimulated more keen discussion than
any of the rest of the contributions. The new plan was
criticised on the starting age of six years as too early for
Sudanese children, it was criticised on the fourteen years of
schooling instead of twelve years, on the lack of reference to
what medium of instruction would be used in the secondary schools
and on the absence of representation of the University on the
suggested boards of the Ministry of Education as well as on the
formulation of the plan which if implemented would necessitate
major changes in the structure of the university.
The plan remained undefended in that Conference against
the criticism arrayed against it and from that time the net*
Minister concentrated on the more urgent task of expansion on
the existing ladder.4* His main concerns were the expansion of
secondary education*4 and the continuation of the policy which
had been government principle since Independence, that fees should
not stand as an obstacle in the face of an intellectually able child
who managed to pass his examinations and so got within the number
5
admitted to the higher stage in the government schools. This
led to difficulties in the collection of fees by the headmasters
in the secondary and intermediate schools. The headmaster of an
1. Ibrahim Nour, "Educational Planning in The Sudan", pp.6-18, ibid.
2. Discussion, Ibid, pp. 19-21.
3. S.G. Ministry of Education, Educational Progress in Sudan,
1963/64, p. 4.
4. S.G. Ministry of Education, al-mu'allmun fi thawrat a-t-ta 'lira,
Khartoum, 1963*
3- S.G. Ministry of Education Annual Report. 1956-57, pp.25-26.
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intermediate school wrote a letter to the Minister suggesting
the abolition of fees in the intermediate schools; instead the
pupils would be.asked to buy their school books and equipment
the cost of which was calculated to be almost equal to the
amount of the fees collected* at least in that headmaster's own
school. By 1965 intermediate education became free and so fees
came to be charged, if at all, only in the secondary schools and
2
the university where the guardian's financial ability would be
taken in consideration.
The withdrawal of the "New Plan" had been made public to
the "International Conference on Public Education" in Geneva In
a report by the Ministry of Education in July, 19614.* which stated
"There has been no modification In the structure of the levels of
education. Indeed the trend now is not to introduce such reforms
until after the junior elementary schools normally referred to as
"sub-grade" schools or village schools have been brought to the
level of the ij.-year elementary school."^ This was being done
through the scheme of in-service-training with the assistance of
Unlcef and Uhesco.^ The year 1963/1964 was described as having
witnessed the greatest expansion in the history of education till
that time. At all levels 390 new educational units were opened.
Much of the attention and efforts of the Ministry were devoted to
1. S.G. Ministry of Education, al-mu 'alimun fi thawrat a-t-ta'lim,
letter by Mubarak Hasan Azrsq.
2. S.G. Ministry of Education, Educational Progress in Sudan 1964/
6j>» p. 3- ~ ™ ~ ~—
3. S.G. Ministry of Education, Educational Progress in Sudan 1963/
6I4* P • 6 •
I4., Ibid.
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solving the practical problems of accommodation, supplies and
recruitment to meet the requirements of expansion. Under such
circumstances the question of reforms of syllabus and curricula
failed to get adequate attention and therefore no important
changes were recorded in this field apart from ephemeral
experimentation on the two shifts school system.1 This was brought
/
about by the pressure of the shortage of accommodation and
furniture, despite enthusiastic response in many areas by the local
population in providing temporary premises for whole schools and
in offering free housing for teachers and even contributing the
2
building of full schools.
Within two years the number of boys* Government secondary
school classes rose from 186 streams with a total number of 6,837
pupils in the year 1962/63 to a number of 277 secondary classes
with an attendance of 10,14.90 boys. For girls the number rose from
II4 secondary classes with an attendance of 1,170 girls to 62
classes with an attendance of 2,360 girls. This provided the
chance for 62% of the intermediate schools boys and 73$ of the
intermediate schools girls to get places in the Government secondary
schools that year, an increase of 101$ in secondary provision for
girls. There was also an increase of 53$ in the total provision
of education for boys. The increases were all at academic
secondary schools; the ten streams of technical secondary education
did not increase^ but the Department of Labour had already started
1. Al-'ard ar-ribi* 1965-1966, Beirut, 1966, p. 21.
2. S.G. Ministry of Education, Educational Progress 1963/6i4, p. 7.
3* Ibid., p. 14.
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vocational training courses for furnier intermediate schoolboys
while other Government departments and the new industries
continued the training of their own artisans. A major
accompaniment of the expansion in the secondary schools was an
acute shortage of secondary school teachers despite the recruit¬
ment of expatriate staff. This shortage was particularly felt
in the fields of English for the senior classes and in mathematics
and science."1"
This race for expansion was going on to meet the targets
2
of the Ten Year Plan and to avert the ominous prophesies by the
man who after conducting the first population census in 1955/1956
indicated that the Sudan could easily find itself going backwards
if provision of education did not exceed the increase in population.^
It was also going on to meet the quantitative provisions suggested
for the African countries in the Addis Ababa Plan.<+ Vliile all
this was happening, with the increasing pressures and demands on
the Ministry of Education from the people inside the country,
another important event took place outside the country.
That event was the second conference of the Arab Ministers
of Education which was held in Baghdad in February 196Ij.. The
1. Ibid. , p. 7.
2. JKrotki, First Population Census of the Sudmi, 1955/56, 21 Facts
about the Sudanese, Salzburg, Austria, 1958, pp. 27-32.. Published
by Sudan Government, Ministry of Social Affairs. Above pp.308-310.
3» U.N. Population Growth and Manpower in The Sudan, Nev; York, I96I4..
4. UNESCO, Final Report of Conference of African States on the
Development of Education in Africa, Addla Ababa, 15-25 Hay *1961,
UNESCOAdA81. Taria, 1961.
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conference was held in a period of detente among the Arab govern¬
ments after the "summit" of Arab Kings and Presidents in Cairo.
The Ministers of Education conference discussed and approved a
"Charter of Arab Cultural Unity" and a constitution of an "Arab
Scientific, Educational and Cultural Organisation", a miniature
Uhesco affiliated to the international Unesco through the Arab
League. The council of the Arab League on 21st of May 1964
endorsed the decisions of the Ministers of Education.*
Arab Cultural Unity
The Charter of Arab Cultural Unity and the recommendations
of the Ministers aimed at both cultural unity and uniformity of
organisation. An educational ladder of 6 years of primary
followed by two stages of three years each and similar organisation
2
patterns for the Ministries of Education, were all recommended.
Chief among the principles of the charter was the use of Arabic as
the language of instruction, studies, and research in all the
stages of education, and at least in the primary and the secondary
stages. But at the same time the Arab states were to make
endeavours towards the strengthening of their students in the
modem literary, scientific and technological cultures and to
provide the students with the linguistic facilities that would
enable them to comprehend these cultures.
1. League^of Arab States, ^ararat al-mu*tamar a-th-thanl li wuzara'
al-rna'arif wa-t-tarbiya wa-t-ta 'lira, Cairo, 19&4»
2« Ibid., pp. 37-43.
3« ibid., PP. 11-17.
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The question of Arabicizatlon was a recurrent then© in
the history of education in the Sudan, expressed in various ways
and with different degrees and places of emphasis in the Graduates
Congress memorandum of 1939* in the report of the Internetional
Commission of 1955* in the Akravi and Kadhim reports, in the "new
plan" and in the eleventh conference of the Philosophical Society
as well as in the popular press and the more specialised journals.1
However the overthrow of the military regime towards the end of
October that year, 1964* brought about, amongst many other thin s,
the long advocated reform of the use of Arabic as a language of
Instruction in the secondary schools.
The October Revolution 19614..
Opposition to the military regime throughout the six years
of its lifetime was widespread amongst the students in the
secondary schools and in the higher institutes. The centre of the
opposition was the students of the University of Khartoum, who
gathered a growing sympathy towards them from the graduates, the
educated Sudanese and the general public as years went by and
the failures of the regime became more manifest. The expansion
which had taken place in education since Independence and the
consequent increase in the number of those who joined the Civil
2
Service in various professions," played a significant role in the
overthrow of the military regime. An average of a 25 per cent
per annum increase in classified officials, (from 9*549 in 1957
1. Nesr El Hag Ali, "Educational Problems in The Sudan", SNH,
Vol. XL.I, I960, pp. 68-73.
2. S.G. Taqrlr Lajnat Tanzim al-khldma-al-madadanlyya, Vol, I,
Part I, Khartoum, May 1967, p. 56.
3^0
33,800 in 196?)^ meant that the vast majority of the members
of this most important section in the running of the affairs of
the government belonged, to the generation who were used to
participating in the school strikes that came to be epidemic
after 1914-6.
The overthrow of the military regime and the restoration
of democratic government to the country were the main aims of the
students* movement. This made them in those days ready allies
for the banned political parties, especially the major ones,
Azharl's National Unionist Party and the Umraa Party. The latter
two did not have a large following amongst the students as had the
communists and the Moslem Brotherhood. The students, and
particularly their more militant leaders, belonged to either the
Islamic movement or the communists and left wing groups of
socialists or Arab nationalists. These were the ideological
groups that had started to infiltrate student life since the late
forties and by the early fifties came to dominate the scene of the
students* politics and to some extent that of the graduates. The
rivalries between the ideological groups, and schisms within them,
led to more cross-fertilization of ideas; the Islamic movement
came to adopt the more effective communist techniques of
organisation such as competition for the leadership of the students*
?
unions and later an of the trade unions, and the communists came
1. John B. Seal, Jr., High-Level Manpower Requirements and Resources
1968-1972, Khartoum, May, 1967, Preface. This report was with-
drawn from circulation after it had been criticised by a panel of
economists from the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences. The
criticism mainly concerning the predictions made in the report.
See Memorandum dated 28th August 1967, Sgd. Sayed Ahmed et al.
2. Mlthaq al-Hizb al-Ishtirakl al-Islaml, Khartoum, 1966.
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to adopt some Islamic slogans which would appeal to the public
at large and defend them against accusations of atheism in a
strongly Moslem society. For instance, they advocated respect
for Arabic and Islamic culture as a main basis of the national
heritage and described Islam as "A strength for the working masses
in their struggle for dignity, national liberty arid socialism.1,1
2
This was despite the orthodox Marxist attitude towards religion
as "the opium of the people."-^ A further synthesis was the
adoption by the major political parties in the country of the
slogans of socialism and Islam and an Islamic constitution which
are the basis of the ideological parties.
In 1961+ the opposition to the repressive measures of the
army in the South was the rallying point for all the student groups
in the University of Khartoum and a direct issue for confrontation
with the military government.^" When the government tried to
intervene and ban a student meeting to discuss the problem of the
South, the students clashed with the police who fired on them,
killed one and wounded many. This took place on Thursday night,
the 22nd of October. The following day, Friday, thousands of
people gathered in a main square in Khartoum for the funeral of
1. Dustur al-Hizb ash-Shjyu'X as-Sudani, Khartoum, 1967# P» 10,
p. 16, pp. "1^-20.
L A
2. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, The Communist Manifesto, Pelican
edition, p. 82, p. 92. SamC translation oif text as in the
edition of Moscow, 196?« Both reproductions of translation
made by Samuel Moore in 1888.
3. Karl Marx, "Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Rights
Introduction" published in Karl Marx and F. Engels On Religion
Moscow, 1935# P* ii-2.
Henderson, Sudan Republic, pp. 203-230.
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the shot student and demonstrations followed. The Sudanese
members of the staff of the University of Khartoum in a general
staff meeting decided to resign and not to resume work as long
as the military rule remained in the country. Soon professional
organisations followed their lead and a general strike was
declared all over the country. The workers and farmers organi¬
sations joined in and the country was brought to a standstill.
The young officers in the army declared their sympathy with the
students and the other professional organisations.
Soon the Supreme Military Council and the cabinet were
declared dissolved by their President and marathon negotiations
with representatives of the professional groups and the political
parties ended at the end of the week in the formation of a care¬
taker government whose duty was the restoration of democratic
government by the country by holding a general election within six
months. The new government was headed by Sir al Khatim al Khalifa
who after being in the South for about nine years as Inspector of
Arabic and Assistant Director of Education for the Southern
Provinces, came to be the Principal of the Khartoum Technical
Institute and the Deputy Under Secretary for the Ministry of
Education. In this Government the representation of the
professional groups outnumbered that of the traditional major
political parties, the Urania, the National Unionist, and the People's
Democratic Party. The latter represented the Khatmiyya following,
whose leadership had disagreed with Azharl during the transitional
period and immediately after Independence in 1956 formed their own
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party which, after overthrowing a national coalition government
headed by Azhari in 1956, ruled the country in coalition with
the Umma Party till 1958 when the army took over. The two Southern
parties, which emerged during the events of the October days, were
also represented by two Ministers on the new Government.
The ideological parties, the communists, and the Moslem
Brotherhood (The Islamic Charter) were, for the first time ever
in Sudan, represented by one Minister each on equal par with the
major political parties. When some of the representatives of the
professional groups in the cabinet were discovered to be communists
or communist supporters complaints soon developed amongst the
Islamic parties, the Umma and the National Unionist Parties. By
the end of February, 1965* a reshuffle was imposed under the same
Prime Minister. Professional representation was eliminated, the
South and each of the three major political parties were represented
by three ministers for each, while the communist party and the
Islamic Charter were represented by one each.
At Last Arabicization in the Secondary Schools
In March the Minister of Education Bedawl Mustafa, who
belonged to the People's Democratic Party, took office. The
Minister and his party were known for their Pan-Arablst leanings
and their pro-Egypt policies. Shortly after, in April, the
school year ended and the long vacation of three months started in
most schools. The country was in the hubbub of a civilians'
revolution that succeeded in overthrowing a military regime by
civil disobedience. The teacher's association was actively
working and preparing to advance the interests of its members
and to contest the general elections in the graduates* seats.
The whole country was preparing for the elections, the differences
being on the time they should be held. At this time the Government
took a decision on the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction
in the secondary schools. Many people claimed the credit for it.
The teacher*s association said they had already decided to start
teaching in Arabic in the secondary schools from the beginning of
the session. Whoever initiated the decision, whether it was the
Minister, his secretary or the teacher's association, the decision
found ready support and publicity.
For the implementation of the decision the Ministry as a
whole was caught unprepared. Till that time the only subjects
that had been taught in Arabic for the School Certificate were
Arabic, Islamic Religion, and History. The History paper was set
in both Arabic and English and candidates were asked to answer all
X
the paper in one of the two languages. To avert the possible
hazards of an overnight change in all the classes of the secondary
school, the Ministry decided to begin by using Arabic in the first
year for all the subjects and to continue the same process till
its completion in four years time in March 1969. On the use of
Arabic as a medium of instruction the Ministry of Education made
great use of the experiences of other Arab countries, particularly
1. S.G. Ministry of Education, Sudan School Certificate
Examination Papers, 1961965.
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the United Arab Republic aa Egypt had been teaching in Arabic
for many years.
Arabicization of the syllabuses in the secondary schools
was meant to solve some problems but it also created others. One
of the problems it was meant to solve, besides those indicated by
the 1955 International Commission on Secondary Education and the
subsequent reports, was the problem of the duality of education in
the North namely in regard to the Ma'had 'ilrals the numbers of
which at the secondary stage had increased after Independence when
a Department of Islamic Religious Affairs was created to look
after them. Between the years 1962/63 and 1963/64 they increased
from 66 secondary streams to 88 streams. Instruction in these
schools had always been in Arabic 3ince the first Ma 'had of
Omduriaan was atarted in 1901 in the different houses of the 'Ulams,
and it continued to be so in 1912 when the Ma'had took shape in
the Mosque of Omdurman and started to follow the system of al-Azhar.^
Despite various reforms in the Ma'had and the fact that it had
reached the level of higher education since 1924* yet its students
were unable to sit for the Sudan School Certificate as it was in
English.
Thus Arabicization enabled these increasing numbers of
students to ait for the School Certificate Examination and certain
modifications were made by the addition of more subjects in
Islamic studies and Arabic to compensate them for their deficiencies
1. lajallat la'had Omdurman, Khartoum 1963, pp. 31-38.
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in higher mathematics, physical sciences and English. The
creation of the Islamic University in the same year out of the
higher section of the Oradurman Ma 'had provided a further chance
of a university degree for this group of students. The Islamic
University was influenced by the al-Azhar Reform Bill of I960,"1"
as was the Ma'had since 1912. The Ma'had graduates were deprived
of government posts particularly during the period of the Condominium
rule. Their only chances were in teaching religion and Arabic
in other schools or Ma'hads or joining the Shari'a Courts, or
going to al-Azhar and later on to the Arabic department of the
Khartoum Branch of Cairo University. The creation of the Islamic
University and Arabicization could be considered in some respects
as a vindication of this long deprived group; but whether they
will solve the chronic problem of uneirrployment for this section
of society will depend on the alternative subjects provided.
Amongst the problems created by Arabicizat ion, at .least
in the initial stages, will be the disadvantage at which students
from the 3outhem Provinces will find themselves when and if they
are to take the same papers in Arabic. The standard of the
Southern students in Arabic until now is decidedly inferior to
that of their Northern colleagues. They have been saved until
now from this disadvantage by regional examinations in the pre-
secondary stages and by the special Arabic papers in the School
Certificate Examinations. This was considered to be a temporary
1. Mahmud Shaltut, "Risalat al-Azhar fi daw*I qanunihl al-jadld",
Magallatul-Azhar, Cairo, 1961, pp. 779-782.
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arrangement but It should continue until such time as it is
fair for Southern candidates to take the same examination as
the Northern candidate. The use of more sophisticated linguistic
techniques in the teaching of Arabic in places where Arabic is
not the mother tongue becomes more urgent as Arabicization
proceeds. The general notion that the spread of Arabic by
itself will solve the problem of national unity should be critically
viewed. Arabic can also be a unifying language for the South
against the North as other languages such as English or French
have been in other countries. Tolerance and understanding of the
growing regional aspirations in the South must not be forgotten
in the quest for a peaceful and equitable solution for the problem
of national unity.
The greatest problem created by Arabicization in the
secondary schools will be that which the University of Khartoum
will face in July 1969, when the first students who have had all
their secondary education in Arabic in the Sudanese secondary
schools will be admitted. Previously the University of Khartoum
used to accept every year a few students who had finished their
secondary education in the Egyptian secondary schools where all
subjects had been taught in Arabic. These students were accepted
on condition that they should pass a qualifying entrance
examination in English. English was, and still is, the language
of Instruction in the University of Khartoum in all faculties and
for all subjects except Arabic, Islamic Law (Shari'a) and some
courses in history. However students from Egyptian schools were
3i+S
exceptional cases and they were mostly restricted to the science
faculties. But in July 1969 the problem will be that of the
vast majority.
The University at The Gross-Roads
The University of Khartoum is not so far fully prepared
to solve this problem. To change into teaching in Arabic is not
easy even if the University wanted to. In spite of the
progressive increase in the number of Sudanese on the teaching
staff of the University since Independence, from 35^A in 1962
2
to in 1968, still, the rest are expatriates most of whom
can only teach in English, particularly in the science faculties
where at least of the students are normally admitted-' and
where secondment from other Arab countries would be difficult
because of their own needs. Many of the Sudanese will still need
to go abroad for further qualifications and their replacements
may be English speaking. Besides, there is the fact that most
of the Sudanese lecturers had their training in Inglish either
in Khartoum, or in British and American Universities, so a change
to the use of Arabic would require a certain degree of restraining
and some exchange of ideas with other Arab Universities such as
those in Egypt, Syria or Iraq, and this would mean that the
University of Khartoum may have to look more towards the Middle
East.
1. Dafh' Allah a-t~Ta 'lim a-j-jami'I fi s-Sudan, p. 13-
2. Letter from the Academic Secretary dated i+th June, 1968.
3. Unesco: Report of the Conference on the Development of Higher
Education in Africa, 1962, Paris, 1962, p. 9h-
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The University of Khartoum has another problem - that
of recognition and standards. It managed to get recognition
from British Universities through the system of external examiners
as the examinations are in English, though this was at the expense
of a high failure rate. A fear of losing this recognition by
changing to Arabic is creating a genuine problem fbr many
Sudanese on the University staff who are apprehensive of academic
isolation.
The use of English in the University had already created
problems even before Arabic came to be used in the secondary
schools, indicated by a high failure rate ranging from 16% to
i
26^ on the average in the Faculty of Economics, to 112 having
to sit supplementary subjects in the first year of the Faculty
p
of Arts out of a total of 239 candidates in 1967- A preliminary
research on the University students1 habits of study showed that
above 90^ of students in the University of Khartoum in 1964/65
were slow readers, while only 25*2$ of American university students
suffered from this problem.-^ "The slow reader in this case must
study about three times as much as the good reader to reach the
same standard."^ Remedial English language teaching could have
been a solution, as was suggested by Dr. Hamdani in 1965» but
1. March 1967 Examination results.
2. Maroh 1967 Examination results.
3. Dr. Muwaffak al-Hamdani, "A Research Project Conducted on
Students Habits of Study, 1964-1965"» University of Khartoum,
Khartoum, 1965.
4* Ibid., p. 7.
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after 1969 thla can only be done at the expense of the already
full timetables.
To meet the expected difficulties with English after
Arabicization in the secondary schools, a change in the methods
of teaching may be required, such as the use of Arabic in
explaining scene points during lectures which are normally given
in English, and for this probably Sudanese tutors and demonstrators
may be required for additional use, more than the normal practice
in class or laboratory work. Also the system of examination may
have to be altered. Instead of the prevalent essay type questions,
multiple choice papers may help to overcome the difficulties of
expression experienced by students whose proficiency in English
may not be adequate to enable them to write the correct answers
they may otherwise be able to give.
The University, Road Ahead
Arabicization, properly carried out and without
prejudice to the fostering of the abilities of the students to
consult foreign references, is, however, the more logical answer
for the University of Khartoum, if the present standard is to be
maintained or indeed enhanced without undue sacrifices through a
very high failure rate. The present annual return from abroad
of about thirty Sudanese scholars to join the teaching staff will
help the University to embark upon it in a few years time, if it
1. Letter dated I}.th June, 1968.
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plans ahead, despite the present rate of expansion in admission of
1
about a thousand students each year since 1966/7.
The Arabicization in the secondary schools will bring
increasing pressure on the University each year, as the pressure,
unlike at present, will grow from within. The students in
Sudan, and particularly at the University of Khartoum, have been
an important instrument of change and reform in the country as
x^ell as in the University at its various 3tages of development.
It is difficult to conceive them as being silent in the coming
few years on an issue such as this which will be directly affooting
them. So far the problem has been pushed under the carpet. It
cannot remain there for long. If it does, the students of the
University of Khartoum, and indeed those of the secondary schools
p
as well, may not have to look to the French students of 1968 for
anexample. Their more successful experience of 1961+ against the
military government will still be alive. To avert an impending
crisis, serious discussion, experiments, research and planning
are all urgently needed. Arabicization may not take place in
all faculties or all departments or even all courses within the
same department all at once^ parallel courses in English on the
same subject may also have to be run for some time.
A real challenge is facing the University of Khartoum and
a difficult choice. But reviewing the adaptability of this
1. "University of Khartoum accepted Students Classified According
to Sex and Faculties 1956/57 - 1966/67".
2. Patrick Seale and Maureen McConville, French Revolution, 1968,
Penguin Special.
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institution and its ability to digest and incorporate into its
modern systems the Sudanese cultural and educational heritage
which existed before Kitchener advocated the Gordon Memorial
College and reviewing its ability to remain at the apex of the
system of education since the early years of this century when
it was started under Currie, one is hopeful of the outcase.
For many years the students and graduates of this
institution and its ramifications managed to remain as the avante-
garde of their people and continued to be so, amidst different
challenges and crises, in the difficult days of "Native
Aimlnistration", in the years of the depression, in the intellectual
renaissance of the thirties, in the era of political struggle of
the forties and early fifties, in the critical period of taking
over the responsibilities from the colonial government during
the short transitional period towards independence, as well as
in the restoration of democracy. Reviewing all this, one would




Educational development in the Sudan since 1896 in all
its stages and at high or low ebbs has been closely associated
with the political development of the country. In this association
they had considerable influence on each other, to the extent that
at certain times it is difficult to say whether education was
politically determined or that political developments were
determined by the impact of education upon them. There is no need
to suppose that this process of interaction will not continue to be
so,particularly when the issues of national unity, economic and
educational development are becoming increasingly interdependent
resulting in an expanding system of education.
However, the developments, the reactions and the reforms
which have taken place so far have produced many educational
problems that open vast possibilities for educational research:
linguistic problems as in the South or at the University of Khartoum,
as well as in the secondary and the intermediate schools; economic
problems such as those of manpower needs and supply at various
levels; problems of organization such as the use of one-teacher
schools or co-education which may help to bridge the widening gap
between the urbanized and the leas urbanized regions of the country;
and the problem of fostering a national unity based on freedom,
respect and understanding.
Last but by no means least In the way of examples is the




participation by the people themselves in the building and main¬
taining of their own schools, participation by the teachers in
the discussion and formulation of educational policies and
solutions regarding their own problems and those of the system in
general, and participation by the pupils and students themselves
in determining the process by which they may become more humane,
knowledgeable and thinking human beings and in the running of
their own institutions and schools as well as in the literacy and
social campaigns outside the schools. These problems, though
they have their Sudanese origins and characteristics which in
the end will require Sudanese solutions, are not all peculiar
to the Sudan. Hany of them are problems common to other
developing countries of the world; others are problems of the
whole world; hence the contribution from each may help towards
the solution of all.
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